Operation Barbarossa – The Major Errors and Blunders

Intro

Well, this is basically a follow-up video on my second video that I originally wanted to release quite early on, well more than 50 videos, 800 000 views and 20 000 subscribers later, here we go. The major error and blunders of the Hitler and his generals during the planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa.

Hitler & His Generals

First off, some words about Hitler and his generals, Barbarossa was basically their baby, thus both of them were responsible, yet similar to some parents, they constantly blamed the other side for all the shortcomings of their little brat in the Russian steppe. I think, both of them had their fair share of bad decision, hence none of them is above scrutiny.#

Structure

Since, we have dealt with the initial family issues, time to get started, I structured this video into two parts, the first part covers all the planning and preparation errors, the second part deals with errors during the ongoing military operations.

Preparation and Planning

Now, a large amount of errors occurred during the preparation and planning of Barbarossa.

Military Intelligence – or lack thereof

First off, Military Intelligence. The German intelligence service for the Eastern Front “Fremde Heere Ost”, which means “Foreign Armies East” had major problems providing substantial insights about the Red Army and this was a well-known problem at the time.

In general, military intelligence faces two key challenges, first the gathering of information and second the analysis of this information. Due to the closed nature of the Soviet Union the means to gather information were severely inflicted, yet according to a recent phd thesis the German efforts in analysis were sometimes also limited. For instance from 1923 to 1933 the German Armed Forces and Red Army cooperated quite closely, thus many German officers were trained in the Soviet Union. [REFER to HOI 4 – national focus] Yet, there is no evidence that suggests that those officers were ever questioned systematically. (Pahl: Fremde Heere Ost: S. 68)

Ultimately the state of the intelligence was quite shocking, it was assumed that the Soviet Army had around 150 divisions, but only about 100 could be accounted for. (S. 75) In terms of reserves it was assumed that the Soviets would have enough manpower to raise another 50 divisions, but would lack the equipment to arm them properly, thus the total of 150 divisions was the assumption for German planning. (S. 69) Now according to the American Military Historian David Glantz, the Soviets raised more than 800 division equivalent. that is more than 16 times what the Germans assumed.
(around 821 division equivalents of those were 73 tank and 32 mechanized (Glantz: Soviet-German War – Myths and Realities: p. 17 ))

The lack of information was widely known, here is an excerpt of the handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces from January 1941, which was printed around 2000 times:
“At the top of the entire Armed Forces probably is the Chairman of the Defence Committee (about comparable to our OKW) the council of People’s Commissars, currently Marshal Voroshilov, who in 1940 was people’s commissar for defense until the summer. He probably has a general staff at his disposal. Details are unknown ”
“An der Spitze der gesamten Kriegswehrmacht steht wahrscheinlich der Vorsitzende des Verteidigungs-Komitees (etwa unserem OKW vergleichbar) beim Rate der Volkskommissare, z. Zt. Marschall Woroschilow, der bis zum Sommer 1940 Volkskommissar für die Verteidigung war. Ihm steht wahrscheinlich ein Wehrmachts-Generalstab zur Seite. Einzelheiten sind unbekannt.” (zitiert nach Pahl S. 77)
So basically, the German military intelligence didn’t even know the upper echelons of the Soviet Military Forces and completely underestimated the Soviets ability in raising and outfit new divisions. This lack of information was still a problem in 1942 for Case Blue, which ended in the disaster at Stalingrad. Even at that time of the war the German military intelligence also assumed that the Red Army was mostly beaten and had limited abilities to regenerate itself. (Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Strategische Grundlagen und historische Bedeutung”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 659)

Logistics

Now, the next one, probably everyone was expecting anyway, logistics. The main problem was that the German army had not a sufficient amount of trucks nor trains even before the beginning of Barbarossa. The main problem with a lack of transport capacity is that the existing vehicles are used more often and sometimes in ways they are not fully suited, this results in additional wear and tear, which ultimately puts further strain on the supply lines. Basically, any major shortcomings in a logistical system can develop into a death spiral.
There was already a lack of train engines and rail cars in Germany even before the attack on the Soviet Union was started, this was clearly noted by the chief for transportation in January 1941. Operation Barbarossa would thus make the situation even more problematic. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 116)
Another major problem was that the rail gauge in the Soviet Union was different to that in continental Europe, thus the reconstruction of all railways was necessary, even if they could be captured in operational conditions. Originally it was assumed that enough Russian rail engines and cars would be captured and a reconstruction wouldn’t have been necessary, but this clearly was not the case. Although the German High Command ordered its troops to advance along the Soviet railway lines they didn’t comply this allowed the Soviet forces to evacuate or destroy a large amount of equipment. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 126) As a result, there was both a lack of construction workers and trains. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 121-126)
In order to cope with the lack of trains, trucks were used, yet due to the dire conditions of the roads this lead to severe breakdowns. In the beginning of August 1941 the Army Group Center – Heeresgruppe Mitte had lost 25 % and the Heeresgruppe North (Army Group North) had lost 39 % of its supply truck capacity. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 127) Furthermore, you need to consider that the situation got even worse during the muddy season, when it was nearly impossible for even tracked vehicles to move properly. Additionally, the Soviets had established special local services to keep the railways in operational conditions during the Winter, such a service needed to be reestablished by the Germans.(Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 124)
In short the transport capabilities of German in both trains and trucks was insufficient and it was known prior to the conflict. There was not enough personnel to handle the rail transportations and there was a lack of construction crews to improve the state of the destroyed rail way infrastructure. At least the lack in crews could have been planned more properly without too much strain on the German industry or manpower.

Missing Grand Strategy – No Two Front War

Now, next is the missing Grand Strategy. One major difference between the Axis and Allied forces was the lack in cooperation and Grand Strategy. The Western Allied Forces, which had a far higher amount of resources, industry and manpower available settled on the Grand Strategy “Germany First”. Now the Axis forces, which had limited economic capabilities couldn’t agree on a grand strategy and usually not even on smaller agreements.

Let’s take a closer look, although in 1936 Germany and Empire of Japan signed, the anti-comintern pact, this pact was lacking and furthermore the German Historian Martin Bernd states:
“Lack of substance and great propaganda should be characteristic for all subsequent German-Japanese agreements.” .(Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.124)
“Mangelende Substanz und großartige Propaganda sollten für alle weiteren deutsch-japanischen Abmachungen charakteristisch werden.” (Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.124)

When looking at the Axis and the Soviet Union relations the situation was quite ironic. In 1939 the Germans were basically partially cooperating with the Soviet Union due to their cooperation against Poland, the large trade agreements and establishment of sphere of influences. Whereas the Japanese were engaged in serious border conflicts with the Soviet Union, most notably the Battles of Khalkhin Gol.

Those border conflicts went badly for the Japanese Army and after the defeats in 1939, the Japanese choose the so-called “South Strategy”, which was favored by the Japanese Navy. The Japanese discussed a German proposal for a military alliance against the Soviet Union several times and it was rejected again and again between January and August 1939. The Japanese Navy was against a military alliance against the Soviet Union and also against Western Forces. The Japanese didn’t want to commit to any alliance. As a result Germany and the Soviet Union established the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was seen as treachery by the Japanese and they recalled their ambassador. (Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.124-125)
After the successes of the German Army in Poland and the Battle of France, the Japanese tried to reestablish contacts with Germany. Yet, Hitler would have preferred a compromise with the British, only after the British declined all German proposals and the Battle of Britain was lost, the Germans reacted positively towards the Japanese.

Yet, the following negotiations didn’t establish a proper unified strategy, thus the military alliance was basically a weak defensive pact, which became even more apparent when in April 1941 signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. After the start of Barbarossa, only the German and Japanese ambassador wanted a Japanese attack immediately. Yet, both the German and Japanese leadership were against an involvement of the Japanese in the attack against the Soviet Union. (Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.125-129)

Missing on improving the anti-tank capabilities

Now, since we covered diplomatic aspect, let’s take a look at a more tactical matter. During Operation Barbarossa the German forces several times came in contact with tanks what were almost invincible to most of their weaponry, most notably these tanks were the T-34, the KV-1 and the KV-2. The German Army should have been better prepared for these encounters and they shouldn’t have come as surprises.

Although the Soviets didn’t use the T-34 during the Winter War against the Finns, they used prototypes of KV-1 and the similar heavy tank the SMK in the conflict. (Source: Zaloga, Steven J. : KV-1 & 2 Heavy Tanks 1939-1945,.p. 7) Thus, the German High Command should have been aware that the Russian might have quite strong tanks. Furthermore, German Panzer tropps themselves had severe problems destroying the French Char B-1 bis in the Battle of France several times, most notably at the Battle of Stonne, where one French Tank managed to destroy 13 German ones. Yet, despite the Finnish and German experience, there were no proper actions taken to prepare the German divisions to deal with heavy or well-armored tanks.

Only Planning for a Short Campaign – The Core Problem

Now, let’s take a look at the biggest blunders of all and also the one that was foundation for most of the others. Namely, the wrong assumption that Operation Barbarossa would be a short campaign like the Invasion of Poland and the Battle of France. It should be noted that Operation Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign, unlike the Battle of France.
The military planning was mostly done by the German general staff and Hitler gave them free reign. He reviewed the plans in December 1940 and agreed mostly, but he had a different view of the situation. He wanted to focus on the North and South to capture resources and deny the enemy its ability to regenerate forces. Whereas the head of the General Staff “Generaloberst Halder” wanted to achieve a decisive blow by attacking Moscow. There was a consent about the first part of the plan, which was the aimed destruction of the Red Army in the Western parts of the Soviet Union. Yet, both parties didn’t settle for how the second part should be executed. As a result up to this day people are still arguing about the decision of Hitler in Summer 1941 to push towards Kiew instead towards Moscow. A problem that was already apparent in December 1940. (Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 631)

Now, the assumption of a short campaign was rooted in the over-confidence of the German Army in its capabilities after the tremendous victory against its Arch-Enemy France in 1940, furthermore the underestimation of the Red Army and the stability of the Soviet Union. After all, many assumed that the Red Army would be beaten early on and the Soviet Union collapse. Most people in 1940 were thinking in World War 1 terms, when the Russian Empire collapsed and the French Army was one of the most formidable in the world. This view was not limited to Germans, many non-Axis politicians and military professionals also assumed that Barbarossa would be a quick victory for the German Army. Although the Germans assumed that the Red Army would break, they acknowledged the fierceness of the Russian soldiers even before the attack, yet the clearly underestimated the Soviet leadership, cohesion and capabilities to learn from their experience in the Winter War and early defeats during Barbarossa.

Not an error – War of Annihilation/Extermination – “Vernichtungskrieg”

Now, the next point is not an error in my opinion, but some people often note it as one. Operation Barbarossa was not just a military operation, it was also a “Vernichtungskrieg” or “War of Annihilation”. I don’t consider it a blunder, because it was an inherent part of pre-requisites of the operation itself, yet I think it is paramount that it is mentioned. In this case, I go with a short quote from the Historian Jürgen Förster:

“Operation ‘Barbarossa’ shows clearly – unlike any other campaign – the indissoluble connection of ideological and power-political goals of the social-darwinistic values of the Third Reich.” (Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 639)

“Im Unternehmen ‘Barbarossa’ wird wie in keinem anderen Feldzug die unauflösbare Verbindung von ideologischen und machtpolitischen Zielen mit den sozialdwarinistischen Wertvorstellungen des Dritten Reiches deutlich.” (Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 639)

To put it as simple and clear as possible for the Nazis the Jews were the real enemy and their annihilation as also the direct or indirect annihilation of many civilians in the occupied territories was part of the plan. Thus it is hard to argue that the various deadly operations and harsh treatment against non-combatants in the occupied area were blunders, because on the Eastern Front the distinction between pure military operations and ideological warfare is extremely difficult or even impossible. Thus calling this issue a blunder would mean to not fully acknowledge the inherent genocidal aspects of Operation Barbarossa.

Errors during the Execution

Now, let’s move to the next section the errors during the execution. The mistakes that occurred during the Operation itself are less, but also crucial and they seem to be in line with the chronic optimism that plagued the mistakes in the planning stage.

Not an error – Kiew instead of Moscow

Now, first I will address an error that was mainly a preparation error, namely the dissenting opinions if Moscow should be the primary target or not. This decision is highly debated, because Generaloberst Guderian wo is considered as the founder of the German Panzer Force, noted in his memoirs that he wanted to go for Moscow instead of Kiew, but Hitler insisted on conquering the Ukraine. Once I also assumed that Guderian was right, but most military historians for quite some time think otherwise and I changed my opinion.
Now, the military historian David Glantz notes the following about an early attack against Moscow:

“Had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in September, Army Group Center would have had to penetrate deep Soviet defenses manned by a force that had not squandered its strength in fruitless offensives against German positions east of Smolensk.” (Glantz: Myth & Realities: p. 24)

“Furthermore, Army Group Center would have launched its offensive with a force of more than 600,000 men threatening its ever-extending right flank and, in the best reckoning, would have reached the gates of Moscow after mid-October just as the fall rainy season was beginning.” (Glantz: Myth & Realities: p. 24)

Additionally, there around 10 reserve armies ready that were used for the Soviet counter-attack in Winter 1941, these units would have been ready for the defense of Moscow while at the same time the troops spared at Kiew would have threatened the over-extended flank of the Germans.(Glantz: Myth & Realities: p. 24)

Not adapting nor acknowledging the resilience of the Soviet troops and repeatedly assuming they were beaten
As mentioned in preparation part the German High Command and Hitler completely underestimated the Soviet Army and Soviet Union to equip and raise new troops. As Halder noted:
“The Russian colossus…has been underestimated by us…whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another dozen.” -Franz Halder

Nevertheless, there was no change in strategy nor did it prevent the Germans to repeatedly assume that the Soviet Army was beaten. (S. 91-92: Source Hitlers Krieg im Osten Ueberschär)

Not adapting after the reserves were used up early on and major exhaustion

That mistake goes hand in hand with the next one, namely the lack of adapting to the losses the German Army sustained in a short amount of time. Within a few weeks the German losses were so high that the reserves were all used up, nevertheless the German Army pushed on and overextended its lines and furthermore overstretched logistics. In overall the number of reserves were too low, the German Army only had about 400 000 trained reserves in June 1941. By the end of November 1941 these troops were all used up and furthermore, there was a lack of 340 000 men even after using local volunteers for non-combat roles and many other optimizations. Yet, the number alone is already staggering enough, another problem is that of those more than 740 000 casualties many were experienced and well trained combat troops that got replaced by inexperienced men. (End of November 1941: 340k Fehlstellen (Hillebrand: Das Heer: S. 19)) Additionally, these men had been fighting for months, they were exhausted and badly supplied. Which brings us to the next point.

Not listening to front commanders

Although, the dire situation was apparent to the front commanders. In Mid November(13th) 1941 at the conference at Orsha near Smolensk the Chief of Staff of German Army High Command met with the leadership of the Army Groups, Armies and Panzer Armies. All front commanders argued against continuing offensive operations, yet, Hitler and Halder insisted on continuing to push towards Moscow. In early December 1941 the Germans finally halted its advance, one day later the Soviets started their counter-offensive. (Castano, Vincent: The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth versus Fiction p. 27-29) At this point, Operation Barbarossa, judged by its initial goals of achieving a quick victory against the Soviet Union, had cleared failed.

Summary – The Underlying and Continuous Problems

To conclude, the main underlying problems for the German mistakes were basically, a strong optimism that prevented any worst-case scenario planning, an underestimation of the enemy and an overestimation of the Germans Army capabilities. Ironically or unsurprisingly, depending on your view on the German leadership, this didn’t really change in 1942. Although in 1942 unlike to 1941, there was no real alternative, thus these underlying problems turned into severe habits that continued til the end of the Second World War and maybe even beyond, because quite many people still to this day claim that the mud and the Winter stopped the Wehrmacht and not the Red Army.

Sources

Books & Articles

Pahl, Magnus: Fremde Heere Ost

Ueberschär, Gerd (Hrsg.): Hitlers Krieg im Osten

Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 626-640

Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Strategische Grundlagen und historische Bedeutung”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 652-666

Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 120-137

Kreidler, Eugen: Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges

Glantz: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay

Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart: Das Heer – Band 3 – 1941-1945

Castano, Vincent: The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth versus Fiction

Zaloga, Steven J. : KV-1 & 2 Heavy Tanks 1939-1945

David M. Glantz Jonathan M. House: When Titans Clashed – HOW THE RED ARMY STOPPED HITLER

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Online Resources

Wikiquote – Franz Halder

Battles of Khalkin Gol

Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

HOI 4 – Historical Infantry Division Layouts – Early War #Hearts of Iron

Intro

In this video I will cover several Infantry Division Layouts from World War II. Although certain parts of the content is tailored for Hearts of Iron players most of the information is military history, only the initial remarks are mostly Hearts of Iron and methodology specific, so just skip ahead on click on the annotation on the screen.

Hearts of Iron IV

Be aware though that these layouts are aimed at being as historical as possible within the Hearts of Iron division builder, thus I am not sure how well they work in HOI 4. This is first and foremost a military history channel, thus I am mainly here for the historical flavor, the German accent and not to support your ambitions in conquering the world, at least for now.
I won’t use the division builder, since I generally try to avoid any copyrighted material and it would actually make everything more complicated and time-consuming. Yet, you will get in one shot the proposed HOI 4 setup and the historical setup together, so you can basically copy it and also learn a bit about the real units too. On the homepage, you can find the proper high resolution screenshots of these layouts see the link on screen and in the description.

Methodology & Accuracy

Some words about methodology and accuracy, if you want to discuss these layout listen to this section very carefully and if you can’t wait for the layouts, you might skip ahead by clicking the button on screen.

Well, figuring out the correct layouts can be quite complicated. Here are a few reason why. You need to be aware that some divisions – especially tank divisions – changed quite considerably throughout the war, thus I usually provide a date for each layout. Another major pitfall is the naming, what one country called a regiment was sometimes something different in another, thus this it was not as straightforward as it seems. Also there were even quite some difference within each country, e.g., a German tank division in 1939 had way more tanks than in 1941, or an US Army Battalion in 1942 was usually larger than an US Army Battalion after the reorganization of September 1943, well, except for two divisions of sixteen armored divisions.
Hence my approach was as follows, it consisted of looking at the data in hearts of Iron, checking the historical division layouts then compare these information to equipment and manpower tables to see if the numbers match for different units.

This process revealed quite some interesting information about hearts of Iron too. First I looked at the data of Hearts of Iron, namely how many manpower and equipment each unit had. This confirmed my assumption that the so called support companies are more like support battalions, only the three smallest ones the engineer, AA and artillery company have 300 men, the others have 400 or even 500 men. Whereas companies were usually around 100 to 200 men. Furthermore, the number of artillery guns for an artillery battalion in game is 36, whereas in real life this was the number of three battalions at least for the German and US Army Infantry division. I don’t know if this is an error on behalf of paradox or if an artillery battalion in game actually should represent a regiment or maybe it is for gameplay balancing reasons. For this video I assume that an artillery battalion in game, is also an artillery battalion historically, if this is not the case, just divide the number of proposed artillery battalions by 3 and you should be fine.

The second step was to look at the organization of these units and the third step was to look at the number of equipment tables and compare if it matches the organization, because the organization can sometimes be misleading. As an example. although an US Army infantry division didn’t have a dedicated anti-tank battalion like a German infantry division, but it had 57 anti-tank guns whereas the German division had only a few more with 75, but some these were also part of the recon battalion, so one might argue that the US Army Infantry division should have a dedicated anti-tank unit in-game if the German Infantry division has one or both should have none.
As you can see it is a bit complicated, thus, take all the following information with a grain of salt, because I had to use a wide variety of sources of different quality and level of detail, which is problematic in itself, but additionally the chances for errors increases due the variety and amount of data. To balance this, I usually added a short explanation why or why not I went with the proposed setup and provide the basic data for my reasoning.

German Infantry Division 1940

So, let’s get started, the Allied Grand Strategy in World War II was “Germany First” and it worked out, so let’s begin with a German Infantry Division from 1940.
It consisted of an Engineer Battalion, an Anti-Tank Battalion, a Recon battalion, an artillery regiment, which consisted of a heavy artillery battalion and 3 artillery battalions, additionally a signal battalion and finally 3 infantry regiments each with 3 infantry battalions. Now the division didn’t have a dedicated medical battalion, but it had 2 medical companies, a field hospital and two medical transport columns with almost 700 men in total, thus I would say this qualifies as a medical battalion. Additionally, it also had maintenance and logistics units attached. So this unit was very well equipped, the only unit type it definitely didn’t possess was an anti-aircraft unit, the division used solely heavy machine guns for anti-air defense. Now, the German infantry division had almost 17 000 men, whereas most other divisions have less than 15 000 men, thus my proposed HOI setup would be as follows:

For support units, an engineer, anti-tank, recon, signal and medical unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get an addition of 2 battalions due to the large amount of men in the division and finally 4 artillery battalions.
Note that for all divisions the non-combat units: logistics, medical and maintenance are the most debatable, because in my sources this information is often not included or limited. Furthermore, their functions sometimes were performed by non-divisional units in several armies.

german_infantry_division_1940_hoi4

Source: Buchner, Alex: The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Soviet Rifle Division 1941

I hope you have your Hammer and Sickle ready, next is a Soviet Rifle Division from April 1941.
It consisted of an a signal battalion, a medical battalion, a supply battalion, an Anti-tank Battalion, an anti-aircraft battalion, a Light Artillery Regiment with 2 battalions, a sapper battalion, one Howitzer Regiment with 2 battalions and 1 heavy battalion, a recon battalion and 3 infantry regiments with 3 battalions each. Yeah, this one seems to tick off all boxes. Yet, in total the division had only around 14500 (14454) men.

But let’s take a closer look at the data, now the number of five artillery battalions sound impressive and the firepower is also clearly more than that of the US and German unit. The number of heavy artillery above 150mm is the same, yet whereas the US and German units use 105 mm guns, the Soviets used 122mm howitzers although 4 less, but additionally they had several 76mm howitzers and cannons, which means that the firepower in artillery at least equal if not greater than the German division. Furthermore, the total number of 54 anti-tank guns is lower than the German division, but similar to the US setup.

Based on this data my proposed HOI setup is as follows:
For support units, an engineer, medical, recon, signal and logistical unit. Then the regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions, to these add one anti-tank and one anti-aircraft battalion. Finally, definitely 4 if not 5 artillery battalions.

soviet_infantry_division_1941_hoi4

Source: Sharp, Charles: Soviet Order of Battle World War II – Volume VIII

US Army Infantry Division 1943

Time for a little bit of freedom, so let’s look at the US Army Infantry division layout from July 1943. It consisted of a Medical Battalion, an Engineer battalion, a divisional artillery unit with a heavy artillery battalion and three artillery battalions. And finally 3 infantry regiments each with 3 infantry battalions. In total this division had around 13000 men.
Now, here is the problem the US Army division had a recon unit, a signal company, a quartermaster company and a maintenance company, but all these units had less than 200 men unlike the German units before. Yet, looking at the data I realized that the division in total had 57 anti-tank guns, which was just short of the 75 from the German division that had some in deployed in their recon battalion, hence my proposed HOI setup is as follows:

For support units, an engineer, an optional anti-tank and a field hospital unit. Then the regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions and finally 4 artillery battalions. Now, the German recon unit consisted to large part of cavalry and only a few armored cars, whereas the US unit had halftracks and 13 armored M8 cars, thus only could also argue that a recon unit could be added as an additional support unit.

us_army_infantry_division_1943

Source: Stanton, Shelby: Order of Battle of the US Army in World War II

British Infantry Division 1939

Next up something for those people that love tea, the British Infantry Division in 1939 of the British Expeditionary Force. Now the British unit names were a bit different, they used the names Brigades and Regiments, although those units were usually had the manpower of Regiments and Battalions, I will use the original names, but symbols that are closing in representing their actual strength.

The division consisted of a Division Cavalry Regiment that was mechanized, an Engineer Battalion, a Divisional Artillery Unit that consisted of 3 field artillery regiments and one anti-tank regiment, furthermore a Supply Unit and a medical unit. And finally 3 infantry Brigades each with 3 infantry battalions. In total the division had a bit short of 14000 men.

Based on this information my proposed HOI 4 setup would be:
For support units, an engineer, a medical, a recon, an anti-tank and a logistics unit. Now, although the number of anti-tank guns was only 48, the unit had a large amount of anti-tank rifles and the French provided anti-tank guns for the British divisions, thus an anti-tank unit seem justified. Then the regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions and finally 3 or maybe 4 artillery battalions, because the British division fielded 72 field guns of the 18 and/or 25 pounder type. Furthermore, the unit was quite well motorized and even mechanized with 140 Bren carriers, thus one actually could replace the regular infantry with motorized or mechanized infantry.

british_infantry_division_1939_hoi4

Source: Nafziger (Note: that it lists 147 pieces of the 25mm anti-tank gun, a number that seems completely off and likely is, because it was a French anti-tank gun and I doubt they received so many of them.)

Japanese Infantry Division 1940 Standard B

Now the war situation may not necessarily develop to your advantage, nevertheless let’s look at the Japanese Infantry division Standard B around 1940, note that these division varied to a certain degree.

It consisted of an engineer regiment, a transport regiment, a recon or cavalry regiment, Division medical services, a field artillery regiment with 3 field artillery battalions and three infantry regiments with 3 battalions. Note that these artillery battalions were equipped with 75mm guns, thus having far less firepower than all other nations. Yet, these divisions had a very high amount of manpower, depending on the setup between 18000 to 21000 men, thus even outnumbering the German division by far.

Based on this data my proposed HOI setup is as follows:
For support units, an engineer, a medical, a recon and a logistical unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get probably an additional 6 battalions. Finally, I think one artillery battalion or at most 2 battalions considering the rather weak firepower of the 75mm howitzer in contrast to the equipment of other nations.

japanese_infantry_division_1940_standard_b_hoi4

Source: Rottmann, Gordon: Japanese Army in World War II – Conquest of the Pacific 1941-1942

Italian Infantry Division 1940

Everyone loves Pizza, but I only can offer you one slice, time to look at the Italian Infantry division of 1940.
It consisted of an engineer battalion, a legion of fascist militia that consisted of two battalions, a regiment of artillery with light gun battalion, a light howitzer battalion and a regular howitzer battalion, finally two infantry regiments, which consisted of three battalions each. Yes, only two infantry regiments, this was the so called binary division layout the Italians used. It also had an anti-tank company, but in total just 24 anti-tank guns. In total this division had 13000 men. (In terms of artillery it had 12 guns with 100mm and 24 with 75mm.)
Now, my sources on this one are a bit varied, I have good German source with the overall numbers and high-level organization, but for more detailed information I rely on the Handbook on the Italian Military Forces from 1943, which was created by the US Military Intelligence during the war, so it might not be 100 % accurate, but so far these handbooks are usually quite reliable in terms of unit organizations.

Based on this information my proposed HOI 4 setup would be:
For support units, an engineer unit and with three eyes closed an anti-tank unit. For infantry, we use the 2 times 3 infantry battalions and add an additional 2 battalions, but maybe a third or even fourth, because the total number of men is similar to that of an US Army infantry division, which had way more support units. Finally, I think one or maybe two artillery battalions, because in total there were 24 guns with 75mm and 12 howitzers with 100mm present.

italian_infantry_division_1940_hoi4

Source: Schreiber, Gerhard: S.56-62, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3; Germany and the Second World War – Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939–1942 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Soruce: Handbook on the Italian Military Forces, August 1943, Military Intelligence Service – TME 30-420

French Infantry Division 1940

Well, after some Pizza, who doesn’t want to enjoy a baguette? So, let’s look at a French Infantry division of 1940:
It consisted of a recon group, a field gun regiment with 3 battalions, a howitzer regiment with one heavy howitzer battalion and a regular one, 3 infantry regiments with 3 battalions each. Additionally, there were several anti-tank companies with a total of 58 anti-tank guns and 2 engineer companies, which were originally organized in a battalion but reorganized in 1939.
In total the division had around 17 500 men. But note that in this case my sources are quite sparse and of limited quality.

Hence my proposed HOI 4 layout is as follows:
For support units, an engineer unit, an anti-tank unit and a recon unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get an additional 3 battalions, because the division has more men than the German division and also less support units. For the artillery battalions, I think three are in order, because it had 36 field guns with 75mm, 12 howitzers with 105mm and 12 howitzer with 155mm.
Source: Sumner, Ian; et. al: The French Army: 1939-45

french_infantry_division_1940_hoi4

Source: Nafziger

Polish Infantry Division 1939

So, in case you want to go into space, here is the Polish infantry division organization for 1939. In this case my data is way more limited than with the previous divisions, especially in terms of the support units, so keep a bit more salt ready.

The division consisted an Engineer Battalion, a light artillery regiment consisting of two light artillery battalions and one regular artillery battalion. Yet, it also had a small detachment with bigger guns, but overall it couldn’t compete with the US or German division in this regard. And as usually it had 3 infantry regiments each with 3 infantry battalions. It had several medical units, but I have no numbers, nevertheless I assume it would be sufficient for a medical battalion. Similar to the German division the Polish division has more than other countries with around 16 500 men.

The division had quite many companies attached, like several anti-tank, a bicycle, an MG, and a cavalry company. Thus, one could argue that these units qualify together as a recon and/or anti-tank unit, although the total number of anti-tank guns was only 27 guns, which is less than half of the US Infantry division anti-tank guns. Based on that data my proposed HOI setup is as follows:
For support units, an engineer, a medical, maybe a recon and with two eyes closed an anti-tank unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get two additional battalions, 2 artillery battalions and maybe a third artillery battalion.

polish_infantry_divsion_1939_hoi4

Sources:
Ellis, Johen World War II – A Statistical Survey – The Essential Facts & Figures for All the Combatants, Edition: 1995 reprinted with corrections

Niehorster

Nafziger

Romanian Infantry Division 1941

And the last division layout for this video, the setup of the Romanian Infantry Division of 1941.
It consisted of a recon battalion, an engineer battalion, a field artillery regiment with 2 light battalions and a regular battalion, an artillery regiment with a light field artillery battalion and regular battalion and 3 infantry regiments with 3 infantry battalions each.
Additionally, it had an anti-tank and anti-aircraft company, furthermore each of the regiments had an anti-tank company, but these units were usually not sufficiently equipped. In total it would be around 30 anti-tank guns. About the signal and medical units, my source for the layout on the Romanian units is good, but it doesn’t include any non-combat units. Yet, since the author notes that the communication and many equipment was quite poor, one can assume that there was no state-of-the art signal unit present and the medical services were probably lacking. The division in total was a bit short of 17 000 men, thus it is quite a large force, especially considering the low numbers of additional units. (Source: Axworthy, Mark: Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1945, p. 39-42)

Based on this information my proposed HOI 4 setup would be:
For support units, an engineer, a recon and with two eyes closed an anti-tank unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get probably an additional 3 battalions. Finally, I think two artillery battalions, because in total there were 36 field guns with 75mm and 16 howitzers with 100mm present.

romanian_infantry_division_1941_hoi4

Source: Axworthy, Mark: Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1945

Sources

amazon.com amazon.co.uk amazon.ca amazon.de

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Online Resources

US Army Armored Division – Organization & Structure – World War 2 #Visualization

Intro

In total the United States raised 16 armored division in World War 2. In September 1943 fourteen of those were reorganized, these are sometimes called the „light“ armored divisions, although this name is a bit misleading, because the main difference was in size and not the equipped tanks. So let’s take a closer look. (Source: Stanton, Shelby L.: Order of Battle US Army World War II, p. 15-20)

Numbers

Such a “light” division in total consisted of around:
11 000 men
54 M8 Armored Cars
54 M7 Priest Self-Propelled Artillery
460 2 ½ Trucks,
450 M3 Halftracks
465 .30 cal Machine guns
404 .50 cal Machine guns
30 57mm anti tank guns
77 Light Tanks like the M5A1 Stuart(, which were later on replaced by the M24 Chaffee)
168 Medium M4 Sherman Tanks
18 Medium Tanks with 105 mm Howitzers
30 M32 Tank Recovery Vehicles
449 Jeeps

Organization

The structure of the September 1943 divisions was without regiments, hence the largest sub-unit is the battalion. The division consisted of 1 Signal Company, 3 Tank Battalions, 3 Armored Infantry Battalions, the divisional Artillery consisting of 3 armored field artillery battalions, 1 Mechanized Cavalry Recon Squadron, 1 Armored Division Trains with a Medical Battalion and an Armored Maintenance Battalion. And 1 Armored Engineer Battalion.

Now every of these Tank Battalions consisted of three Medium Tank Companies and One light Tank Company. Let’s take a closer look.
The Medium Tank Company consisted of an HQ section and 3 Medium Tank Platoons. The HQ Section consisted of two M4 Shermans, one M4 with a 105 howitzer and a jeep. Each of the Medium Tank platoons consisted of 5 M4 Shermans.

The Light Company was quite similar. It consisted also of one HQ section and three platoons. The HQ section consisted of two M5A1 Stuart tanks and one jeep. Each Platoon consisted of 5 tanks. Note that from late 1944 onwards the Stuarts were replaced by the M24 Chaffee Light tank. (Source: Stanton, Shelby L.: Order of Battle US Army World War II, p. 19)

Sources

Books

Zaloga, Steven J.: US Armored Divisions, European Theater of Operations, 1944-45 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Stanton, Shelby L.: Order of Battle US Army World War II (amazon.com affiliate link)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

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Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

M4 Sherman

Italian Forces and Industry in Early World War 2 (1939-1940)

Intro

Prior to World War 2 both Hitler and Mussolini were boasting about their military forces to each other. Mussolini announced in 1934 that he can mobilize 6 Million soldiers, in 1936 he increased the number to 8 million and in 1939 to 12 million. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 54, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3) If those numbers sound a bit off, well, Operation Barbarossa was largest military invasion in history and it was conducted by around 4 million soldiers. Nevertheless, the Italians managed to mobilize around 3 million soldiers, yet these soldiers were basically worse equipped than the Italian troops in World War 1. Quite in contrast to the German and Japanese forces, the Italian forces were not ready for a war against any major force.(Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 54, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

The question is why the Italian Armed Forces were not ready, there are several reasons for this, in general the Italian and Fascists system was quite inefficient. First, the Italy had a limited amount of industries, which weren’t properly prepared for arms production. Second, the allocation of resources and organization was limited, additionally similar to Germany and Japan, Italy also had a severe lack of resources. Third, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain required resources that the Italians couldn’t spare, after all those conflicts dragged on far longer than anticipated. As a result the Italian forces were not ready when the war started in 1939. Mussolini was quite aware of this problem, after all, he insisted on a period of peace during the negotiations of the Pact of Steel – “Stahlpaket” with Germany and didn’t join the war until June 1940 by declaring a war on France. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 54-56, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Organization before the war

At first, some word about the general organization of Italian Army before the war. Like other countries Italy drew lessons from experiences in Spain and Ethiopia, yet their forces were still in reorganization when the war started and the industry couldn’t match the requirements for the required motorization or even the basic equipment that was needed.

In 1937 the Italian Army restructured its divisions from the common system of tripartite to a bipartite system, the so called “binary” system, where each infantry division only consisted of 2 infantry regiments instead of 3. Something that is also portrayed in Hearts of Iron III and Hearts of Iron IV, as you can see here for the division builder of an Italian division in 1939 and a British division in 1939, but be aware though that the Hearts of Iron IV basic divisions layouts lack artillery regiments, furthermore the so called support companies historically usually were battalions, as you can see here with a basic German infantry division from 1940. Yet, from a game design perspective it makes sense to call them companies, because so you can’t mix them up with your regular battalions when writing about division compositions on the forums. Anyway, if you want to learn more about unit organizations, check out the playlist on my various organization videos.

Now, the intention of the binary system was to make the units more capable for mobile warfare, the units should be easier to command and be more mobile. The lack in manpower should be countered with modern equipment, yet, this was wishful thinking because the Italian industry couldn’t even provide basic equipment in sufficient numbers. On the outside the binary system created more divisions, but basically this was only useful for propaganda and didn’t increase the capabilities of the Italian Army. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S.56-57 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Next up, is a brief look at the Situation in September 1939 and then a more detailed look at the state in June 1940.

Situation in September 1939

Let’s look at the state of the Italian forces in the beginning of the War in September 1939, when Italy was still at peace. In short the Situation of the Italian Armed forces in September 1939 was abysmal. Yet, you need to keep in mind that Italy didn’t enter the war before June 1940.

Army

At first the Army, it had had 67 divisions without the units in Ethiopia, these divisions consisted of
43 Infantry
3 Tank
2 Motorized
3 Fast division
5 Alpini, and
11 other division for special purposes.

Yet, only 16 of these division were completely restructured, furthermore there was a lack of artillery, tanks, transport-vehicles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Even basic supplies like quality food was lacking, so basically the Army had a severe lack of almost everything. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S.58-59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Navy

The Navy was better equipped in terms of basic supplies like food and ammo, but it also lacked anti-aircraft capabilities on its ships and in its bases. Yet, there was severe lack of fuel. Still, in comparison with the other branches the Navy was the best equipped and prepared.

Air Force

The Italian Airforce the “regia aeronautica” also had major problems, there was a vast amount of different aircraft types and additionally the ground crews were of limited quality, this lead to low number of operational aircraft of less than 50 % in September 1939, when only 1190 planes were operational out of 2586. Furthermore, most aircraft were usually underpowered and under-armed. [Something most War Thunder players are highly aware off “Spaghetti guns”.] (Schreiber, Gerhard: S.58-59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)
As a result of that dire state of the Armed forces and the severe lack of ammo, weaponry, fuel, transport capacity and personnel, the ministry for war production in December 1939 advised Mussolini that only an army of 73 division would be feasible instead of the originally planned number of 126. Yet, still the industry wasn’t capable in equipping those units sufficiently til the entry of Italy in into the war in June 1940, but nobody assumed that Italy would enter the war that early. Well, seems like Mussolini had a tendency for premature – declarations. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 58-59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

The Situation in June 1940

Now, after the Italian declaration of war in June 1940 the situation was a bit different, but not much, but let’s take a more detailed view.

Army

First the Army, in June 1940 Italy entered the war with a total of a bit less than 1.7 million soldiers (1 687 950) and a total of 73 divisions..
Whereas in 1915 the Italian army joined the war with more men, it was also an army that had similar quality weapons and equipment like other majors, but in 1940 this was clearly not the case. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Of the 73 divisions only 19 had the required amount of personnel, equipment,weapons and transport capacity. Another 34 division were operational, but lacked personnel (25 %) and transport capacity. The last 20 divisions lacked more than 50 % personnel, a significant amount of equipment and 50 % of transport capacity. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 59-60 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

The infantry formed the mainstay of the Italian army, but the firepower of an Italian infantry division was according to Gerhard Schreiber only about 25 % of a French Infantry division or around 10 % of a German infantry division. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 61 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3) Now, I don’t know how the author determined those numbers, but here is a direct comparison on the numbers of a Italian and German Infantry division with the intended equipment and personnel:

Comparison between an Italian and German Infantry Division in 1940

Ital. ID (1940) German ID (1940)
449 Officers 518 Officers
614 NCOs 2573 NCOs
11916 Men 13667 Men
12 Heavy howitzers (sFH) 15 cm
6 Heavy infantry support guns 15cm
12 100mm howitzer 36 Light howitzers (lFH) 10,5 cm
24 75mm guns 20 Light infantry support guns 7,5 cm
8 65 mm mountain guns
8 47mm anti-tank gun 75 3,7cm anti-tank guns
8 20mm anti-air guns
30 Mortar 81mm 54 mortar 8,1 cm
126 Mortars 45mm 84 mortar 5cm
80 Heavy machine guns 110 Heavy machine gun
270 Light machine gun 425 Light machine guns
(Source for the German Division: Alex Buchner: Handbuch der Infanterie 1939-1945)

The most important differences here are the low number of NCOs in the Italian division, NCO form the backbone of every army, thus this lack of leadership definitely didn’t improve the overall quality of the division. Furthermore, the biggest Italian gun had 100mm and only 12 were assigned to a division, whereas the Germans had 3 times that and additional 18 guns with 150 mm of caliber. Now, the Italians had a variety of guns ranging from 75mm to 20mm, but almost all in low numbers and of various types this is basically a logistical nightmare with limited firepower, especially in combination with the severe lack of transport capacity and weak industry. Also in terms of infantry support weapons like mortars and machine guns the Germans had an advantage.
Based on that data, I assume the firepower difference was calculated based on how much shell weight each division could deliver for a specified amount of time. At first you can’t spot a 1 to 10 difference, but you need to consider the weight differences of higher caliber guns. Let’s take a look at the weight of a 15 cm howitzer shell, it was about 50 kg whereas the 10,5 cm howitzer could only deliver a shell of around 15 kg. The shell weight and thus the resulting firepower can easily missed, if one looks only at the caliber alone. (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/15_cm_Kanone_16 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/10.5_cm_leFH_18 )

Resource Problems

Yet, this comparison assumes that the division was fully equipped with artillery, but Italy had a severe lack of modern artillery and anti-aircraft guns, it lacked about 15 000 modern artillery guns and the industry could only put out less than 100 per month. This meant that the Italians had a limited amount of modern artillery and since that wasn’t bad enough there was also a lack of ammo. The situation with tanks was not much better and those tanks were also to a large degree simple light tanks of limited combat capabilities. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 61-65 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)
Resource Problem
Furthermore, the Italian industry had a lack of resources, how dire the situation was can be best expressed with some numbers. These are the percentages on the Italian estimate for meeting the requirements of 1940:
Artillery (all types) 6 %
Ammo, small caliber 25 %
Ammo, medium caliber 7 %
Ammo, heavy caliber 10 %
Rifles (Model 1891) 35 %
Machine Guns 10 %
Mortar 81mm 70 %
Ammo, Mortar grenades 81mm 10 %
Planes 42 %
Engines 40 %
Bombs under 1000 kg 40 %

(Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 66 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)
One can assume that Mussolini would get führious from the “insufficient resources” icon popping up all the time, if he would play Hearts of Iron.
One can assume Mussolini would have gone mad from the “insufficient resources” icon popping up all the time, but he was probably already mad already.

Navy

Now, the Italian Navy was by far the strongest part of the Armed Forces. For the Mediterranean the numbers of the Italian fleet were quite considerable: (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 77 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3) Here is a comparison between the Italian, British and French Fleets assigned to the Mediterranean.

Italy UK France
Type Number Tonnage Number Tonnage Number Tonnage
BB 4 117240 5 148350 5 116165
CV 0 0 1 22600 0
CA 7 70000 0 0 7 70000
CL 12 74630 9 51000 7 51723
DD & TP 125 120335 35 48200 57 67250
Submarine 113 88000 12 13000 46 49000

Note that 2 of these 4 Italian battleships weren’t fully operational yet in June 1940. Also, due to the lack of the Italian industry these numbers can be a bit misleading from strategic point of view, because the British had way better capabilities to construct new ships in contrast to the Italians, thus losses on the Italian side had a greater strategic impact. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 75-78 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Furthermore, these numbers don’t represent the quality of the ships, its crews nor other important factors. Nevertheless the Italian ships meet the international standards unlike their army units. Although, there was some major problems. First the lack of air coverage by land based aircraft due to range and insufficient coordination with the air force, of course the aforementioned missing naval air arm was also a major flaw in the Italian Navy structure. Second, the power plants of the ships had limited reliability and there was a general lack of anti-aircraft weapons for the ships and harbors. Third, the lack of a radar on Italian ships had a crucial impact during the Battle of Matapan against the British. The Germans had their own radars, but only after the loss at Matapan informed the Italians about their radar and provided assistance. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 75-78 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Air Force

Now, let’s take a brief look at the Air Force. In June 1940 the “regia aeronautica” had 1796 operational planes and 554 non-operational ones (total 2350), thus it clearly had a higher readiness ratio than in September 1939, the total number of planes is actually a little lower than in 1939, this is probably due to the fact that this number doesn’t include training planes. Yet, a major problem was the lack of a proper naval aviation, which is quite problematic for a country that has a quite extensive coastline. Although Italy had some good air frame designs it lacked mostly powerful engines and also its production capabilities were not the best to put it very mildly, well, time for an international comparison. Schreiber writes about the Italian aircraft industry the following:

“Italy basically achieved between 1940 and 1943 an average output per year that was slightly above the British monthly average of produced aircraft in 1943.”

(Translated & cited from the German version of Germany and the Second World War – Volume III)

“Italien erreichte also zwischen 1940 und 1943 im Durchschnitt eine jährliche Fertigungsquote, die etwas über dem lag, was die britische Luftfahrtindustrie 1943 in einem Monat ausstieß.”

(Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 71 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Conclusion

There is a strong tendency to give the Italian soldiers a bad reputation for being cowards and unreliable, which certainly is influenced by the fact that in World War 1 the Italians turned against their former Allies the German and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Nevertheless, in World War 2, Italian soldiers fought as brave as their allies and foes, thus there is no reason for the continuous disrespect about their combat capabilities, which was mostly a result of the poor state of their industry, equipment, weaponry and supply situation.
As said before soldiers deserve our respect, even if we don’t share their side and/or views.

Sources

Books

Germany and the Second World War – Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939–1942 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Buchner, Alex: The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Schreiber, Gerhard: Politische & milititärische Entwicklung im Mittelmeerraum 1939/1940, in: Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3 (amazon.de affiliate link)

Buchner, Alex: Das Handbuch der deutschen Infanterie 1939-1945; Gliederung – Uniformen, Bewaffnung – Ausrüstung, Einsätze (amazon.de affiliate link)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

15 cm Kanone 16

10.5 cm leFH 18

Why did the German Aces have so many air kills?

Intro

When it comes to World War 2 many people often cite the high kill numbers of German and Japanese Pilots. The problem is they usually try to use these numbers to make various points on how effective the Axis forces were, well, there are many problems with this. Luckily the third most successful German ace of World War Günther Rall, actually spoke out on this in a polite and indirect manner. He answered the question: why did German Aces have so many air kills compared to Allied pilots. I will use his answer and expand on it a bit.

The conditions stated by Günter Rall

Günther Rall outlined several conditions:
1) First off he notes that in order to shoot down enemy planes, you need a sufficient number of them in your mission area. Many Allied fighter pilots in the later stages of the war never saw a German plane and even if they did, they often heavily outnumbered their foes. In contrast this situation was very uncommon for the German side after late 1941, after all they faced the Soviet Union, British Empire and the United States. Each of them usually matched or outnumbered the Germans in total planes alone, together they had a considerable numerical advantage. Let’s just look at the initial numbers for operation Barbarossa. At the time of the German attack the Soviet Air Force consisted of about 10 000 to 15 000 aircraft, of which 7 500 were deployed in the Soviet’s Western theatre. Whereas the German Air Force had around 2800 aircraft deployed for Operation Barbarossa. (Jones, David R.: From Disaster to Recovery: Russia’s Air Forces in the Two World Wars: p. 272)

Even earlier in the war during the Battle of Britain in summer 1940 the Germans had about the same number of fighter planes as the British. During the height of the battle in August 1940 the Fighter Command had around 1000 fighters, which was about the same number as the Luftwaffe. (Source: Overy – Battle of Britain)

This strategic disparity in planes didn’t necessarily transfer down to the tactical situation. Because the Germans could to a certain degree decide when, where and how to engage the Allied aircraft, particularly when they were attacking Germany and the occupied territories. Thus, tactical victories were still quite common and those improved the kill counts of German pilots.

2) Second, Western Allied pilots usually had a limited number of missions to fly and then they were rotated out or could return home. Due to the lack of German pilots this wasn’t a possibility, hence German pilots usually fought until they were killed, captured or incapacitated in one way or another way.

There were other factors as well, like the initial superiority of German training in combat pilots due to the pre-war build up and experiences from the Spanish civil war. Furthermore, nearly every major country used a different system for the counting of kills and losses in World War 2. Additionally, especially in air combat the kill claims for all sides could be up to twice as high as the losses of their enemies. In short, there are many problems with deriving valid and comparable kill to death ratios from these value across different countries.

In a strategic war the Average Pilot Counts

But let’s take at the bigger picture, one way to properly determine the effectiveness of combat pilots is by taking a look at the average pilot, because in a total war the achievements of exceptional individuals rarely have an effect above the tactical level. But the combined force of a large number of soldiers, pilots or sailors usually is the determining factor that has strategic effects.
This is the reason why proper training programs were so important, something both the Germans and Japanese didn’t put enough emphasis on during the war. Thus, armed forces should not be judged solely based on their current or initial quantity and quality, but also in their ability to maintain this quantity and quality during a war.

Conclusion

To conclude comparing the individual achievements of aces usually doesn’t provide meaningful information about major aspects of the air war. It usually only serves as an excuse for nationalistic tendencies and/or contempt, which in a way is probably the same thing. Most people note that national pride is important, and I agree with that, but I think real pride has no need for a comparison, it comes from within and not from an outside measuring stick. After all, it is important that we respect the achievements and service of all men and women that served, no matter if they flew 50 missions with no kills or were aces with more than 200 kills. Quite many pilots that once fought each other became friends after the war, I think they serve as great examples that mutual respect is a true virtue of a hero and that despite various differences an honest agreement on core values like respect is more important than the color of our flags.

The Interview with Günther Rall

Sources

Books and Articles

Overy, Richard: The Battle of Britain – The Myth and the Reality (amazon.com affiliate link)

Jones, David R.: From Disaster to Recovery: Russia’s Air Forces in the Two World Wars. In: Higham & Harris: Why Air Forces Fail (amazon.com affiliate link)

Jones, David R.: From Disaster to Recovery: Russia’s Air Forces in the Two World Wars. In: Higham & Harris: Why Air Forces Fail (amazon.de affiliate link)

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Disclaimer amazon.com

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

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Online Sources

Ask Historians (reddit) – Why did German fighter aces have so many more kills?

Why the Imperial Japanese Air Forces Failed in World War 2

Intro

The Second World War to a large degree was determined by the disparity of the economic capacities and manpower between the Axis and the Allies. Yet, solely looking at production numbers and men can lead to a deterministic or even fatalistic interpretation that prevents us from looking at other factors that also played a vital role in the defeat of the Axis Forces.
This video is based on the article: The Imperial Japanese Air Forces by Osamu Tagaya. (See Description)

High Level Organization

The Japanese leadership was well aware of its limited capabilities in both resources and industrial capacity. Yet, it failed to unify the two branches of the Japanese Armed Forces, notably the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy to focus on one strategy in the years leading to the war. The Army for a large part saw as their main enemy in Russia and later the Soviet Union, while the Navy determined the United States of America as their principal foe. Both branches couldn’t agree and since they were not subordinates of the Japanese Government, there was no unifying power to force them into cooperation. This lead to two different strategies that were competing with each other for resources, manpower and equipment. This also lead to parallel development of similar aircraft types, like bombers and prevented the creation of uniform standards. (Tagaya: p. 178-180) Such inefficiencies and waste of resources are problematic in general, but in combination with limited industrial capacity and resources such effects weigh several magnitudes higher than for industrial giants, like the United States.

Army Shortcomings – The Japanese Army Air Force (JAAF)

Let’s take a look at the shortcomings of the Japanese Army Air Force. Since the Japanese Army Air Force was mostly developed for tactical support of a land war against Soviet Union, it lacked capabilities for naval navigation and long-range capabilities, something that was crucial for their use in South East Asia and especially the islands of the Pacific. As a result the Navy had to fly long-range bombing missions in the Philippines for the Army. (Tagaya: p. 179-180)

One major problem was that the Japanese Army lacked strong advocates for air power in its ranks. This was due to the fact that the Japanese had a very limited amount of army officers with air combat experience. Although the Japanese were among the first to use combat aircraft in World War 1, it was a short a limited engagement in 1914. These experiences were too limited to convince enough officers of the importance air power. The army initiated two times the creation of an independent air force as a third branch, like Germany and the United Kingdom with the Royal Air Force. Yet, the Navy disagreed, because they feared that similar to the British RAF that the Fleet Air Arm would only play a marginal role in an independent branch. (Tagaya: p. 180-185)
The main roles for the Army Air Force lay in recon and air combat, whereas bombing missions received only limited attention. This is reflected in the slow build-up of its bomber squadrons in the 1920ies.(Tagaya: p. 182)

For a short time the Army like the Navy saw the United States as their main opponent, during that period the development of a large four engine bomber was started. Furthermore, there were projects to use aircraft catapults on land-bases in order to circumvent the problem of building long air strips after an invasion of the Philippines. Yet, once the Army focused again on Russia and Asia, these projects were discontinued in the early 1930ies. Due to annexation of Manchuria by the Japanese an extended land border to the Soviet Union changed the strategic situation. Furthermore, the development of the TB-3 bomber by the Soviets put the Japanese home islands into the range of the Soviet Air Force. (Tagaya: p. 182-185)
Around the mid 1930ies the Army started a major expansion of its air arm and in 1937 declared the destruction of the enemy’s air force as the primary mission. Yet, in the conflicts in China and with the Soviet Union the Army Air Force mainly contributed on a tactical level. Furthermore, in 1940 the emphasis on destruction of the enemy air force was weakened and the offensive power remained mostly on a tactical level. (Tagaya: p. 185)

The main problem with Japanese Army aviation lay in a lack of initiative and a conservative senior leadership that was mostly reacting to international developments instead of formulating its own doctrines. This lead to a shortage of officers with proper experience during the rapid expansion. (Tagaya: p. 186)
“This often resulted in poor leadership and unimaginative staff work, giving rise to operations that where questionable in their effectiveness and all too predictable and conventional in nature.” -Osamu Tagaya:The Imperial Japanese Air Forces, p. 186 (link in the description)

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)

IJN Achievements

Now, before we take a look at the shortcoming of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which were quite different to those of the Army. Let’s take a look at their initial achievements first.
The Navy unlike the Army had strong advocates for air power in its ranks. This is due to the fact the modern Navies usually have a more open attitude towards technology and innovation. After all an infantry division consists mostly of men, whereas a battleships consists mostly of steel with a lot of technological components and a handful men.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was a pioneer in naval aviation. It built the world’s first purpose-built aircraft carrier the HIJMS Hōshō in 1922. Furthermore, it introduced the first operational deployment of an all-metal monoplane carrier-fighter plane in 1937. And in 1940 it was able to perform the mass deployment of torpedo and dive-bombers in coordination with fighters launched from several aircraft carries, something no navy at that time was able to do. Right before Pearl Harbor, the IJN had more aircraft carriers than any other Navy and had the world’s leading naval air arm.

Furthermore, there were some other aspects were the IJN achieved leading roles. In terms of aircraft the Zero outmatched all it counterparts and sometimes even land-based aircraft. Furthermore, the IJN possessed a strong land-based naval bomber force the so called “rikko” units, which were initially developed to counter the limits on the number of carriers due to Naval Treaties. These units sank the Royal Navy’s battleships the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse early on in the War. Also the attack on Pearl Harbor and the following half year the IJN basically marked the start of domination of aircraft carriers in naval warfare. (Tagaya: p. 186-187)

IJN Shortcomings

Yet, despite all these achievements in naval aviation, it is quite surprising that the IJN didn’t drop the battleship as a core weapon prior or after these initial successes of carriers. Its fleet organization still focused on the battleship and didn’t create a complete carrier task force organization, unlike the US Navy later in the War. Although, the enormous amounts of resources put into building the Yamato and Musashi super-battleships are to a certain degree understandable, because before the war in the pacific, it was not clear how important carriers would be, but the reluctance to change the naval organization was major flaw. This is also reflected by the presence of Japanese Battleship fleet at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. (Tagaya: p. 187-189)
One major flaw of the IJN was its focus to primarily target enemy warships and often ignore the enemy supply ships. Like after the defeat of the Allied cruisers at the battle of the Savo Island, where the transport ships were left unharmed. This was not just one incident, the IJN submarine doctrine focused on destroying enemy warships as did the Japanese air men. To some degree this maybe hindsight bias, but misjudging the strategic value of merchant ships and supplies, probably stemmed from the focus on a classical decisive battle thinking.
In defense of the Japanese, we need to take into account that even the Western Allies that focused on strategic warfare early on didn’t focus on the German supplies in their bombing campaigns, it took them until May 1944 to focus at fuel production, which severely limited the mobility and combat effectiveness of all German forces. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 483-485) In the Pacific with its long supply lines between the islands, the strategic value of attacks against merchant shipping was about as crucial as fuel for Germany. Because, without supplies and fuel ground, naval and air forces are extremely limited in their effectiveness. (Tagaya: p. 188-189)

Japanese Capabilities

Let’s take a look at Japanese capabilities. As mentioned before the focus of the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy was on supporting battles. This narrow view lead to a neglect of logistics and other crucial elements. Similar to the German Luftwaffe there was a certain neglect for all elements that didn’t surround actual combat, yet to a far greater extent. After all, the Luftwaffe possessed one of the leading air transport arms in the beginning of the war quite contrary to the Japanese that lacked transport aircraft. For instance the Japanese lacked pilots for ferrying aircraft to the front lines and their capabilities to construct airfields was limited. Furthermore, there was a severe lack of warning and communication equipment like radar and effective radios sets for fighters. (Tagaya: p. 189; Corum: p. ) Unlike the German Air Force in Western Europe, the Japanese couldn’t rely on an existing infrastructure in the Pacific, thus these shortcomings reduced the combat effectiveness and readiness of their units. As a result naval bombers were used several times to drop supplies, because there were no transport aircraft available. This was in stark contrast to the Allies that airlifted an infantry division from Australia to New Guinea. Furthermore, the Japanese periodically used combat pilot to ferry planes due to lack of ferry pilots.
The lack of mechanized engineering equipment to create and improve existing airfields also had severe long term effects. It not only resulted in a huge delay and back-breaking labor on the Japanese side, additionally, the resulting installations were often very limited in size. As a result Japanese airfields were usually congested with planes that were parked closely to each other on several occasions this lead to severe losses when those air fields were attacked. (Tagaya: p. 189-190)

Often these attacks occurred without any warning, due the Japanese lack of radar equipment. Although the Japanese were once among the leaders in radar technology, they fell behind by not investing and employing the technology for military purposes.

In general the Japanese efforts and capabilities surrounding communication and coordination were limited. There was a lack of effective shortwave radios, thus Japanese fighter pilots basically communicated with visual signals. This prevented to a large degree that they could fully exploit their initial advantages in training and equipment. Furthermore, it also prevented the creation of a proper ground- or carrier-based-control capabilities like the British used during the Battle of Britain or the US Navy developed throughout the war. (Tagaya: p. 189-191)

Japanese Priorities and their Consequences

Let’s take a look at the Japanese Priorities and their consequences. The Japanese focus on battle and combat units was the determining factor throughout the war and the lack of unified strategy between the Navy and Army showed a lack of foresight and strategic perspective. The missing unified strategy prevented a proper and effective allocation of Japans limited resources before and during the war. In contrast even though the United States enjoyed an abundance of industrial capacity and manpower, it still committed to the Grand Strategy of “Germany First” with the British. (Tagaya: p. 191-192)

The Japanese aircraft industry lagged behind in terms of powerful engines, this problem was circumvented by using no armor plates and self-sealing fuel tanks in their early models. Due their experiences fighting the Chinese although they assumed that these measures were sufficient. Unlike the Germans that improved their aircraft after their experiences in the Spanish Civil war.
Thus, during the Guadalcanal campaign Japanese losses increased and their highly-trained airmen thinned out quickly. The lack of proper training programs were similar to the Germans and since the Western Allies put a strong emphasis on training early, this soon lead to a situation where the average Japanese pilot was less trained than the average Allied pilot. (Tagaya: p. 191-193)
“In the end, the initial margin of superior training and experience exhibitied by its airmen proved insufficient to prevent serious attrition.” (Tagaya: p. 193)

Japanese Aircraft Industry

Let’s take a look at the Japanese Aircraft industry. Japan before and shortly after the First World War was dependent on Western technology and imported aircraft and equipment at that time. During the 1930ies they reached self-sufficiency in engine and air-frame design, but their development cycles were still quite long. Furthermore, in aircraft components and subsystems, like radios Japan was still very dependent on Western imports. The duration of the development cycles was a problem. Yet, this could have been dealt with by ordering follow-up types early enough, but the Japanese didn’t issued specifications for follow-up designs early enough. Prior to April 1942 there was serious effort invested to create a successor for the Zero fighter plane. If these measures would have been taken in 1940, then the Japanese could have had an aircraft to counter the Corsair or Hellcat when they arrived, but they still had to fight them with their modified version of the Zero. Furthermore, the initial successor of the Zero the A7M “Reppu” failed and wasn’t abandoned soon enough thus delaying the N1K1-J “Shiden”, which entered combat in October 1944 and its improved version the “Shiden-Kai” (also known by older war thunder players as the UFO) was ready in March 1945. Hence, even though the development cycles of the Japanese were not as fast as that of the United States, this problem could have been averted by ordering a replacement at an early stage. (Tagaya: p. 193-195) As a result the end of the war, the Japanese only fielded a handful of types that introduced during the war, whereas the United States replaced a large amount of its pre-war models.

Result of Training and Industry Policies

As a result, in June 1944 the Japanese faced highly trained US pilots with new superior planes in their slightly upgraded planes flown by poorly-trained pilots. This resulted in an ineffective air force, which had almost no other option but to resort to Kamikaze attacks due to insufficient training and equipment. Note that we are talking about average pilots here, because those win the war not a small number of extraordinary aces. (Tagaya: p. 192-193)

Conclusion

To conclude, similar to Germany, Japan wasn’t ready for a war long-war on a global scale in terms of its industrial capabilities. But only looking at the industrial side of a country when it comes to analyzing a war can be misleading, because one might miss important areas of improvement. One way to avoid this is, to take a look at engagements, when the economic power of the winning factions wasn’t yet the determining factor. For the War in the Pacific these were the Guadalcanal campaign and the Battle of Midway. In both cases the Japanese committed various errors and the United States proved to be a skillful enemy even without superior numbers. Thus, the turning point of the war in the Pacific was before the United States could bring its full numerical advantage to the table. Something that was clearly different from the war in Europe. (Tagaya: p. 196-197) Finally, the Japanese reluctance to move away from their strong focus on combat at the cost of logistics and support, played an important role in the reversal after their initial successes. (Tagaya: p. 196-197)

Notes

The video a summary of the article listed in the sources.

Sources

Books & Articles

  • Tagaya, Osamu: The Imperial Japanese Air Forces, In: Higham & Harris: Why Air Forces Fail
  • Corum, James S.: Defeat of the Luftwaffe, 1935-1945, In: Higham & Harris: Why Air Forces Fail
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Disclaimer

Amazon Associates Program: “Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.”

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Atlantic Wall – Example of a Coastal Defense Position (Atlantikwall)

Background

The Atlantic Wall or “Atlantikwall” in German was an extensive system of coastal defences and fortifications reaching from the South of France to the Northern parts of Norway. In some areas the defenses were quite formidable, whereas in others areas they were lacking. In this video I give you a short overview on the French parts of the Atlantic Wall and then show you how an individual infantry division was setup for coastal defense.

Principles and Organization of the Defense

Let’s start with the basic principles of the German defensive setup. The German High command analyzed the amphibious operations in Italy in 1943 and concluded that the most successful way to defend against an Invasion was to destroy the enemies landing force as soon as possible. The plan was to deploy strong forces in the coastal area in fortified positions, these troops should be stacked properly to provide a deep defense and supported by local reserves for counter-attacks. The units were ordered to hold out until the end. This should provide enough time to mount a strategic counter-attack with motorized units. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 463 (amazon.de affiliate link))

To give you some direct references, the German Army Command in the West (OB West) and it’s commander Generalfeldmarschall Rundstedt noted:
“Unser Vorfeldhindernis ist das Meer, der beste Panzergraben!” – “Our first defensive obstacle is the sea, the best tank ditch!” (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 463)
And also “Im Bereich West gibt es kein Ausweichen.” (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 463 (amazon.com affiliate link to the English Version))
“In the Area West there is no evasion.”

The last directive was probably influenced by the fact that the chances of surrendering were considerably higher on the Western Front than on the Eastern Front, because it was known to most German soldiers that they were treated quite well by the Western Allies. Thus surrendering was a viable option to German soldiers on the Western front. The German Generals were very well aware of this and it was quite troublesome for them. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 499-500) Since, we covered the basic principles of the defense, let’s take a look at the high-level organization of the defense.

Organization of the Defense on the strategic level

Among the German Commanders and leaders there was a consensus about the general defensive strategy, but there was some serious debate on how the units for a counter-attack should be deployed. There were basically two approaches, a decentralized approach in which motorized units were located closely to the front lines or a centralized approach, whereas a large group of units was stationed farther from the front. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 464)

In January 1944 a decisions was reached. One part of the tank divisions would be stationed close to the landing areas and additionally a central reserve would be deployed in Paris. The whole discussion and planning of the defense strategy was almost exclusively performed by army commanders, the Navy and Air Force were not really considered. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 464-465) So let’s take a look at the construction of the Atlantic Wall.

This is also reflected by the fact that the intention was to destroy the enemy during the invasion or shortly afterwards, but not prior to the landing, which was of course almost impossible due to Allied Air and Naval superiority. Yet, it underlines again the primacy of the German Army above the other branches. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 465)

Construction Process

The construction of the fortifications initially was mainly aimed at freeing up soldiers for the other front lines. Yet this changed in Fall 1943, up from that point more focus was put into providing a strong defense against an upcoming invasion.(Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 466)

The German High Command assumed an attack would be most likely in the Calais and Le Havre area, thus there was a strong regional focus on these areas. The regions of Normandy and Bretagne were of lesser importance, but everything else in France was of minor importance and very little fortifications were planned and constructed there. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 465)
The constructions of the Atlantic Wall required a large amount of construction workers. Although many foreign workers were transferred into Germany, in June 1944 still around 140 000 non-Germans and 18 000 Germans were used for the build-up of the Atlantic Wall. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 466) Yet, a large part of these workers were used to repair damages from the Allied bombing campaign and French Resistance attacks, furthermore some were also used for building up V-weapon bases. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 466) Let’s take a look at the total numbers.
Until the end of 1943 around 8500 fortifications and emplacements were constructed. Until the invasion about 12 200 (12247) fortifications in total were finished on the Western French Coast. Additionally, half a million beach obstacles and 6.5 million mines were placed. These fortifications were equipped with a large amount of artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft, which were often protected by concrete emplacements. In the Normandy region there was often a lack of resources and workers, thus even some large guns were without proper fortifications. Yet, in the areas were the Germans anticipated an Allied attack the fortifications were numerous and well-protected against bombing attacks. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 467-470)

Organization of the Units

Now, the chain of command and the authorities were quite complicated due to regional, functional and other structures. Some of these structures may have been useful, but often it was more about the prestige of some commanders. I spare you the details and just give you an example on how the various “relationships” of the 2nd Panzerdivision. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 474-475)

The division was part of the Panzergruppe West, operationally it was under the authority of the I. SS-Panzerkorps, territorially (05:00) it was under the command of the Military Administration in Belgium and Northern France and in terms of supplies it was attached to the 15h Army. This layout was not an isolated case. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 474-475)
CAPTION: „I will get a Bier now, because you are all drunk anyway.“
After all German bureaucracy is like war, and war never changes.

Overall Troop Quality

Let’s take at the quality of the troops. The units that manned the fortifications of the Atlantic Wall were mostly second rate German infantry divisions, they so called “bodenständige Divisionen”, which were infantry division intended for a static defense. They only had a very limited amount of transport capacity, no recon units and usually only 2 infantry regiments instead of 3. Furthermore, they often lacked properly trained NCOs and officers. These units were also often equipped with various captured equipment, thus of lower quality and complicating the logistical situation. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 481) In total around 25 of these static divisions were present since Fall 1943. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 476)
Additionally, various units were shipped to France to be regrouped and reinforced, yet usually these units were extremely depleted and exhausted. Thus, they were of limited use especially since the often replaced other troops that were transferred out to other front lines. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 476)

The motorized divisions, which should constitute a counter-attack were limited initially. In Fall 1943 only 2 were deployed in France, yet this number increased to 11 divisions until June 1944. About 5 of these units were sufficiently equipped, but the 6 others lacked tanks and other equipment. In total there were about 1860 armored vehicles available at the time of the invasion. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 480-481)

The State of the Air Force and Navy

Before we take a look at the defense layout of an infantry division on the coast, some information about the overall state of the German Air Force and Navy on the Western front. The situation was dire and got worse, it was unable to provide proper defense against the continuous air strikes from the Allies. Furthermore, in May 1944 the Allies focused their bombing attacks on the German fuel production, which considerably limited the ability of the Luftwaffe in its mobility and training. In case of an invasion, it was planned to transfer several air units from other areas. Yet, still that would only bring the number of planes to a total of around 1650 operational aircraft. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 483-485) At the same time the Allies had more than 9000 aircraft available over Normandy. (Source: Wikipedia )

This air supremacy of the Allies also prevented almost any operations of the German Navy. Due to detection by enemy radar the German ships couldn’t leave the harbors without being faced with immediate air and naval attacks. Thus, deploying naval mines in a systematic fashion was not possible. There were German plans to mine the coastal regions in Normandy, but the Allies successfully prevented these operations. (Deutsche Reich & 2. WK: Band 7; S. 485-487)

Defense Layout for of an infantry divisions (348th Infantry Division)

Now, lets take a closer look at the defense layout of the coastal region that was defended by the 348th infantry division. It was a bodenständige Division, thus intended for a static defense. The coastal area defended by this unit was about 30 to 35 km in length. On the Northern flank the 344th Infantry division and on the Southern flank the 245th infantry division were deployed.

Infantry Regiment Deployment

The 348th consisted of two infantry regiments. One regiment defended the Northern region and the other the Southern region.
There are numerous emplacements and defensive positions. I don’ really have any clear information about them, but I assume most of them were fortified with concrete fortifications considering the amount of passive defenses.

Artillery Deployment

The southern region contained a company from a coastal artillery battalion or “Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung” and an army artillery battalion or “Heeres Artillerie-Abteilung”. As far as I know these battalions were not part of the division itself, which had its own artillery regiment. A total of 14 batteries of these units were deployed at the following positions. And furthermore, there were another three batteries for 10cm artillery pieces.

Passive defenses, mines and obstacles

Now there were various static defense and obstacles:
First off there were a “few” mine fields, yeah, well, now you know why they needed 6.5 million of those little bastards.
There were 4 areas that were protected by hedgehogs in front of them.
Another 5 areas that used ramming logs some of them are located in the water or directly on the beach area.
And finally one area was protected by an anti-tank wall, which was the location of one the headquarters units. So let’s take a closer look at those.

Headquarter units

The headquarters unit for one infantry regiment was located here at the anti-tank wall, which is located right behind the forward area of the defenses and also in well centered. The same goes for the second regiment headquarters in the South. At little bit more behind, but again in the center is the divisional headquarters located, which is also the position for the headquarters of the artillery regiment and the signal battalion.

Reserve Areas

Now there were 5 areas for reserves, 4 of divisional reserves and one regimental reserve. The only regimental reserve was located very close to the front line in the North. A little bit more behind was a divisional reserve area. Then there was a large reserve area next to the division headquarters, where a company of assault guns and an anti-tank platoon were deployed. There was another reserve area next to the division HQ and one in the Southern area close to the front line.

Conclusion

To summarize, the Atlantic Wall wasn’t an impenetrable defensive line nor was it just hollow propaganda. The quality and quantity of the defensive positions varied a lot and was closely related to the German Commanders assumed invasion location, which was not the Normandy. The strategic reserve to counter an invasion was deployed as a decentralized reaction force in combination with a centralized mobile force to perform counter-attacks.

Due to the Allied Air Superiority the German Air Force and Navy were basically incapable of providing any substantial contribution during the preparation against the invasion and the invasion itself. Furthermore, the constant air strikes severely reduced the amount of the available work force due to the need for repairs that couldn’t be spent on constructing fortifications and obstacles.

Sources

Books

Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg – Band 7: Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive – Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943-1944/45 (amazon.de affiliate link)

Germany and the Second World War – Volume 7: The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944/5 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Fortress Europe: Hitler’s Atlantic Wall by George Forty (amazon.com affiliate link)

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Disclaimer amazon.com

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

Disclaimer amazon.co.uk

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie
Heeres-Artillerie-Abteilungen
348th Infantry Division

Arado Ar 234 – The First Jet Bomber and some special Variants

Intro

The Arado 234 was the first operational jet-powered bomber in the world. Only a little more than 200 were built, even less saw actual combat. Nevertheless, it earned its place in aviation history and is worshipped by some members of the War Thunder community as a deity.

The initial studies for the Arado 234 were started as early as late Fall 1940. Yet, these designs were focused on creating a medium-range recon aircraft not a jet-bomber. It should use jet engines that at that time were still in development. The planned aircraft should be immune to interception due to its operational altitude and speed. In 1941 one air-frame (E370) was selected and the designation Ar 234 was chosen. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich: p. 49)

Basic Design

The design was a one seated air frame with a shoulder-mounted wing, it was a clean and simple design. The cockpit should be pressurized. The design provided an all-around view to the front, yet there was no view to the rear. Since a large part of the fuselage was used for fuel tanks and the thin wings didn’t provide sufficient storage space for a traditional undercarriage there were many different proposals to solve this issue. The system, which was selected was a take-off trolley that would be dropped shortly after take-off and in order to land a centrally-mounted skid with smaller skids was used.

This system was kinda odd, but what followed was probably even more odd. The air-frame was ready in Winter 1941, but the jet engines were still not ready for about 1 year. Thus, it was proposed to install piston engines, yet due to the low ground clearance this wasn’t possible. Yet, meanwhile nobody started to redesign the air frame in order to house a proper landing gear system or at least I couldn’t find any information about this. Because later on, it became obvious rather quickly that a landing gear was needed and the air frame was redesigned to create space for a landing gear mechanism. I am not sure if the landing skid oversight is hindsight bias, lack of sources, an engineering or political issue.

Series Overview

There were three different main series of the Arado. The A-Series which were the prototypes with the landing skid, the B-Series, which was an improved A-Series with landing gear and other improvements and finally the Ar 234 C Series, which had 4 jet-engines instead of 2, although of a different type.

Now the production numbers for these series vary widely, but take these values with a grain of salt, because prototypes and pre-production aircraft are sometimes counted and sometimes not, furthermore some C-Series planes were converted from the A-Series, thus there is probably some double-counting going on:

Around 7 A-Series prototypes were built, the B-Series saw 210 production aircraft and the C Series saw 10 prototypes and 14 pre-production and production types.(Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich: p. 56) Thus, in total less than 250 planes were produced. These numbers are very low, in comparison around 1400 Me 262 were built, 6500 He-111 and 15 000 Ju 88. (and 34 000 Bf 109s.) (numbers from Wikipedia)

Now of these few hundred planes even less were operational at any given point in time, this was due to several factors like the unreliable engines that needed be overhauled after a few flight hours and had a very limited service life:

the short operational lifespan of the jet engines – rarely more than ten hours between [a] major overhaul – dictated the availability of the jet for combat.

(Source: p. 2 Sterling Michael Pavelec: The German Jet Program 1939-1945)

The reasons for this were that jet engines were a new technology, but this situation got more complicated due to the lack of rare materials, thus leading to the use of lesser quality substitutes and finally since fuel was also very limited often low-quality fuel was utilized.

Now let’s take a closer look at the different types:

Ar 234A Series

As mentioned before the original air frame was ready in late 1941, but due to the lack of engines and inability to use piston engines, it couldn’t be properly tested. It took more than a year for the first pre-production jet-engines to arrive in February 1943 (pre-production Jumo 004A). Yet, these engines weren’t cleared for flying, thus they were only used for taxying around the plane on the runway. Finally, after new engines arrived the first flight was performed in Mid-June 1943 (15th).

The main problem with the skids became apparent early on. The aircraft couldn’t be maneuvered after landing and had to be towed, which was problematic with cluttered airfields and especially due the threat of strafing attacks. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich: p. 51) Furthermore, the parachute on the trolley usually didn’t work properly thus breaking it repeatedly. Hence, the plane was redesigned to add an undercarriage system into the fuselage. This lead to the Arado 234 B model.

Ar 234B Series Blitz

Which had its maiden flight as a prototype (the Ar 234 V9) in March 1944. In June 1944 the first pre-production flight of the Ar 234B-0 was performed. Another prototype was equipped with a periscope bomb sight and bomb shackles for bombing trials. Some planes were also equipped with a landing chutes and so called “Rauchgeräte” literally meaning “smoke devices”, which were rockets that assisted in take-offs. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich p. 51-53)
Pre-Production planes were tested and in one flight Mach 0.86 was achieved, but it is not sure if this is correct, because compressibility effects normally began to manifest themselves in the vicinity of Mach 0.78. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich p. 51)

The two main version of the B Series were the Ar234B-1 and the Ar234B-2. The Ar234B-1 was a simple recon version. Whereas the Ar 234B-2 was more versatile and suitable for bombing, pathfinding and photographic recon. There were many different modifications and systems that were fitted on some planes like special recon equipment, drop tanks and bomb sights. There was a bomb sight for level bombing, but also a bombing system that allowed for glide and shallow dive-bombing. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich p. 53)

Operational History

The B-Series aircraft were the only once that were used on the front line, yet due their limited number and the fuel situation they had very little to no influence beyond the tactical level. Hence, the operational history will be rather short.

The very first units flew recon missions above British East Coast harbors in order to determine if an invasion of the Netherlands was being prepared. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich p. 53) Some units of the Kampfgeschwader 76 flew bombing missions during the Ardennes Offensive in late 1944 and early 1945. Furthermore, in March 1945 several missions in combination with Me 262 were flown against the Rhine bridge at Remagen, which was captured intact by US forces earlier on. Yet, these attacks were without success. A few planes were also used for recon missions in Northern Italy. The last planes were basically grounded due to a lack of fuel.(Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich p. 54-55)

Ar 234C Series

Now, the intended follow up for the B-Series was the C-Series. The air-frame of the Ar 234 was strong enough to withstand considerably more power than two Jumo 004B engines could provide. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich: p. 55) Thus it was proposed to create a variant that used 4 BMW 003A turbojets that were smaller and lighter. The first trials began in February 1944 and used airframes from the Ar 234 A variant (Ar 234 V8; Ar234 V6 followed in April 1944). One version used four engines in two nacelles (Ar 234 V8), whereas another used 4 engines in 4 individual nacelles (Ar 234 V8), the first version proved be more suitable and was adapted for the Ar 234 C series. There were several modifications in the C Series that differed from the B Series, most notably a redesigned cockpit, cabin, skin re-contouring, aileron design and an enlarged nose wheel. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich: p. 56) Yet, only pre-production aircraft were produced. There were around 8 sub variants planned and developed, which delayed the overall process. The first five variants were the:

  • Ar 234C-1: a recon plane, with camera and 2 aft-firing MG151.
  • Ar 234C-2: a bomber variant, intended to use 1×1000 kg bomb and 2x 500kg bombs and probably the best known variant due to War Thunder the
  • Ar 234C-3: a multipurpose variant that could be used as a bomber, ground attack or night fighter, armed with 2 forward firing MG151 and 2 aft-firing MG151.
  • Ar 234C-4: BMW 003C powered recon
  • Ar 234C-5: two seat bomber, with bombardier and navigator

Size & Dimension

Time to take a look at the size and dimensions of the Arado 234. In overall the dimension of the different series were very similar or unchanged, for instance the wingspan and horizontal stabilizer didn’t change at all and length only increased by less than half a meter between the A and the C Series. Since, the B Series saw the most action, here are the dimensions for Arado 234 B-1 according to the drawings from the 6th of December 1944 by the “Entwurfsabteilung” which means design department in English. For scale there is a figure with a height of 1.8 m.
The Arado had a length of 12.62 m, a wingspan of 14.4m, the distance between the highest point of the rudder and the lowest of the undercarriage was 4.28 m and the horizontal stabilizer was 5 m wide. Now these absolute measures more or less intuitive.

Dimensions for all 3 Series

Arado 234-A (according to the drawing from 13th July 1943)

Length: 12.58 m (41.3 ft)
Wingspan: 14.2 m (46.6 ft)
Height (from top to the bottom of the extended skid): 3.75 m (12.3 ft)
Wingspan horizontal stabilizer: 5 m (16.4 ft)

Arado 234 B-1 (according to the drawing from 6th December 1944, Entwurfsabteilung; S. 21)

Length: 12.62 m (41.4 ft)
Wingspan: 14.4 m (47.2 ft)
Height (from top to the bottom of the undercarriage): 4.28 m (14.0 ft)
Wingspan horizontal stabilizer: 5 m (16.4 ft)

Arado 234 C- 3 mit 4xBMW 109003 A1 (according to the drawing from 9th September 1944, Entwurfsabteilung; S. 28)

Length: 12.84 m (42.1 ft)
Wingspan: 14.4 m (47.2 ft)
Height (from top to the bottom of the undercarriage): 4.15 m (13.6 ft)
Wingspan horizontal stabilizer: 5 m (16.4 ft)

Comparison to Bf109 and He111

So let’s take a look how they compare to other planes.
The Bf109 had a length of around 9m, the He 111 was almost 4 meters longer than the Arado with it’s 12.6 m, as you can see the Arado is even small for German medium bombers. In contrast a a B-17 G was about 22.7m (22.66m) in length although this should only give you an indication on the size difference, because both planes were designed with completely different concepts in mind.

Technical Specification

Now let’s take a look at the performance and weapon loadout, as noted before the Arado 234 was designed primarily as a recon plane, it was later fitted with bombs, but those were mounted outside and thus created drag. Yet, considering the small size of the plane the maximum bomb load was not too bad with 1500 kg, in comparison the He-111 could carry up to 2000 kg in its internal bomb bays.
(Values for the Ar 234B-2 according to Green Williams: Warplanes of the Third Reich, p. 55)

The maximum speed at an altitude of 6000 m (19500 ft) was 742 km/h – 461 mph
At an altitude of 10000m (32800 ft) it was 700 km/h – 435 mph
It’s Range without bombload was 1630 km and with bombs around 1550 km
Range: 1630 km – 1013 Miles
Range with bombs: 1556 km – 967 Miles

The overall flight performance of the Arado was very well perceived by its pilots. It was a highly maneuverable plane and handled well at speeds below 900 km/h (560 mph), thus the handling was only problematic during dives. At that speed the plane became nose-heavy and the elevators sloppy, thus maintaining a straight dive could be problematic. (Green Williams: Warplanes of the Third Reich, p. 55) The major problem was the reliability of the engines, which also could flameout during flight and under certain circumstances not be restarted again. (Green Williams: Warplanes of the Third Reich, p. 55)
The major problem was the reliability of the engines, which required frequent overhauls. Also if an engine flamed-out it could only restarted below 4000 m and a speed between 400 km/h (250 mph) and 500 km/h (310 mph). Above these values relighting was not possible. (Green Williams: Warplanes of the Third Reich, p. 55)

Interesting Variants

Now, I got my hands on a book full of Arado documents and there were many interesting variants in it, some, which never left the drawing board, but are nevertheless interesting so let’s have a look.

Early Fighter Variant

The first that caught my attention was a basic drawing dated to the 22nd of May 1943. (S. 14-15) It is a fighter Variant of the Arado. It has a different nose configuration, which should have included armor plates to protect the pilot from the front, since the regular version only had an armor plate in the back. Furthermore, it was proposed to equip it with 3x30mm Mk 108 machine cannons and 4x20mm MG151 machine cannons. Whereas 2 of them would be aimed backwards.
It seems that this early fighter variant served as a foundation for the propsed Night Fighter Variant the Ar 234P. (Green Williams, Warplanes of the Third Reich: p. 58)
Now, you might think that the Arado would be not a good fighter, but well, there is a report from from Mid-June 1944 about various flight demonstrations of German and captured Allied aircraft. Due to the agility of the Arado, the State Secretary of the Aviation Ministry (Erhard Milch) wanted to see a comparison between the turning performance of the Ar 264 and the Me 262. To quote from the report:

It showed the clear superiority of the Ar 234 in a turn fight; Ar 234 V10 had the 262 several times in front of its barrels. The Me 262 yet was able to run away during disengagements.

(Report about the Exhibition of the Ar 234 in Rechlin 12th & 13th June 1944 – Source: Arado Ar 234 – Eine Dokumentation, Band 1; Karl R. Pawlas, 1976, S. 157)

Dieser zeigte die eindeutige Überlegenheit der Ar 234 im Kurvenkampf; Ar 234 V10 hatte die 262 mehrfach vor den Rohren. Die Me 262 konnte jedoch bei Absetzbewegungen davonlaufen.

(Bericht über Vorführung Ar 234 in Rechlin am 12. u. 13.6.1944 – Source: Arado Ar 234 – Eine Dokumentation, Band 1; Karl R. Pawlas, 1976, S. 157)

I will probably do a short video and transcript on the full report, because it contains some interesting views of the Germans on their own and Allied planes. Furthermore, it would be an interesting idea for a War Thunder reenactment, because many planes are actually available in the game already.

Anti-Escort Variant

There was another proposed version that was title “Jagdeinsatz gegen Begleitschutzjäger – 16.12.1944 Entwurfsabteilung” which roughly means “Deployment against Escort-Fighters”. It included a sketch and also a chart with the altitude and speed for the P-38 Lightning, P-47 Thunderbolt and P-51 Mustang. It is dated for Mid-December 1944 and was one of the many subvariants for the Arado 234 C Series. It should have been equipped with 3 so called “Magirus Bombs”, which were gun pods with 2×20 mm MG151 machine gun cannons. One under the fuselage and one under each engine, similar to the bomb layout.(S. 37) The weight for such a gun pod with 2xMG151 with 200 shots per barrel is given with 230 kg (507 lbs). (Since there is a bomb loadout with 3×250 kg for the Arado 234 C3 in War Thunder you could try out the basic flight performance.) These gun pods would probably be a very interesting variant for War Thunder.
Now, there is also a protocol from a meeting held about 6 months earlier in June 1944, just a few days before D-Day. Which clearly states that the Ar 234 C could be equipped with 3 Magirus bombs and used a “Hilfsjäger” support-fighter, but there is no interest in such an arrangement. Although it is noted in the paragraph below that an Ar 234 C should be equipped with an armored and pressurized cabin to be used as a high-altitude fighter “Höhenjäger” with 2xMG151 (S. 141). Hence, the Anti-Escort variant was probably the high-altitude fighter variant with additional gun pods.

Conclusion

Although the Arado 234 was initially designed to be a recon plane it was successfully adopted as a jet bomber and probably would have been also successful as a night-fighter and maybe even as a day-fighter. In this regards it is similar to other German medium bombers like the Do 217 and Ju 88, which also served as night fighters. Considering that it was the first of its kind, it definitely performed very well besides the engine reliability, which was also heavily influenced by the desperate state of German resources that late in the war.
Today, there is only one surviving Arado 234 left, which is owned by the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. Right now, it seems to be located at the Steven F. Udvar-Havy Center in Chantilly, Virginia, but better check the link to be sure.

Sources

Books & Theses

William Green: The Warplanes of the Third Reich (amazon.com affiliate link)

Karl R. Pawlas: Arado Ar 234 – Eine Dokumentation, Band 1; 1976 (amazon.de affiliate link)

Sterling Michael Pavelec: The German Jet Program 1939-1945 (Master thesis, free to download)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

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Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

Airvectors Arado 234 Article

Aviation History Arado 234 Article

Arado 234 at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum

Battle Of Britain – The Fighting & Balance of Force

Intro – Fuzziness: Phases & Geography

The Battle of Britain is like a cuddly toy, it is popular, everybody wants to touch it and it’s very fuzzy.
Or as professor Overy put it:

“Most battles have a clear shape to them. They start on a particular day, they are fought on a geographically defined ground, they end at a recognizable moment, usually with the defeat of one protagonist or the other. None of these things can be said of the Battle of Britain.”

The geography of the Battle of Britain is wide and fuzzy, due to several reasons. First, the German attacks were flown against various targets like ships, economic targets and airfields. Second, the RAF also flew attacks against German shipping, industry and harbors. And third, it is often neglected that the Royal Navy, Kriegsmarine, Bomber and Coastal Command were also involved, after all the Battle of Britain was seen by both sides as a prelude to the Invasion of Great Britain. Thus, it would be a quite limited view to just think about Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe fighting above England.

Balance of Force – Aircraft & Wrong Estimates

Let’s take a look at the overall balance of force or probably more interesting the overall perception of force based on estimates.
Both sides usually had wrong or completely wrong estimates on the other side’s capabilities and amount of operational planes and/or destroyed throughout the whole battle.
Now to get a proper force estimation you need basically three numbers:

  1. The initial strength
  2. The number of replacements
  3. The number of losses

The British got the first, second and third number wrong. Whereas the Germans got the second and third number wrong. At first, you might think, well the Germans were less wrong so they should have made better assumptions, well no, because they were wrong in the wrong way. They underestimated the replacement output of the British, whereas the British overestimated the replacement output of the Germans. So let’s take a look at the numbers

Strength Estimates

Now, for the initial strength the Luftwaffe got their estimate in Mid July 1940 close on for the total number of British Fighters and the operational ones with 900 and 675 operational, since in August the Fighter Command had around 700 operational planes.
In contrast to the British estimate of the front line strength of the Luftwaffe at around 5800 aircraft in August 1940, whereas the frontline strength for the Luftwaffe in September was about 3000 planes with 2000 operational, with about 1700 aircraft used against Britain.

Production Estimates

Now, in terms of production
The British assumed the German aircraft output was around 2000 planes per month, whereas the Germans estimated that British industry could produce 200 fighters per month.
Well, the real numbers were quite different, the Germans on average could only produce 1000 planes, whereas the British produced a bit more than 400 fighters per month.
So basically, both sides got the production numbers wrong by a factor of at least 2x times, just in different directions.

Kill estimates

Now in terms of reported kills both sides also got highly inflated kill numbers, but since the British overestimated all German numbers this number actually corrected their estimates in the correct direction, whereas due to the German underestimation of British production this lead to a very wrong number.
As a result, the Germans assumed to fight a way smaller force than they actually did, which lead to flawed strategic decisions, because it was often assumed that Fighter Command was beaten, thus switching to new stage in a plan that was missing the prerequisite stage.
Around spring 1941 those estimates finally approached reality.

The Battle of Britain is usually divided into four phases. Of course the exact dates of those differ a bit.

Phase 1 – Foreplay

The first phase of the Battle was in June and July, it was used by both sides to learn and adapt. The German operations were in a way armed recon combined with hit and run attacks. The amount of bomber aircraft was limited, whereas a large amount of fighter were used. During the day the area of operation was mostly the British coastline, yet during night targets all over Britain were attacked.

The British adapted their approach and only sent a small amount of fighters against attacks, in case they were just diversions. The improved their tactics, coordination and communication.
The Germans learned that their bombers needed escort since Fighter Command prioritized bombers. Which meant that they had to give up flexibility one of their strongest advantages, since German fighter pilots were mostly trained in free-roaming hunting mission.

Phase 2 – Attack on Fighter Command

The second phase began around Mid August 1940.
Now, the German attacks focused on destroying the British fighters and airfields. For about 4 weeks the German started around 50 main attacks against airfields, yet only about 30 of those were fighter airfields. Additionally, there were around 1000 small raids against other targets like industry, supplies and communications, whereas there were only 6 major raids against radar installations.

The attack on the airfields were of limited success, some were put out of operations for several days or nights in total, whereas by end of August German Air Intelligence assumed that at least 8 airfields were completely knocked out and many others badly damaged. This was clearly not the case, since no airfield was permanently put out of action.
Fighter Command adapted and used squadrons to protect important airfields, whereas others attacked the raids. Hurricanes were usually used against bombers, whereas Spitfires were used to attack enemy fighters.

The British defense system described in my earlier video was probably never really understood by the Germans, they assumed the British were fighting a decentralized battle, where each airfield fought for its own. This was probably the reason, why there was no systematic attack on radar installations. Furthermore, the Germans overestimated the amount of damage they inflicted against fighters or installations. They assumed that in August about 50 % of the British fighters were destroyed. In early September it was reported to Göring that the Fighter Command had only about 100 operational fighters left.

Well, the real numbers were a bit off, if you define the difference of 600 fighters as a bit.
Yet, the heavy fighting took a toll on both sides.

During the time period from 6 August to 2 September the Fighter Command lost 440 fighter planes. Whereas the Germans lost 440 in the shorter period from 8th August to 31st of August. Additionally the lost another 460 aircraft.

Due to the extensive fighting the Luftwaffe and the Fighter Command showed signs of exhaustion.

Yet, in early September came the switch to attack primarily London, which removed pressure from Fighter command. This decision is actually almost uniformly seen as the beginning of the third phase.
Now this decision is usually regarded as a revenge attack for the bombing of Berlin. This assumptions seems to be wrong, first the attacks are often solely attributed to Hitler, but as Overy puts it: “The decision to launch attacks on London rested with Hitler, but all the preparation was in place long before.” Second, London was already bombed before the bombings on Berlin.

Phase 3 – 7th Sep. – Nailing one spot

The attack on London was problematic for the Luftwaffe. The fighters were operating at the limits of their range. The losses from the previous weeks of heavy fighting were extensive and Göring ordered the fighters to fly not above the bombers anymore, but directly with them, which lessened their flexibility even more. Due to the high losses, main bombing attacks switched gradually to night bombing.

For the London attacks the Luftwaffe attacked from a higher altitude, this presented several problems for the RAF. First Radar was less accurate and second their fighters usually couldn’t get above the German planes, which was the ideal attack positions. To adapt to this situation fighters were given more time to assemble and Spitfires were flying high altitude patrols.
The losses for the Luftwaffe were high, in the first week the Germans almost 200 bombers and 100 fighters. Whereas the RAF lost 120 fighters. The losses continued to be high and after about 10 days the Luftwaffe switched to night-time attacks.

Although the invasion of England was called off the Battle of Britain wasn’t over, the air attacks on Great Britain were continued and around October 1940 it entered the fourth and final phase.

Phase 4 – Outro

This phase consisted mostly of night bombings by bombers and large daylight fighter operations.
The night bombings could only be engaged by anti-aircraft fire and thus the losses were minor, after October the German losses were to 50 % from accidents related to weather conditions.
The daylight operations were performed with fighter-bombers that were heavily escorted. The goal was to finish off the British defenses, which only made sense due to the complete wrong estimations of German Air Intelligence. Yet, these attacks were flown at high altitudes were the Bf 109 had a performance advantages thus the loss ratio of the Fighter Command was increasing, but it was too late and too little. Finally in November the daylight operations faded away and the Battle of Britain was over.

The course of the battle can be represented in numerous ways, probably the easiest way to demonstrate the continuous shift is by showing the shift in the number of fighter pilots.

Balance of Force – Pilots

This clearly shows that the notion of “the few” against “many” may be a bit off. But the notion itself isn’t completely incorrect, it is just a matter of perspective. Because 1) these are only the numbers for fighter pilots and 2) the Fighter Command usually engaged first with a small group of fighters. Thus a small group of British fighter often met a big German air group.
This is a good reminder that the small picture is often more intriguing, but the big picture is usually closer to the truth. Or to put it another way, it is hard to analyze a war while you are sitting in a trench or a cockpit for that matter.

Sources

Books

Overy, Richard: The Battle of Britain – The Myth and the Reality (amazon.com affiliate link)

Maier, Klaus A.: Die Luftschlacht über England in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg.): Der Zweite Weltkrieg (amazon.de affiliate link)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

The RAF Fighter Control System

RAF Museum – Background Battle of Britain

Never was so much owed by so many to so few

Notes on Accuracy & „Methodology“

(1) Almost all numbers are from Overy: The Battle of Britain (see sources).
(2) Estimates and actual numbers are often from different time, they are intended to show how off the estimates were NOT the actual balance of force.
(3) Most numbers are rounded.
(4) The composition of plane-types in the visualization is not accurate except when it is explicitly a number stated fort that type of aircraft.

Yorktown vs. Shokaku class Carriers – USS Enterprise vs. IJN Zuikaku

Intro

In Mid 1942 two of the most modern aircraft carriers in the US Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy were the USS Enterprise and the HIJMS Zuikaku. So let’s take a look their dimensions, defensive capabilities and aircraft loadout.

Dimensions

The length for the Enterprise was 251 m or 824 feet, whereas the Zuikaku was 257 m or 845 feet long.
Looking at the overall dimensions, one would assume that USS Enterprise would be about the weight of Zuikaku, but according to various sources this wasn’t the case at all. Most values differ, but all sources have one thing in common. Namely, that the displacement of the Zuikaku is significantly higher than that of the Enterprise. Since I couldn’t find a proper explanation, I started asking questions and thanks to several people mentioned in the description, here are the answers.

One aspect to consider is that the Enterprise was built under treaty regulations and the Zuikaku wasn’t, so the values of the Enterprise are probably a higher than on the official records.
But lies are only one part of the story, additionally, there were clear difference in terms of construction and equipment.
First, The Enterprise had a welded hull which is lighter than the riveted hull of the Shokaku class.
Second, the Yorktown class had only one hangar and it was an open hangar, which requires less weight.
Third, the Enterprise was less armored and had a weaker under-water protection.
Fourth, the Zuikaku had considerable more horsepower, which requires bigger and stronger machinery.
These are the main factors that contribute to the considerable higher displacement of the Zuikaku.

Anti-Aircraft Armament

Now, in terms of anti-aircraft weaponry in June 1942, the Enterprise had 8 5 inch, 4 quad 1.1 inch and 30 20mm guns. The Zuikaka had 16 5 inch guns and 12 triple 25 mm guns.
One way to compare the AA defense is with some simple math. Let’s take the effective rate of fire multiply it with the weight of the shell and with number of guns. Then sum it all up and we get around 6000 kg per minute for the Enterprise and 4000 kg for the Zuikaku. So every minute the Enterprise could throw a Panzerkampfwagen I at you, whereas the Zuikaku could only manage a light Scout Car.

Besides putting out one third less stopping weight than the Enterprise, the Zuikaku had another problem the tracking speed and fire control systems of Japanese guns were inferior, especially for the 25mm guns. Thus, the effectiveness of those shots put into the air was considerable less than that of the USS Enterprise. This significantly lowered the defensive capabilities of the Shokaku class.

Radar

The Shokaku class carriers originally had no radar, both ships were later equipped with radars but that was after the battle of Midway. The lack of radar was major weakness, because the only way to detect enemy aircraft was with optics and the Mark I Eyeball. Since Japanese Aircraft (Stille: p. 9) radios were of low quality often no proper warning could be given by or to Combat Air Patrols in order to provide a coordinated defense.

In contrast the Enterprise was equipped with a radar that could detect small aircraft at about 3000 m altitude at a range of about 90 kilometers or 55 miles.

Armor

In terms of passive defense the Shokaku class carriers were better equipped than the Yorktown class carriers. The maximum value of Zuikaku’s belt armor was about 6.5in whereas the Enterprise had a maximum of 4 inch. The same for the deck armor with a maximum of 2.6 inches vs. 1.5 inch of the Enterprise. Furthermore, the Shokaku class featured a more sophisticated torpedo protection system than the Yorktown class carriers.

Aircraft Loadout

The Aircraft loadouts are for the Battle of Midway for Enterprise in June 1942 and for Pearl Harbor for the Zuikaku in December 1941, because the Zuikaku nor the Shokaku were present at the Battle of Midway. But the order of battle for the Japanese squadrons was similar.
In terms of fighter, the Zuikaku had 15 A6M2 Zeros and the Enterprise had 27 F4F Wildcats.
The Zuikaku had 27 B5N2 Kates, whereas the Enterprise had only 14 TBD Devastator Torpedo bombers. The Zuikaku again fielded the 27 planes for the dive bomber force, in contrast to the 38 SBD Dauntlesses of the Enterprise.

In total the Zuikaku had 69 operational aircraft and the Enterprise 79. Yet, the Zuikaku had another 12 spare aircraft in storage that could be made operational. Thus increasing the total number to 82 aircraft while the maximum load was 84 aircraft. But the Enterprise also had less than her maximum loadout of 90 aircraft.

Now, there are two interesting aspects here:
First, the total number of planes of the Enterprise is higher than that of the Zuikaku, although the Zuikaku had two hangars.
Second, there is a significant higher amount of dive bombers on the American side.
Why was that the case?

The US and Japanese approach towards storing and servicing aircraft was different the US used a so-called deck park. As a result the US carriers used the Hangar space and the flight deck to store planes, whereas the Japanese were limited to the hangar space.

Now, why were there so many more dive bombers on the US side?
This is due three reasons, first the US Navy assumed that Torpedo bombers were inferior and kept them mainly for attacking Battleships. Second, the US Navy thought that a dive bomber attack is better suited for limiting flight operations of an enemy carrier. And third, the US doctrine lay an emphasis on carrier based scout bombers, which could also be used as normal dive bomber. In contrast the Japanese used scout planes from Cruisers and Battleships to perform recon.

Conclusion

To conclude, the biggest drawback of Japanese carriers lay in their limited defense capabilities, due the lack of radar, inferior AA guns and weak fire control. Whereas the US Navy increased the number of fighters early on to strengthen further their active defense, the Japanese didn’t, thus widening the gap.
Nevertheless, the Shokaku class carriers were good or even great carriers, but against an enemy that constantly and quickly adapted a small flaw can become a major flaw in a short amount of time. After all the best weapon, tactic or strategy can be outclassed with proper counters. In war as in life nothing stays static for too long.

Sources

Books

Stille, Mark: US Navy Aircraft Carriers 1922-45. Prewar Classes (amazon.com affiliate link)

Stille, Mark: Imperial Japanese Navy Aircraft Carriers 1921-45 (amazon.com affiliate link)

USN Carriers VS IJN Carriers – The Pacific 1942 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Smith, Douglas V.: Carrier Battles – Command Decision in Harm’s Way (amazon.com affiliate link)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

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Online Resources

Wildenberg, Thomas: Midway – Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?
Note: That quite some assumptions in this article are dated, see here.

Ask Historians – Why were American carriers so much more durable

Enterprise (in)correct length

Midway Order of Battle

USS Enterprise CV-6

Yorktown Class Carrier

Shokaku Class Aircraft Carrier

Zuikakua Carrier

Various sites about the USS Enterprise:
Big E

CV 6

Enterprise CV 6

The USS Enterprise

Notes on Accuracy & “Methodology”

(1) To put it simply, when it comes to data about WW2 ships everything seems to be a bit off. Many sources differ all the time. I have like 3 different crew values for the USS Enterprise, basically every book, website and Wikipedia has one or several different values.

(2) Furthermore, thanks to various commenters on reddit and the paradox forums I know that this is very common. Also there seems to be an error on the length of the Enterprise according to this very well illustrated and sourced forum post: Calling all USS Yorktown CV-5 fans

(3) The same goes for articles (see sources Wildenberg and reddit comments on it).

(4) So, I tried to use only one source for each value in order to keep the data as clean as possible, also I did some cross-referencing, but since most experts seem to disagree take everything with a grain of salt, when it comes to displacement, dimensions and crew members.

(5) Values and equipment is from Mid 1942 or before. Zuikakus plane loadout is from the attack on Pearl Harbor, because she and the Shokaku were not present at the Battle of Miday. Note that especially the AA loadout changed considerable several times, in the end the Zuikaku had 96 25mm AA barrels and the Enterprise was equipped with 40mm bofors.

(6) The Aircraft loadouts are for the Battle of Midway for Enterprise in June 1942 and for Pearl Harbor for the Zuikaku in December 1941, since the Zuikaku nor the Shokaku were present at the Battle of Midway. But I took at the order of battle and there was no major change in Japanese setup.

(7) Mid 1942 is also the general “cut-off date”, thus proximity fuses, Japanese deck parks, etc. are not taken into account.

(8) There is a lot of wrong or dated information out there.