Battle Of Britain – Setting and the British Defense Organization

Men & Equipment

Probably one of the most iconic references to the Battle of Britain is the quote ”Never was so much owed by so many to so few”, hence let’s start with the numbers of men and equipment:
During the height of the battle in August 1940 the Fighter Command had around 1380 and the Luftwaffe 870 fighter pilots.
In terms of planes the British had 1000 fighters, which is around the same number as the Luftwaffe.
Yet, only 700 of the British fighters were operational, whereas 800 of the Germans.

The main part of the Fighter Command planes were Hurricanes with about 55 % of the operational fighter aircraft whereas the Spitfire only reached around 30 %.
The German Luftwaffe used only one Single Engine Fighter the Bf109 (of the E-Series/Variant.)

Organization

The Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe were organized differently. The RAF used a functional approach having a command for bombers, coastal aircraft, reserves, training and fighters. Furthermore, Fighter Command had operational direction over the Anti-Aircraft Command, which was part of the British Army.

The Luftwaffe was organized in so called “Luftflotten” literally meaning “Air Fleets” that used a mix of fighter, bomber and other aircraft.

Yet, the organization wasn’t a major problem for the Luftwaffe. In Poland and the Battle of France the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority in a short amount of time. Thus, it had little experience in escorting and especially defending large formations of bombers. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was first and foremost a tactical-oriented air force for providing close support to the army, but it was not suited for strategic operations. Thus the Luftwaffe went into a battle it was neither experienced, trained nor built for against the RAF, which also had a well-organized defense system. (So let’s take a look at it.)

British Command and Control System

Fighter Command was divided into 4 Groups and these were divided into individual Sectors with their sector station, whereas sector station is a fancy name for airfield. This hierarchy also reflected how information was transferred.

When enemy aircraft were detected by radar the Fighter Command headquarters was informed. This information was relayed to the Group HQs and individual sector stations. The Group HQs decided which sectors were activated, whereas the sector commanders decided on which squadron would be sent into combat.

Since radar stations could only provide information on planes flying over the sea, once planes were flying inland further information was provided by trained volunteers to the Observer Corps, which relayed it directly to the sector stations, who reported to the Group HQ.

Radar

A central part of this system was the so-called Radar, which is an acronym for “Radio Detection and Ranging”.

The Chain Home System had 21 radar stations that could detect the range and altitude of planes up to a 200 mile or 320 km radius, but the average was only 80 miles or 130 km. Aircraft flying below 1000 feet or 300m could not be detected by this system. To detect low flying planes the Chain Home low station system was used which had only a range of about 30 miles or 50 km.
Although this system seems flawless in theory in practice there were many problems, e.g., radar stations being out of order due to upgrades and inaccurate data from the Observer Corps.

Also relaying the radar information to the squadrons took at least 4 minutes, whereas a German squadron could cross the Channel in about 6 minutes.

Another source of viable information was signal interception. Decrypted enigma traffic usually couldn’t be provided fast enough to help intercept raids, but due a weak low-level-radio discipline on the German side there was usually a steady information about destination and origin of enemy squadrons.
This system allowed Fighter Command to choose when and where to attack. Something the Luftwaffe Command never faced before and even more important probably never fully realized throughout the whole Battle.

Notes on Accuracy

The numbers are mostly from Overy (see sources). Often those numbers are at the beginning or end of the month, but usually for different dates for the German and British forces. For simplicity I only state the month. This video is intended to give a clear and short overview, hence certain details can’t be included.

Sources

Books

Overy, Richard: The Battle of Britain – The Myth and the Reality (amazon.com affiliate link)

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Online Resources

The RAF Fighter Control System

RAF Museum – Background Battle of Britain

Never was so much owed by so many to so few

Barbarossa would an earlier date made a difference?

Intro

There are many comments and remarks that state that if the Operation Barbarossa would have started about a month earlier, it would have been successful or at least that Moscow could have been taken. This is a common belief and in the past I also thought it was true, but life is about learning. So let’s take a closer look.

The argument that an earlier attack date would have allowed a successful outcome rests mainly on one assumption, namely that the Russian Winter stopped the Wehrmacht. This assumption also indirectly implies that the German Army only suffered minor losses.

Manpower, Tanks & Combat Effectiveness

On June 22 the German Army attacked with about 3,1 Mio men.

At the same time the German army had about 400k trained reserves, 80k of those were directly attached to the fighting units as field replacement battalions. After just 4 weeks, these battalions were used up. German reserves soon dried up and by the End of November 1941, the German Army had a lack of 340k men. (End of November 1941: 340k Missing Men “Fehlstellen” (S. 19 Hillebrand, Heer (amazon.de affiliate link)))

At first this doesn’t seem too much, but the Army used many local volunteers in non-combat roles, to fill up the ranks. And even more importantly, the highest losses were sustained by combat units and at least 400k men were already replaced from reserves, hence the combat units took substantial losses, decreasing the combat effectiveness.

Let’s take at figures for tanks. In total there were about 3400 tanks, in beginning of September 1941 700 of those were total losses, 560 were either total losses or not-operational and 540 were being repaired. Leaving about 1600 operational tanks.

In early November 1941 the organization department of the General staff assessed the combat effectiveness of the infantry and tank divisions. The conclusion determined the combat effectiveness of the infantry at 65 % and that of the tanks at 35 % of their original values.

This clearly shows that the Barbarossa wasn’t a walk in the park for the German Army.

Logistics

Another aspect are of course logistics. The German Army had to cover huge distances of up to 700 miles or 1200 km to deliver supplies. There was a lack of trains and the German Army was under-motorized. The vast distances, the speed of the advance and the poor infrastructure wore down the existing vehicles rapidly. Germany had about 500k motor vehicles on the Eastern front ranging from motorcycles to trucks. About 20 % (106k) were lost by the end of 1941. A number that couldn’t be properly replaced and the situation with horses wasn’t any better.
This resulted not only in major logistical problems, but also decreased the mobility of combat units.

Exhaustion

The significant losses in men and equipment, the limited amount of supply and the continuous fighting left the German Army exhausted. There was no quick victory in sight and the front commanders were aware of this situation, unlike the High Command. This is reflected by the results of a meeting in mid of November, where the High Command wanted to conduct further offensive operations, whereas the front line commanders opposed them.

Conclusion

Hence, when General Winter finally arrived the German Army was already in a critical situation. If Barbarossa had started a month or even two months earlier the losses, the overstretched supply lines and the exhaustion would have been pretty much the same, thus a different starting date wouldn’t have made only a minor or no difference at all.
Hitler and the German High Command lead Operation Barbarossa to its grave (their army to a grave), which was dug out by the Soviet Army, General Winter merely helped filling it up.

Winter

Of course the winter was also a factor, but it is the only one these factors that should affect both sides about equally. It didn’t because due to the logistical situation the German Army was ill-prepared for winter combat.

Winter worked as a multiplier not a reason itself.

So the Winter was more like a few nails in the coffin for Barbarossa, but definitely not the coffin itself.

Sources

Books

David M. Glantz, Jonathan M. House: When Titans Clashed – How the Red Army stopped Hitler (amazon.com affiliate link)

Rolf D. Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: Hitlers Krieg im Osten (amazon.de affiliate link)

Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart: Das Heer – Band 3 – 1941-1945 (amazon.de affiliate link)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

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Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resource

Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Glantz: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay

Imperial Roman Army – Training

Intro

“Put an equally brave, but untrained soldier in the front line, and he will look like a woman.” -Cicero

This gives a very good impression how the Romans thought about training.

Training served many purposes like,

  • ensuring combat readiness, discipline and unit cohesion
  • serving as a political tool in foreign and domestic affairs
  • improving and maintaining the infrastructure of the Empire

Basic Training

To become a fully enlisted soldier in the Army, every recruit had to pass basic training.
Basic training was performed daily for at least 4 months. (Davies: p. 14) It ensured that the recruit was fit for duty in the Roman Army, thus each recruit had to pass several proficiency tests. Recruits failing those tests would receive a different diet and notes in their records.

Training Content

Whereas basic training was probably more intensive and fundamental, the regular training was similar. It covered individual and collective aspects as well as combat and non-combat training.

Individual training:

  • weapons training, including close combat and ranged weapons
  • physical exercise like swimming, running and jumping

Collective training:

  • improving coordination like keeping the ranks close and parading
  • construction training like digging ditches and planting palisades
  • mock fights where one party tries to dislodge another party defending with shields

3 times a month infantry and cavalry together went on a route march (amubulation) with full equipment of about twenty miles. This march was not just going from one destination to another, it was basically a small military exercise that covered various maneuvers for the cavalry, crossing different terrain and after reaching the destination, a camp with ditches and ramparts was constructed.

Furthermore, large scale military exercise with other forces were conducted periodically and regular inspections served as quality control. We know from Emperor Hadrian that he visited and inspected large scale exercises. Giving reports on the performance of units, including praise and criticism. But Hadrian put a strong emphasis on training and discipline, thus he was probably an exception rather than the rule.

Training Infrastructure

To ensure the proper training, facilities and specialist are needed. There were different training grounds for the infantry and cavalry. Usually training was done outside, but in case of very poor weather special training buildings were available to perform the activities indoors.

Additionally, there were special areas for training aspects like camp-building, fort-building, siege-works, artillery practice and bridge-building.

Furthermore, there were several specialist for drill instructions, weapons and cavalry training.

  • Campidoctor : Drillinstructor
  • Doctor armorum or armatura: weapons instructor
  • Doctor cohortis: drillinstructor battalion (cohort)
  • Exercitatores & magister campi: cavalry instructors

Benefits of Training

Discipline & readiness

The constant exercises and marches helped in maintaining combat readiness, physical fitness and unit cohesion.
Or as Veranius put it: “Trained by sweating, puffing and panting, exposed to summer heat and bitter cold under an open sky, the soldiers become accustomed to the future hardships of real fighting.” (Davies:p. 137) (Q. Veranius)

Building Infrastructure

Additionally, soldiers were often used to build roads and other important buildings. Bohec states that the soldiers could build markets and whole cities. The construction of towers, forts and defense lines was performed by the infantry whereas the cavalry guarded them.
The construction and engineering aspects was an aspect of Imperial Roman doctrine. The fast construction of bridges and other structures should remind barbarians of their inferiority, thus deterring them from attacking.

Conclusion / Outro

“Exercises that do not involve the perils of a real battle, are a sufficient relaxation to soldiers, however weary they may be.” (Davies:p. 137) (Q. Veranius)
Training in the Imperial Roman Army was a crucial and complex process that didn’t just focus on the ability of the soldiers to fight in battle, but to succeed in enduring campaigns and thus maintaining the capabilities of the Empire to wage and win wars.

Related Articles

Sources

Books

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Online Resources

The Military Institutions of the Romans (De Re Militari) By Flavius Vegetius Renatus-Translated from the Latin by Lieutenant John Clarke

Imperial Roman Army – Recruitment

Intro

The Imperial Roman Army has been and is still admired by many people as an excellent fighting force. There are many reasons why the Roman Army was so effective, one was its recruitment process (probatio) which consisted in determining if a potential recruit fulfilled the necessary criteria to serve in the Imperial Roman Army.

Requirements

There were physical, mental and legal requirements for joining the Imperial Roman Army. Note that the requirements were the highest for elite units like the Praetorians and Legionaries.

Physical Requirements

Height

Let’s start with the physical requirements a soldier needed to be of a certain height. The values for a Legion soldier were at least 1.72m or 5ft 8 inches in height. For soldiers of the first cohort or cavalry even up to 1.78m or 5ft 10 inches. If you think these values are too high, you are probably right, modern scholars assume that these values are probably idealized.

Strength, Stamina, Agility and Eyesight

Other important physical attributes were of course strength, good posture, stamina, agility and eyesight. There is one known example of a soldier being dismissed due to weak eyesight.

Age

Finally, the maximum age for joining was around 35 years, whereas the minimum age was about 13 years. But these are extreme examples, most recruits joined between the ages of 18 and 23 years. Note that the service period lasted for 16 to 30 years depending on the branch of the Army.

Mental Requirements

Next are the mental requirements, these were probably of lesser importance, but legally it was allowed to discharge a soldier based on physical or mental defects.
Education was probably not a major requirement for the common soldiers, but since commands were given in Latin a recruit had to have a sufficient understanding of it.
Furthermore, since the Army needed specialist a good education probably could tip the balance. For instance specialist posts like the signifier, who were in charge of the accounts and funds, required well educated people with good legal records, which brings us to the next point the legal requirements.

Legal Requirements

Slaves, former slaves – the so called “freedmen” were not allowed to join the Army, only in dire situation were they conscripted. Only freeborn men were allowed in the Roman Army and to join the Legionary Units the recruit also needed the Roman Citizenship.
There were other legal requirements too, we can assume that most crimes would prevent joining the Roman Army. Trajan ruled that convicts of capital offenses, adultery or any other major crimes were not allowed to serve.

Note that modern scholars have different views on how thorough or superficial these legal examination were performed.
Finally, there are some examples that a recruits used letters of recommendations in order to provide references for their “good character”, this is also a debated topic, since only a few of those letters are known.

Probatus (approved)

But even after passing these requirements the recruit wasn’t a full soldier yet, he was now considered “probatus”, which meant he was approved for training in which he needed to pass several proficiency tests. Note that in this period the punishment for failing in discipline or even criminal acts like selling military equipment was less severe and even pardoned.

Signatus (“enlisted”)

After the recruit trained for at least 4 months and passing all proficiency tests, he was “signatus”, thus he became fully enlisted. The name of the recruit with his age and any distinguishing marks would be added to the unit’s record. Now he was considered a full soldier and the recruitment process was over.

Conclusion

Although not all information is undisputed it is clear that the Roman recruiting process was systematic and well organized in order to ensure a constant flow of high-quality recruits to keep the ranks filled. Nevertheless, these new troops also needed further training, which will be topic of another video.
Thank you for watching and see next time!

Related Articles

Imperial Roman Army – Organization & Structure
Imperial Roman Army – Training

Sources

Books

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

The Military Institutions of the Romans (De Re Militari) By Flavius Vegetius Renatus-Translated from the Latin by Lieutenant John Clarke

Ancient Roman units of measurement

[Waterloo] Napoleonic Era Infantry Combat vs. Modern Combat

Intro

The realities of Napoleonic infantry combat were very different from that of the World Wars and especially contemporary combat. This video takes a look at the weapons, basic principles and other important factors from that era. In order to provide a more relatable and vivid impression I will use references to modern weapons and combat.

Weapon Comparison

First off, the weapons, the infantry weapon of the Napoleonic era was the musket. Now a musket is not a rifle, a musket uses a smooth bore barrel, whereas a rifle has a barrel with spiraled groove, which is also called rifling. This spiral gives the projectile a spin that increases its stability and accuracy. Although the rifle is more accurate due to nature of its barrel it took longer to reload and was more complicated.

Now, the standard muskets at the Battle of Waterloo were usually muskets from the 18th century in slightly improved version. So let’s take a look at them and how they influenced combat and doctrine.

Muskets abilities and limits

The French Musket 1777 (improved 1801) usually called Charleville after the manufactory place (p. 50 Füssel) had a weight of 4.6 kg, a length of 1.53 without bayonet and a caliber of 17.7 mm (0.69 in).

The British used mostly the Land Musket, which is better known as the Brown Bess. Its weight was 4.8 kg with a length of 1.49 m and a caliber of 19.3 mm (0.75 in).
The Prussians had a newer musket yet in low numbers, I provide it mostly for reference, since the Prussian troops at Waterloo used a variety of looted weapons and the older Prussian Potsdam Musket (1723 / M1723/M1740).

The Prussian M1809 had a weight of 4kg, a length of 1.435 m and a caliber of 18.5 to 19 mm.

The muzzle velocities of all these muskets was around 300 m / second (1000 ft / second), but take this value with a grain of salt. (The weight of the musket balls was around 20 to 30 gram. Since the infantry carried around 50 to 60 shots, this meant about 1 to 2kg of extra weight.)

As you can see there is only a slight difference between these weapons, but let’s take a look at two more modern weapons. First the German standard rifle for the Second World War the Karabiner 98 kurz.

It had a weight of 3.9 kg, a length of 1.11m and a caliber of 7.92 mm with a muzzle velocity of 760 m/s. Second, a contemporary weapon the US M4 Carbine, it has a weight of 3.4 kg, with the stock extended is has a length of 0.756 m and a caliber of 5.56 mm. The muzzle velocity is 880 m / s ( 2900 ft / s).
The main differences are clear, the weapons got shorter and lighter. The muzzle velocity increased and the caliber decreased. Not really surprising, but let’s take a look how these changes affected the individual soldiers and the combat situations.

Weapons and their influence on combat

Weight and Length

First off, men in the Napoleonic era were usually smaller and had less weight, thus the weight of the gun in combination with the longer length had a more tiring effect than for a “modern infantry man”. A British male in the first half of the 19th century with an age of around 30, had an average weight of about 58.5 kg ( lbs). Thus the Brown Bess was about 8.2 % of his body weight. (British men, Birth Cohort: 1800-1819; Age 26-30; 58.50 (see Table 4) source )

The average German male in 2005 weighed 82.4 kg ( lbs), thus the Brown Bess would only be about 5.2 % of his body weight. This difference doesn’t seem much, but you need to take into account a prolonged engagement which usually followed after a longer period of marching or maneuvering. It all adds up, especially if you try to aim that weapon and hold it steadily. Furthermore, reloading in the Napoleonic era took several complicated steps that required to lower the weapon. Together, the physical strain on a Napoleonic soldier just for aiming, firing and reloading his weapon was far more tiring than for an infantry man in the World Wars or in a contemporary conflict. ( Source )

The difference in Muzzle Velocity and Caliber

Next, the difference in Muzzle velocity and Caliber resulted in different kinds of wounds. First off, the larger caliber meant that the damaged area was larger, also the projectile was a ball and not a shaped bullet. In combination with the increased muzzle velocity that means that modern bullets usually pass through their targets and most other stuff like wood and car doors, unless you are acting in a Hollywood movie. Quite contrary to a musket ball, which usually stuck when it hit its target. The combination of larger wounds, stuck projectiles and the poor state of medicine meant that limb damage often resulted in amputations and other wounds were usually deadly in one way or another.
Let’s take a look at the overall accuracy of the Muskets.

The firefights during the Napoleonic era were quite prolonged engagements and could take a few hours, yet the amount of causalities was quite low in comparison to modern firefights. This was due to the high inaccuracies of musket fire, which was a result of technical and other factors.

First, basically above the range of 150 m the chances of scoring a hit was extremely slim. (Bremm: p. 41) Various shooting tests were performed both against single targets or large targets that simulated an enemy formation. A Prussian shooting test in 1810 was performed against a target of 90 m length and 1.8 m height, which was the size of an enemy column. It resulted in a hit chance of 60 % at a range of 70 m. At 140 m it dropped to 40 % and at 210 m it dropped to 5 %. (Bremm: p. 43).

Yet, these test were usually performed under ideal conditions, since muskets had a far lower muzzle velocity than a bolt-action rifle from the World Wars, the bullet drop was more significant. Additionally, these musket were way more difficult to handle than modern weapons, which decreased their accuracy in combat significantly.

Scholars at that time did various calculations based on causality rates and other values and came to different opinions on the average hit chance:
Napier assumed only one out of 300 shots would hit, thus giving a hit chance of 0.3 %.
Guibert assumed 1 out of 500 shots with a chance of 0.2 %
At the battle of Vitoria the British needed around 800 rounds to inflict one casualty, thus giving a hit chance of 0.125 %. (Nosworthy: p. 204-205) These low hit rates were also due to the fact that units fired outside their effective range, thus severely decreasing the chance to hit. (p. 205)

Nevertheless, let’s compare the musket hit chance with that from the Battle of Vitoria. If we take the hit chance of 40 % at 140 m and the value from Vitoria with 0.125 % than the musket was 320 times less effective in combat. So let’s take a look at the reasons for this high discrepancy between theoretical and practical values.

Causes for difference between theoretical and practical values

Volley Fire vs. Aimed Fire

One factor was that regular line infantry didn’t use aimed fire regularly, unlike the various skirmisher units. Additionally, there was almost no training and even when training was performed it was done under ideal conditions that had little resemblance with the actual combat situation. (Nosworthy: p. 205-206)

Now, why wasn’t aimed fire used regularly? Because it was usually not feasible on the battlefield. The soldiers were confined to close formations that used concentrated and coordinated fire against the enemy. As Nosworthy notes: “ Aimed fire and volley fire were by their very nature mutually exclusive practices.” (Nosworthy: p. 206)

The combat situation at that time required regularly delivered and strictly controlled volleys. (Nosworthy: p. 206) This was not the time of individual soldiers shooting at individual soldiers. It was more like large groups of soldiers shooting at another large group of soldiers. This is also reflected by the previously mentioned Prussian shooting test that used a large area as target to reflect an enemy column.

Discipline, unit cohesion and coordination were crucial and way more rigid than in modern combat, as an example, an infantry formation attacked by cavalry needed to withhold its fire until a critical moment, else most of the shots were completely ineffective. (Nosworthy: p. 206-209) Although not really a historical accurate movie, such a situation can be seen in The Last Samurai, when the infantry fires too early at the enemy cavalry charge that comes out of the fog, thus inflicting almost no causalities.

Physics and not accounting for it

Another factor were physics, although bullet drop was known and there was a system to adjust the angle for various ranges. Usually this practice was not performed in combat situations, which is noted by officers from several armies. (Nosworthy: p.206-207) The reasons for this are many, first not all officers nor their men fully deemed leveling their musket necessary, second the main focus was on a high rate of fire and third correct leveling of muskets would have required proper training. (Nosworthy p. 207)

Chaos of Combat

The next factor was due to the very nature of combat in that time period. The effectiveness of fire decreased as soon as combat prolonged, Due to the confusion and disorder of a large group of men firing repeatedly. Which was very well described by General Mitchell:
“One man is priming; another coming to present; a third taking, what is called aim; a fourth ramming down his cartridge. After a few shots, the whole body are closely enveloped in smoke, and the enemy totally invisible;” (Nosworthy p. 209)

Thus, in a short amount of time the effectiveness of a unit would decrease significantly in enduring engagements. This also resulted in switching from volley fire to running fire, which was basically a disorganized voluntary fire. (Nosworthy: p. 208-209) Although this voluntary fire was usually aimed, the results were disappointing.: “Duhèsme was surprised to find that his battalion, firing at any enemy battalion one hundred paces [aprox. 76 m] away, was only able to inflict three or four casualties as the result of lengthy firefight.” (Nosworthy: p. 209) (NOTE: according to Glossary in Nosworthy: 1 pace = 30 “; that means 0.76 m)

Smoke, Dust and Fog

Next, as already noted smoke was a serious problem, this was due to the fact that in those days smokeless powder wasn’t invented. It was only a small annoyance for a single soldier, but for a large formation of infantry that was concentrated in a tight fashion and optimized to fire as much rounds as possible this was a serious problem, because the smoke quickly accumulated. According to reports from that time, this resulted in situation where even larger formations couldn’t be seen when more than 45 m (60 paces) away, some claim even 15 m (20 paces), but well that account was from a journalist. (Nosworthy: p. 210)

Reliability

Another major aspect that was the reliability of muskets. Since a musket was muzzle-loaded, heavy or continuous rain basically made it unusable. An example was the Battle at Katzbach, where rain prevented both sides from using musket fire. (Nosworthy: p. 213)
Furthermore, the flint (flintlock) (Feuerstein) became defunct after around 25 to 30 shots and thus needed to be replaced. Even under good conditions up to 20 % of all shots were misfires. (Bremm: p. 43)

Prolonged fire also could overheat the barrels, which could lead to igniting the powder to early, and as a result maim or kill the soldier. (Nosworthy: p. 216) Continuous fire of around 25 rounds would heat up the barrel that it couldn’t be held properly for reloading and it was required to hold it at the sling. (Nosworthy: p. 72-73) Also after around 8 minutes of continuous firing the barrels were too hot to continue. (Nosworthy p. 73) This of course reduced the rate of fire as a firefight prolonged.

Rate of Fire

Theoretical a rate of fire of 4 to 5 shots per minute was possible, but in reality it was closer to 2 or 3 shots per minute (Füssel: p. 50) Nosworthy notes that in the first minutes a veteran may achieve 5 shots per minute, but this would drop to around 3 shots per minutes rather soon.. Since firefights lasting for 3 hours were not unheard of. The average rate of fire was probably below 3 or 2 shots per minute. (Nosworthy p. 73)

Conclusion

From our perspective many practices during the Napoleonic Era may seem ineffective and often even suicidal, but taking a closer look reveals that due strong differences in technical equipment, training and the resulting necessities of combat that these approaches were probably the most effective available at the time to deliver as much firepower as possible. I hope this video gave you a better understanding of that era of Military History and can serve as a foundation for upcoming videos.

Sources

Books

Nosworthy, Brent: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies (amazon.com affiliate link)

Füssel, Marian: Waterloo 1815 (amazon.de affiliate link)

Bremm, Klaus-Jürgen: Die Schlacht – Waterloo 1815 (amazon.de affiliate link)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

Demographic Data – 18th Century

Rifle vs Musket

Infantry Tactics and Combat during the Napoleonic Wars.

Karabiner 98 Kurz (not wikipedia because the weight there is a joke)

Brown Bess

Brown Bess – wikipedia

Potsdam Musket 1723

Infanteriegewehr M1809

Charleville Musket 1777

Infographic – German Infantry Division 1914/1918 – Organization, Structure & Numbers


infographic_german_infantry_division_1914_1918

German Infantry Division 1914/1918 Organization & Structure- 1,049px × 2,499px

Video

German Infantry Division 1914/18 – Visualization – Organization & Structure

Sources

Stachelbeck, Christian: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (amazon.de affiliate link)

amazon.com amazon.de

German Infantry Division 1914/18 – Visualization – Organization & Structure

Infographic – German Infantry Division 1914/1918 – Organization & Structure

infographic_german_infantry_division_1914_1918

German Infantry Division 1914/1918 Organization & Structure- 1,049px × 2,499px

Intro – Basic Numbers of 1914 Division

In 1914 a German infantry division consisted of about 18000 men. The division was equipped with 4600 horses. 24 heavy Machine guns and 72 light field guns. (Source: Stachelbeck: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (S. 120) – amazon.de affiliate link)

Organization of 1914 Division

Now in terms of organization and structure, a German Infantry division in 1914 consisted of 2 Infantry brigades, which themselves consisted of 2 Infantry regiments each, which consisted of themselves of 3 infantry battalions and 1 MG Company. Furthermore, the division had one artillery brigade, which consisted of 2 artillery regiments, which consisted of 2 artillery battalions each. Additionally in some cases there were also cavalry, engineer and medical units attached.

Infantry Company in 1914

This structure is quite abstract, so to get a better grasp on it in terms of men, let’s get one level lower. Each Infantry battalion consisted of 4 infantry companies. Since a division had 12 infantry battalions there was a total of 48 infantry companies. Such a company itself consisted of 150 men in peacetime, yet was increased to 270 during wartime. This meant that around 13000 (12960) of the 18000 men served in the Infantry companies.

This Layout was soon changed for various reasons. One was to get a more uniform structure, the structure of 2 subunits levels was replaced with a structure of 3 sub-units. This structure of 3 was still the determining in World War 2 infantry divisions. (Note that changing this structure didn’t necessarily lead to a change in total men or equipment, for instance the numbers of guns for a battery was changed from 6 to 4. (S. 123-124))

Changes during the War

There were many other changes throughout the war concerning the division layout, some were to deal with the change in necessities of the war and others about strategy. To note a few changes, there was the addition of a permanent medical company in 1916 and the increase engineer companies throughout the war. But probably the greatest change was in terms of equipment.

Comparison 1914 – 1918

To give you a short impression on how much an early-war Infantry Division was different from a late-war Infantry division, let’s revisit the initial numbers and compare them to a division that was intended for offensive operations in 1918, the so called “Mob-Division” or “Angriffsdivision”.

The early war division had around 18000 men, whereas the late war had 15000 to 16000 men, note that the second number is an estimate by an expert on this topic.
In terms of horses there was a decrease from 4600 to 4300, since the attack divisions received more horses than regular divisions the number of horses in overall decreased to greater extent than this display might suggest.

In terms of light machine guns there was an increase from 0 to 180.

Furthermore, the number of heavy machine guns also increased from 24 to 108.

Whereas in terms of light field guns the number of 72 was halved to 36.

Yet, there was a significant change in other artillery weapons, whereas the early war division relied solely on light field guns the 1918 division had: 12 heavy artillery guns, 18 light mine launchers and 6 medium mine launchers. Note that the mine launcher in German is called “Minenwerfer” meaning literally “mine thrower”, which is the old German name for a mortar.
(Source: Stachelbeck: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (S. 120) – amazon.de affiliate link)

End Note – Visualization of the men to machine gun ratio

As you can clearly see, the number of machine guns increased substantially by more than 10 times from 24 to 288 machine guns, thus several times multiplying the amount of firepower of the division.

To illustrate in 1914 there was one machine gun for every 750 men. Whereas in 1918 there was a machine gun for every 56 men.
The number of artillery pieces in total didn’t change and stayed at 72, but the number of types was increased and thus resulted in a far more versatile artillery force. The heavy artillery provided more firepower and the mortars allowed for short range indirect fire in close coordination with the infantry, thus the overall flexibility and effectiveness of the division was increased without increasing the total number of artillery pieces itself.

Sources

Books

Stachelbeck, Christian: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (amazon.com link)

amazon.com amazon.de

Disclaimer amazon.com

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

Reorganization of the German Army, 1914-1918

Artillery of the Great War

Imperial Roman Army – Organization & Structure

Intro

The Roman Imperial Army consisted of

  • Provincial Armies
  • Garrison in Rome
  • And the Navy

The brunt of the forces was in the Provincial armies that were made up by the legions and their auxiliaries in total around 240k men. The Garrison in Rome was about 15k men, although few in numbers these units were the most powerful in political terms. Finally, the Navy consisted of about 45k men.

Base Organization

  • Garrison in Rome
    • Praetorian Cohorts
    • Urban Cohorts
    • The Vigiles
  • Provincial Armies
    • Legions
    • Auxiliaries
  • Navy

Garrison in Rome

Let’s start with the Garrison in Rome. They consisted of the Praetorian Cohorts, the Urban Cohorts and the Vigiles.

Praetorian Cohorts

The Praetorian Cohorts were the guards of the Emperor and went on campaigns with him. These were elite soldiers that were ideally suited for peaceful and less peaceful duties. Due to their proximity to the Emperor and military power they had a major influence on who became the next Emperor. Thus, the first act of an Emperor usually consisted in ensuring the loyalty of the Praetorians, this was done in different ways such as paying large donations or replacing them with loyal legion units. [4 Symbols]
The number of Praetorians ranged widely from about 5 000 to 10 000 men.

These cohorts were under the orders of one of two prefects. Each cohort was lead by a tribune and six centurions.

Urban Cohorts

Additionally to the Praetorians there were another 3 cohorts in the vicinity of Rome the so called Urban Cohorts. Each consisted of 500 men each. They mainly served as a police force within Rome, e.g., they dealt with the control of slaves and unruly citizens. Originally they were under the authority of the city administration, but in the 2nd century this was changed and they were more closely linked to the Emperor.

Vigiles

Finally, the vigils was a force of 7 cohorts with 1000 men each. Their main function was firefighting and patrolling the streets at night, nevertheless they were lead as a military unit.

Provincial Armies

Whereas the units in Rome were the most important in political terms, the most important military units were the provincial armies consisting of the legions and auxiliaries.

Legions

Every province that bordered to barbarian region had one or more legions stationed in it. They were commanded by a legate who also was the governor of the province. If a province had several legions stationed in it, the governor was also the army legate that had command over the legates for each legion. The legates were chosen carefully depending on the circumstances of the province, because being a legate was a step in political career not a military one. The other officers in the legion command were six military tribunes and the camp prefect. The military tribunes were split in two groups, one of them was from the highest social class and this was basically his apprenticeship in command. The other five tribunes were form the upper class and had no command authority but fulfilled administrative duties. The third in command was the camp prefect, which was a senior position in a military career and usually held by men in their fifties.
The number of legions only varied a little bit and was usually around 25 to 30 legions. A few were lost or disbanded. Probably the most notable loss occurred in the early Empire, when the Germans were less welcoming to other civilized cultures and destroyed three legions in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest.

A legion consisted of around 5000 men of mostly heavy infantry and some cavalry. The infantry was made up by 10 cohorts each with 6 centuries consisting of 80 men each. The attached cavalry unit had 120 men. Note that these numbers varied later on. Most notably, is doubling the number of soldiers in the first cohort.

Contubernia (8 men) x 10 = century; 2 x century = maniple (160). Century basic unit of the legion. Cohort = 6 centuries. 10x cohorts = Legion;
First cohort, 5 x double centuries; 5 x 180 = 800

Now a legion was an elite unit of mostly heavy infantry, thus it was important to conserve its forces and also to support it with more agile troops.

This is where the Auxiliaries come in.

Auxiliaries

Each legion had its own Auxiliaries attached. These were made up by men from the lower class that had no Roman citizenship. that was free, but had no Roman citizenship.
Their manpower was about equal to that of the legion, but without a central command structure beyond the cohort. Auxiliaries units were lighter, more mobile and also more expandable. They usually made first contact with the enemy, allowing the legate to conserve his legionnaires for the decisive engagements.

The Navy

Now, to the final the part to the Roman Navy, which was permanently established in beginning of the Empire. Nevertheless, it was never was as important as the legions. Furthermore, the information about the Navy in certain areas is scarce and quite disputed. Its main functions were securing the seas and to support the legions in various campaigns.
The Navy was organized into fleets, each fleet was commanded by a prefect and consisted of squadrons of probably 10 ships each. A captain commanded a ship, whereas a centurion was in charge of the crew.

Unlike in most movies, the rowers of Roman galleys usually were not slaves and were expected to take part in combat at sea and on land.
The two major fleets, where based on the Eastern coast and Western Coast. Each fleet consisted of about 50 ships mostly triremes. There were several smaller fleets mostly in important areas like Egypt, Rhodos and Sicily. But the Navy wasn’t limited to the sea. There were river fleets too, e.g., on the Danube. These rivers fleets were used for patrolling the borders and various support duties.

Some fleets were established temporarily to support campaigns of the Legion, e.g., a fleet used on the Rhine and German North Sea.

Summary & Conclusion

The Imperial Roman Army had to maintain order in a vast area with various different challenges and enemies. To adapt to these challenges a diverse force was needed, ranging from elite troops on the fringes of the Empire to firefighters within the walls of Rome. Considering the secondary role of the fleet in an Empire that covered the whole Mediterranean underlines that Rome was first and foremost a land power. Thus the quote “all roads lead to Rome” is not without merit.

Related Articles

Recruitment of the Imperial Roman Army
Imperial Roman Army – Training

Sources

Books

amazon.com amazon.co.uk amazon.ca amazon.de

Disclaimer amazon.com

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

Disclaimer amazon.co.uk

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Soviet Air Force 1941/1942 – Defeat & Recovery

The Soviet Air Force in World War 2 got a very rude awakening, it endured one of the most devastating defeats in aviation history. At the time of the German attack the force consisted of about 400 000 personnel, and 10 000 to 15 000 aircraft, of which 7 500 were deployed in the Soviet’s Western theatre. Whereas the German Air Force had around 2800 aircraft deployed for Operation Barbarossa. The Germans achieved total surprised and launched an attack with about 1000 bombers against 66 airfields in the Russian border districts. (p. 272)

Aircraft Losses during Operation Barbarossa

The reported losses on these initial attacks vary, but the 1970s Soviet official history states the loss of 800 aircraft destroyed on the ground and a total loss of 1200 aircraft. This basically crippled the Soviet air force stationed near the front lines. These attacks also inflicted significant damage and chaos on the logistical side. Thus, by day three of operation Barbarossa the Luftwaffe was free to focus mainly on supporting the ground troops, who captured the Russian airfields.(p. 273)

In Mid July 1941 the Soviets admitted to the destruction of almost 4000 (3985) aircraft, whereas the German air force claimed around 6900 (6857) planes destroyed. The kill claims were probably a bit higher than the real ones, but the official war time number probably lower. Yet, most importantly both numbers are substantial.

These losses were during the initial phase of operation Barbarossa and are based on war time claims by both side. Now according to post-war Soviet and German records between the beginning of the operation and the end of the year 1941 ( 22nd of June 1941 and the 31st of December 1941), the losses were approximately as follows:
A total of 21 200 aircraft were lost on the Soviet side. With 17 900 combat aircraft and the loss of 3300 support aircraft. (Greenwood: p. 67/ p.88) Yet, only 50 % of these losses were combat losses. The German side lost a total of 2500 (2505) combat aircraft and 1900 (1895) damaged. (Greenwood: p. 67)

Note: That these numbers may be quite off and shouldn’t be compared 1:1, because both sides counted losses differently, the problem is I haven’t found a proper article on this topic yet. Although a knowledgeable user indicated that German losses were usually total losses, whereas Russian losses seemed to include damaged vehicles.

Reasons for the Disaster

The reasons for the disaster are many, some of them were the result of ongoing processes, some were structural shortcomings and others were definitive failures in leadership. In any way Stalin played a major role in most of these factors.

Although the Soviet Air Force was successful in the Far East in 1938 and 1939. During the Spanish Civil War the German Bf 109 outclassed the Russian planes like the I-15. The performance of the Red Air Force in the Winter War against Finland was a disaster, thus a major reorganization was started in February 1941 which would at least take until Mid-1942, thus it wasn’t finished when the Germans attacked and made the force even more vulnerable. (p. 274)

Additionally, the Soviet expansion into Eastern Poland and the Baltic States required many resources that would have been needed elsewhere, about two thirds of built or renovated air fields were located in these regions. (p. 275) Thus, many units were still located on unsuited air fields, which were too small or unfinished, which also made camouflage and dispersal more difficult. Unlike the British the Soviets lacked a proper early warning system, which resulted in a total surprise combined with Stalin’s reluctance to prepare properly to the upcoming German attack. (p. 275)

Purges

Another major structural problem was created by Stalin purges. In 1937 the Air Force had 13000 officers, of those 4700 (4724) were arrested. Followed by another 5600 (5616) in 1940. (75 % of the most senior and experienced commanders were among those.) Although some of the arrested officers were later released it were only around 15 % (about 900 (892) or 16 percent of those in 1940). This of course had a severe impact on morale and effectiveness, because the Air force consisted of to a large degree of purge survivors, promoted inexperienced young officers and fresh recruits. (p. 276)

The purges also affected the design bureaus for weapons and aircraft. Some were dismissed, some were arrested, which often lead to the execution and some were put in special prison bureaus like Andrei (Nikolayevich)Tupolev.(p. 277-278)

Furthermore the drastic measures and understandable fear surrounding the purges also inflicted the production of aircraft, because changing the production line from one aircraft to another can be quite complicated and usually includes a severe reduction in efficiency for adapting machinery and processes, this “loss” or better investment of time could be easily seen as sabotage. So most factories were reluctant in switching over to new models.(p. 278)

This meant that in 1940 7300 (7267 old fighters and bombers) old designs were produced whereas only around 200 of newer models.(186 new fighters and ground attack “machines” (p. 277))
The numbers especially for newer models increased in 1941, yet the training on the new aircraft was kept to a minimum due to fear of losses caused by accidents, which could also lead to “sabotage” or other charges. I guess Stalin would have been a huge Beastie Boys fan or maybe the other way round, that would at least explain all those moustaches… Oh, well I digress.

Recovery Summer 1941 to Winter 1942

Let’s take a look at the recovery of the Soviet Air force, although the German losses were way lower than the Soviet ones, the Luftwaffe also had far fewer aircraft available in the beginning. Furthermore, the logistical system of the Luftwaffe was unsuited for a long war in Russia, something I discussed already in one of my previous videos. Already in October and November the Russians ordered attacks against Luftwaffe airfields. Additionally, since the Japanese were no longer a threat, more than 1000 aircraft from the Far East arrived, all this helped to slowly tip the balance.
Whereas in end of September (30th) 1941, the Russians could oppose the 1000 Luftwaffe air planes with only 550 (545) of their own. In mid-November the situation was quite different with 670 Luftwaffe planes versus 1140 (1138) Russian planes. (p. 279) Yet, the numbers alone didn’t win the battle for the Red Air Force, but the balance was slowly changing and in fall 1942 the Luftwaffe got seriously challenged. (p. 279)

After Hitler denied the 6th Army to break out of Stalingrad it was supplied only by the Luftwaffe, the Soviet established a so called “aerial blockage” and after two months of intensive fighting the Luftwaffe’s air superiority was finally lost. (the Germans could only field 350 fighters vs. 510 (509) Russian fighters in November 1942 (19th))

Important Factors in the Recovery

Let’s take a look at the major factors that contributed to the resurrection of the Soviet Air Force. One aspect was the mostly successful evacuation of the air craft industry and the lack of German attacks on this industry. Furthermore, the successful creation of a talented command staff and successful reorganization, which was supported by Stalin. (p. 280) The restructuring efforts included the transformation into air divisions, whereas each division consisted of one type of aircraft, which improved the logistics and command efficiency.(p. 281)
Additionally, the use of on-board radios grew, which allowed better coordination with ground stations for warning and command-and-control. (p. 281) There were also tactical changes like the creation of special ace units and the use of free hunts with experienced pilots. The Soviet Air doctrine focused strongly on fighters in order to achieve air superiority, thus a considerable effort was spent to develop the fighter arm into an elite force. (p. 75 Greenwood)

All these changes and the continuous Luftwaffe losses, allowed the Soviet Air Force to break the air superiority of the Luftwaffe and subsequently force it into the defensive role. Thus, within a mere 18 months the Soviet Air Force was able to recover and deal a severe blow against its enemy.

Additionally, the Soviet Air Force was starting to receive more and more planes, due to the lend-lease program which supplied around 18000 (18303; p. 280) planes during the whole war.

Sources

Books

Amazon.com (affiliate link): Jones, David R.: From Disaster to Recovery: Russia’s Air Forces in the Two World Wars. In: Higham & Harris: Why Air Forces Fail
Amazon.de (affiliate link): Jones, David R.: From Disaster to Recovery: Russia’s Air Forces in the Two World Wars. In: Higham & Harris: Why Air Forces Fail

Amazon.com (affiliate link): Greenwood, John T.: Soviet Frontal Aviation during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-45. In: Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century
Amazon.de (affiliate link): Greenwood, John T.: Soviet Frontal Aviation during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-45. In: Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century

amazon.com amazon.de

Online Resources

CHAPTER V -ATTRITION ON THE PERIPHERY: NOVEMBER 1942-AUGUST 1943

Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa

Pop-culture Beastie Boys Reference – Sabotage

Logistics of the Luftwaffe in World War 2

for a more thorough look check my video on why the Luftwaffe Failed in World War 2.

Intro

In order to understand the logistics of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) in World War 2, we must take a look at the rearmament process, the military control of the industry, the attitude towards logistics and the dominance of the operational-tactical approach.

The Type/Sub-type Madness

The German re-armament focused on a fast build-up of arms and equipment. To achieve this many different models were produced by a wide range of companies. Yet, such an approach increases the cost of maintenance and supply due to the wide range of different vehicles and weapons.

This problem becomes apparent, if you look at the numbers in 1943: the US Army Air Force has 18 types of aircraft, whereas Germany had 50. This problem was prevalent in other areas too, like the armament of planes.

Take the B-17, it had one type of defensive gun, the 0.50 cal machine gun, whereas the He-111-H6 had three different types [SHOW 7.92 mm, 13mm and 20mm]. Nearly every German plane usually had a combination of at least two different types of guns throughout the war, whereas the US Forces usually used only one type of gun at all.

Luftwaffe in charge of its own industry

This problem was to a certain degree due to the control of the arms industry by the Luftwaffe. Until 1944 as the only branch of the German Armed Forces, it controlled its own industry. Which was in contrast to the United States, where the industry delivered the units most suited for mass production to the military.

Now, these circumstances were already problematic, but although German engineering is usually highly regarded throughout the world. The relationship of the military and engineering was “complicated” at best.

Disdain for Engineering

Many officers had a lack of technical understanding and were fine with it, some were even blatantly ignorant. Technology for them and thus the engineers were basically “meager”/mere servants.

This is divide between military and engineering is well illustrated by the debate about special insignias for technical officers. It was assumed that a technical officer would be perceived as less valuable by normal officers.

The attitude of the military towards technological and logistical matters manifested itself in the overall doctrine and principles.

Primacy of the operational-tactical approach vs. logistics

For instance, the primacy of the operational-tactical thinking was codified in the directive for the quartermaster. It clearly states that the supply chain management acts as a servant to the operational and tactical command.

“Alle im Versorgungsdienst tätigen Offiziere und Fachbearbeiter müssen sich bewußt sein, daß die Versorgung stets Dienerin der operativen und taktischen Führung ist und niemals zu deren Hemmschuh werden darf.” (Horst Boog, S. 242-243; referring to Quartiermeister-Vorschrift, Berlin 1936)

“All officers and clerks working in the supply services must be aware that the supply chain management is always servant of operational and tactical leadership and must never become the stumbling block.”

This is again in contrast to the Allies, in the RAF War Manual on operations, it is stated that every operational commander had to be aware of the supply/logistical situation. Yet, there is nothing similar in the German directive.

The Result

To conclude, the German Air Force was well suited for small and short wars with its operational (and military) focus, but the fast buildup and military dominance in industrial matters lead to a logistical nightmare as the war prolonged and turned into a war of attrition. Whereas other air forces usually adapted their logistical approach, the German Air Force command was reluctant due to disregard for anything outside of the operational and tactical realm. Thus, to a certain degree the Luftwaffe resembled very well the so called “Knights of the Skies”, yet in a time when the outcome of a war was mostly determined by “mere servants”.

Sources

Books

Boog, Horst: Luftwaffe und Logistik im Zweiten Weltkrieg; in: Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte 7: Die Bedeutung der Logistik für die militärische Führung von der Antike bis in die neueste Zeit.

Further Reading and Recommendation

amazon.com amazon.de

Disclaimer

Amazon Associates Program: “Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.”

Amazon Partner (amazon.de): “Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu Amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden kann.”

Online Resources

Heinkel He 177