Comparison German Field Army 1917 vs 1944 [Document]

Special thanks to Matthias Hoffmann for providing information on the German Field Army in 1917.

Intro

The title of this video may appear like click bait, yet actually it is the short version of a document from the organization department of the German Army’s Generals Staff in July 1944.

The original title of the document was:
“VERGLEICH DES FELDHEERES 1917 MIT DEM FELDHEER 1944” which means “comparison of the field army in 1917 with the field army 1944”

So, this video is mainly a visualization of selected parts of the document with some additional information and context. The document has a quite interesting date, namely the 20th July 1944, which was the day of the best known attempted assassination of Hitler. I don’t know if this is a coincidence or not, after all the officers behind the assassination wanted prevent an unconditional surrender similar to 1918. And in their assumptions stable front-lines were an important foundation for any negotiations. (Müller, Klaus-Jürgen: 20. Juli 1944 – Der Entschluß zum Staatsstreich, in: Beiträge zum Widerstand 1933-1945, S. 5)

What is the Field Army?

Now, you probably want to know what is the difference between the Army and the Field Army? Well, the field army is the part of the Army that does most of the killing and dying, one could say the field army is out in the field. For some contrast, other parts of the army would be the Reserve Army (Ersatzheer) or the Occupation Army (Besatzungsheer).
So, since we got that covered let’s get started.

Front Length

In terms of the front lines the Western Front in 1917 had a length of 650 km, whereas in 1944 it was 151 km, yet this only covered the invasion front not the coast lines.
The Italian the front was 450 km in 1917 and 281 km in 1944.
Yet, the huge difference was of course on the Eastern Front with 1700 km in the First World War vs 2720 km in 1944, whereas the later number does not include the front lines in Northern Finland and Norway.

In total the 1917 front length was 2800 km, whereas the 1944 front length was 3152 km.
Now, let’s look at the number of divisions next.

Number of Division

On the Western Front in 1917, there were 148 German divisions, whereas in 1944 there were 60 division of those 22 division were on the invasion front.
On the Italian Front there were 54 Austro-Hungarian divisions in World War 1, whereas in 1944 there were 22 German divisions and 1 foreign division, for a total auf 23 divisions.
On the Eastern Front in 1917 the Germans were probably not up to modern diversity regulations, but still a quite mixed composition with 82 German, 43 Austro-Hungarian, 3 Bulgarian and 4 Turkish division, in 1944 there were 128 German and 36 allied division. Thus in total of 132 and 164 divisions for the Eastern Front.
If we add all these numbers together we get 334 Division for 1917 and 247 division in 1944. Thus there is a total difference of 87 division. Additionally, you can clearly see that in World War 2, the Eastern Front was the most important frontline, whereas in the Great War it was the Western front.

Total numbers

Now, the total numbers of men in the field army are from December of the previous year, because in the document there are only the numbers given for December 1943 and the number for the First World War is missing, but thankfully someone provided proper sources for the First World War.
Now, the total number of men in the field Army in December 1916 were almost exactly 4.8 million (4 799 095), whereas in December 1943 it were about 4.3 million (4 270 000). Note that this difference is considerable smaller than the gap of 87 division, because these numbers only account for the manpower of the German Field Army and not their Allies.

Manpower per Front km

Now, since we have the total numbers of men and front lengths, let’s see how the many German soldiers were available for each front kilometer. Although note that the total numbers of men are from December 1916 and 1943, whereas the front lengths are from July of the following years. So this part is more about giving you a general idea on the situation than historical accuracy.
For final stages of the First World War there was a total front length of 2800 km, which had around 4.8 million men stationed there, whereas for the final stages of the Second World War there was total front of 3152 km with about 4.27 million men. Thus, we get 1714 men per km in World War I vs 1355 men in World War 2. (2759 per mi, 2180 per mile)
Note that these numbers are only for the German soldiers and don’t include the manpower of all Axis Forces in Europe, which had considerable more manpower in World War 1, thus the difference in men per front kilometer was even more significant.

Cut-Content: Battalion per Front km

A German infantry battalion of 1917 had a required strength of 750 men [NOTE: That before the number was 1050 before and changed to 850 in 1918.] (Nash, David: German Army Handbook April 1918, p 44) As a result about 2.3 infantry battalion per front kilometer.

Now, since a German infantry battalion of 1944 had a required strength of 700 men (708). (Keilig: Bl. 101 – V 64) This means a little less than 2 infantry battalions per front kilometer.

Sources

Vergleich des Feldheeres 1917 mit Feldheer 1944, Generalstab des Heeres Organisationsabteilung (I), in: Keilig, Wolf: Das Deutsche Heer 1939-1945; Bl. 201 / 1944-1 & 2

Inf. Div. 1944, Keilig, Wolf: Das Deutsche Heer 1939-1945: Bl. 101 – V 64

Müller, Klaus-Jürgen: 20. Juli 1944 – Der Entschluß zum Staatsstreich, in: Beiträge zum Widerstand 1933-1945, S. 5

Sanitätsbericht über das deutsche Heer im Weltkriege 1914/1918

Nash, David: German Army Handbook April 1918

Total Manpower of the German Army in 1916/1917?

Feldheer

Artillery Combat in the First World War

Intro

World War 1 is often seen as a mindless slaughter fest that saw little tactical innovation nor major methodical advancements. There are many reasons for this ranging from anti-war literature to military writers that were directly affected by the war. And of course the so called “Great War” was overshadowed by its bigger brother the Second World War, which saw the widespread and revolutionary use of tanks, the rise of air power and the end of the battleship. Yet, many of these revolutionary tactics, doctrines and vehicles can be traced back to World War 1. Although in 1914 many tactics and approaches were quite blunt and obsolete, by 1918 a lot of innovations took hold or were fully implemented already. (Steel Wind: p. 1-2 (amazon affiliate link))

Artillery tactics 1914-1918

This video will focus on how the use of Artillery changed throughout the war and cover some of the many major innovations. Artillery tactics changed to a large degree from 1914 to 1918, whereas in 1914 the use of artillery in tactics and techniques had still a strong resemblance to the Napoleonic era, in 1918 the foundations of a modern artillery is clearly recognizable. Although the basic principles of indirect fire, massed fire, counter-battery fire, calibration and meteorological corrections and combined arms were known, they were usually not applied on the field in 1914, yet in 1918 these principles were used consistently and to a large degree by all sides. (Steel Wind: p. 2-3)

The situation prior to the War

Let’s begin, prior to 1914 all sides envisioned a highly mobile war with a strong focus on offensive operations. Furthermore, artillery was mostly seen as a direct fire weapon that would be brought forward with galloping horses at crucial moments and support the attack of the infantry.
Yet, this wasn’t possible at all, because the increase in firepower was enormous, not only from machine guns, but also from regular rifles, because their ranges usually could reach artillery that was using direct fire. Furthermore, the combined fire power of artillery, rifles and machine guns forced the infantry into trenches, but direct fire artillery against trenches doesn’t work. Hence, the traditional artillery used in a direct fire role was suddenly both vulnerable and quite ineffective in the early stages of the war. (Steel Wind: p. 5-6)

The four phases of artillery employment according to J.B.A. Bailey

So let’s take a look at the different phases and challenges the artillery faced during the First World War. The four major phases as described by the British Colonel J.B.A. Bailey are as follows:
Inadequacy (1914), Experimentation and Build-up (1915), Destruction (1916-1917) and finally Neutralization (1917-1918)

Inadequacy (1914)

In the beginning of the war the artillery was mostly an auxiliary arm, it should support the infantry, but there was little training or doctrine available in order to coordinate such efforts. This often led to friendly fire incidents. In terms of coordination of artillery itself, there were major limits too. The highest level for coordination was the division and in some cases it was only at battalion level. (Steel Wind: p. 5-7)

The massing of artillery was still performed like in Napoleons time, a large number of guns was placed next to each other in an area as close to the front as possible. The use of the artillery as a direct fire weapon was still the common approach, although the Russo- Japanese War (1904-1905) already showed that indirect fire was necessary due to the increased firepower of small arms that forced the artillery further behind the front line. Additionally in 1914, there was no real concept nor focus on counter-battery fire, some doctrines even forbade using artillery against enemy artillery. (Steel Wind: p. 5-7)

Due to the focus on mobility and offensive operations prior to the war, field artillery was first and foremost light. As a result these guns were too light to do real damage against field fortifications and trenches. Additionally, they were setup for a low trajectory line of fire and limited range. As Zabecki notes exemplary about the French:

“Prewar French doctrine envisioned using the 75-mm gun to maximum ranges of only 4,500 meters. The gun itself could fire out to 9,000 meters; but to conform to doctrine, the carriage and fire control instruments were constructed for a maximum range of only 6,000 meters.” (Steel Wind: p. 7)

Ammo Problems

The Inadequacy was also a problem in terms of supplies, especially when it came to ammo. All armies had far too less ammo stockpiled. Let’s take a look at the ammo consumption rates of artillery rounds per month from 1866 onward:(Steel Wind: p. 6-8, Table 2.1)

Year War Army Rounds
1866 Austro-Prussian German 20 000
1870 Franco-Prussian German 81 000
1904 Russo-Japanese Russian 87 000
1912 First Balkan Bulgarian 254 000
1914 World War I French 900 000
1916 World War I French 4 500 000
1918 World War I German 8 000 000

As you can clearly see there was a constant increase. Now let’s take a look at the consumption rate in the Great War.
Yet, the national stockpiles and industries weren’t sufficient for this amount of ammo consumption.
The French assumed a consumption of 100 000 rounds per month, but used 900 000 rounds, considering that in the First Balkan war 254 000 rounds were used per month, this number was either dated or didn’t take into account the latest developments. Thus, at beginning of the war in 1914 the French Army had less than 5 million rounds in stock. The Russians had 12 million. The Germans more than 20 million, but they also had more artillery than the French.

Besides the shortage of ammo, there was another problem, the main type of ammo in 1914 was the shrapnel round. A shrapnel round was filled with iron balls that extended in a cone-shaped pattern when it exploded (The Field Artillery – History & Sourcebook p. 48), so in a way it acted like a flying shotgun. It could cover an area of about 25 meters (82 ft) wide and 150 meters (492 ft) long (values for a 75mm gun). Shrapnel was only useful against troops on open ground, because it was quite ineffective against dug in troops and basically useless against fortifications.
The alternative were high explosive shells which killed by tiny steel fragments and air burst. (The Field Artillery – History & Sourcebook p. 48) Furthermore, it allowed to destroy and damage field fortifications and entrenchments, something the shrapnel round was unable to do. Thus, the high explosive (HE) round became the most important round, which at the end of the war was almost as deadly against troops in the open as shrapnel. (Steel Wind: p. 7-9)

Lack of Large Guns and/or Lack of Doctrine for them

Although ammo was a major problem for all nations, when it came to heavier guns like howitzers, there was a clear difference between France, the German and the British Empire. The French fielded an excellent 75mm field gun the M1897, but they assumed it would be able to deal with all targets, thus there was only a very small amount of heavy long-range artillery available. In contrast the Germans took lessons from the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) war and had a larger number of heavy guns, but their doctrine was lacking and thus couldn’t really exploit the numerical superiority in heavy artillery. The British had taken lessons from the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and had a large number of heavier guns, yet the British Expeditionary Force that landed in France 1914 had only a small amount of these heavy guns with them. (Steel Wind: p. 10 -11) Hence, every side had its own far share of limitations, but let’s take a closer look at the numbers.

In 1914 the French had 3840 75 mm guns, but they only had 308 guns with a larger caliber than 75mm. In comparison the Germans in 1914 had 5086 77mm field guns and 2280 larger artillery guns, whereas the British in 1914 had 1608 light guns and 1248 heavy guns in total, but only a small portion in the British Expeditionary Force in France.
By 1918 these numbers changed quite considerably, the French in November 1918 had 4968 field guns and 5128 artillery pieces above 75 mm. Thus, they had more than 10 times the heavy artillery than in 1914. But let’s look at the Germans, in 1918 they fielded 6764 field and guns and 12 286 artillery pieces above 77 mm. Thus still outgunning the French in heavy artillery. Although, if we add the British guns of 1918, with 3242 light guns and 3195 heavy guns in France, the gap in heavy artillery gets smaller but is still significant. (Steel Wind: p. 10 -11)

Experimentation and Build-up (1915)

Now, back to 1915, after the war reached a static stalemate on the Western Front the Armies began to adapt their techniques. The artillery units also faced a major leadership problem, due to the rapid expansion in 1914 and 1915. This was especially true for the French artillery, because many artillery NCOs were transferred to the machine-gun units. (Steel Wind: p. 12-13) Thus, many of the techniques needed to kept simple.

Methods of indirect fire

One of the major changes was to shift to effective indirect fire. Since Napoleon the basic technique was to mass fire, but due the increase in firepower from small arms and machine guns, the artillery needed to be deployed behind the front lines. Hence, the only possibility to mass fire was by using indirect fire. Basically, two approaches for indirect fire were developed and used in the Great War: Observed fire and unobserved fire.

Observed fire

Observed fire as the name suggest needs an artillery observer, he locates the target and communicates the coordinates accordingly, furthermore if necessary information to adjust range or direction is passed on.

There were several disadvantages with this approach:
1) The Observer needs a line of sight to the target.
2) Any adjustment of the firing solution would result in sacrificing any surprise, which allowed troops to either move out of the area or take cover. It should be noted that taking cover considerable lowered the effectiveness of an artillery strike, something that is usually not well portrayed in movies nor computer games. (Steel Wind: p. 13-14)
3) The observer needs a reliable line of communication, which was usually not possibly due to technical limitations and/or battle damage. (The Field Artillery – History & Sourcebook p. 46-47)

Unobserved fire

The alternative to observed fire was unobserved fire, yet it relied on maps and was done without adjustments. This is one of the reasons why modern military maps are usually way more accurate and full of elevation information, but at the beginning of the war that information was usually not available. Another problem was, that since no adjustments were performed the fire would also be incorrect, due to the fact that firing tables were based on standard data, which relied on standard conditions and well, you don’t have standard conditions in real life. Factors like weather, the conditions of the gun tubes and the different quality of ammo lead to inaccurate unobserved fire even if the maps were precise enough. (Steel Wind: p. 12-13) To address these challenges various methods like registration and other techniques were developed during the war to allow for more precise unobserved fire.

Standing & Creeping Barrage

Another area of improvement was the change from Standing Barrages to Creeping Barrages. In the beginning the basic attack pattern was a standing barrage. This meant that the enemy line was shelled for a certain period of time, during that time the defending units often moved away from their defensive position or into secured underground shelters. After the artillery attack ended, the units moved back into position, thus when the infantry began its attack it would usually still face strong opposition from the defending infantry. (Steel Wind: p. 14)

To counter these, the so called creeping barrage was developed, which slowly moved ahead of an infantry attack, first shelling the target area and then moving to the next area. The problem with the creeping barrage is that the attacking infantry had to move through heavily shelled terrain during their advance. (Steel Wind: p. 14) To put it simply, in 1915 the armies developed or consolidated their abilities in indirect fire and basic artillery coordination.

Focus on Destruction (1916-1917)

Now, the time period of 1916 to 1917 saw the artillery becoming “a blunt instrument of the indiscriminate hammering of entire patches of real estate.” (Steel Wind: p. 14)
The main goal during this period was to destroy enemy infantry and enemy fortifications. Additionally, artillery should serve as wire cutter by destroying enemy barb wire through extensive shelling. If you think this might be a quite a loud and expensive way to cut wire, well you might be right:
4 75mm field guns at a range of 2500 meters needed about 600 rounds to sufficiently destroy an area of 25 by 30 meters of barbed wire. Of course the number of shells increased at a range of 7000 meters the amount of rounds doubled to 1200. (Steel Wind: p. 14) Now, destroying barb wire was not some rare objective.
The artillery basically became a tool for almost anything, no matter how suited or unsuited it was. This lead to extensive shelling of enemy positions prior to attacks.

April-June 1917 Field Artillery Journal of the United States Field Artillery Association
Zabecki points out that the April-June 1917 issue of Field Artillery Journal of the United States Field Artillery Association, gives a very good picture of the prevailing doctrine at the time. It summarizes the steps for an attack the following way:

No attack is possible until after an intense and effective artillery preparation, which has for its objects:
(a) To destroy the enemy’s barbed wire;
(b) To disintegrate and destroy enemy’s trenches and dugouts, and to destroy or annihilate their defenders;
(c) To prevent, or at least to interfere with, hostile artillery action;
(d) To prevent the passage of the enemy’s reserves by curtain (barrage) fire; and
(e) To destroy the machine guns wherever they can be located.

(Source)

In short, the artillery should basically do almost everything besides moving into the enemy trenches. Notice that the first objective was destroying the barbed wire, only on the third and fifth objective were the enemy artillery and machine guns. The problem was the success of these artillery attacks was limited, any surprise was lost during the long shelling of the enemy position, during that time the enemy could prepare counter-measures and move troops into positions. Additionally, many troops moved into secured concrete bunkers or left the attacked positions. Even if the barb wire was destroyed, the terrain was usually also hard to traverse for infantry and especially for any artillery or guns that would be needed to support any deeper advancement into the enemy lines. (Steel Wind: p. 15-16)

The limited effectiveness of a long preparation attack can probably best illustrated by taking a look at the British attack at the Somme in June/July 1916. They performed a 7 day preparation attack in which about 1500 (1537) guns fired about 1,6 million shells ( 1 627 824) at the German positions, as reminder the French started the war with about 5 million shells.
After these prolonged and extensive shelling some generals believed that nothing could have survived the bombardment, but after the artillery stopped the Germans moved into positions and the British Army took the largest single-day loss in British History with more than 57 000 (57 470) men wounded, dead or missing. (Steel Wind: p. 16)

I see by your gravestone you were only nineteen
When you joined the great fall-in in Nineteen-Sixteen.
I hoped you died well, and I hoped you died clean,
Or young Willie McBride, was it slow and obscene?

-Green Fields of France / No Man’s Land – Eric Bogle

Neutralization – Suppression (1917-18)

In the final phase of the artillery warfare that started around the winter of 1917 there was a shift towards how artillery was used to support an attack, instead of trying to destroy the enemy troops and fortification it shifted towards neutralizing the enemy, whereas neutralizing in this case means basically suppressing the enemy. The suppression should prevent the enemy from using his weapons effectively, thus the destruction of the enemies troops and equipment was not the primary objective of the artillery attack anymore. (The European Powers in the first World War: p. 74-76; BRITISH ARTILLERY IN WORLD WAR 2 )

The aim was to stun the enemy by a short preparation attack that lasted “only” hours instead of days. To achieve this the Germans used a three phase attacks the first attack was against the communication, command and control, the second phase aimed at the enemy artillery and the third phase was directed against the enemy infantry defending the front. The use of different types of gas shells and different types of artillery for specific targets increased the effectiveness of these attacks. After the successful applications of these techniques on the Eastern Front, they were used also in the German offensives in 1918. Soon all Western Allies adopted the German artillery techniques. (The European Powers in the first World War: p. 74-76)

Generally, the French usually were several step behind the German innovations, quite in contrast to the British, which in certain areas were actually were more advanced than the Germans. (The European Powers in the first World War: p. 75-76) The British seemed to have developed independently to the Germans similar ideas on neutralizing the enemy with the use of gas and other means, although some these principles were not used or delayed due to prejudices of the Commander-in-Chief. Probably most notable is the battle of Cambrai in November 1917, where the British used their artillery in a new way. They use gas and smoke to neutralize the enemy and at the same time achieved surprise by moving the guns at night and proper camouflage. Unlike the Germans the British used large-scale tank attacks and adapted their tactics for supporting tanks accordingly. (Steel Wind: p. 114-116)

Summary / Conclusion

To summarize, the First World War saw an extensive change in the use of artillery, first it was deployed and used almost like in Napoleonic times, yet soon it was forced off the front lines due to overwhelming fire power. This resulted in a switch to indirect fire, which the armies were mostly not adequately equipped nor trained for. After adapting indirect fire, the artillery was seen as a tool for everything from destroying enemy obstacles to annihilating enemy troops, a task that it was not suited for.In the final phase it was deployed and used with a clear focus on its abilities and usefulness against specific targets, which resulted in major success and the establishment of effective principles. These principles to a large degree are still the core of modern day artillery to this day.

SourcesBooks

Zabecki, David T.: Steel Wind – Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery (amazon.com affiliate link)

Zabecki, David T.: Artillery in The European Powers in the First World War (amazon.com affiliate link)

Dastrup, Boyd L.: The field artillery: history and sourcebook (amazon.com affiliate link)

amazon.com amazon.co.uk amazon.ca amazon.de

Disclaimer amazon.com

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

Disclaimer amazon.co.uk

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

https://web.archive.org/web/20160322214456/http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/1917/APR_JUN_1917/APR_JUN_1917_FULL_EDITION.pdf

BRITISH ARTILLERY IN WORLD WAR 2 – Fire planning

Marble, Sanders: the Infantry cannot do with a gun less – The Place of the Artillery in the BEF, 1914-1918f

My favorite Version of Green Fields of France by Dropkick Murphys:

British Infantry Division 1914/1916 – Visualization – Organization & Structure

Basic Numbers of a 1914 British Infantry Division

In 1914 a British infantry division consisted of about 18100 (18073) men. The division was equipped with 5600 (5592) horses. 24 Machine guns, 54 18 pounder field guns, 18 4.5 in howitzers and 4 60 pounder heavy field guns. (Source: Richard Rinaldi: Order of Battle of the British Army 1914 and others see links below)

Organization of 1914 Division

Now in terms of organization and structure, the division in 1914 consisted of 3 Infantry brigades, which themselves consisted of 4 Infantry battalions each, which consisted of themselves of 4 rifle companies and 1 MG Section each. Furthermore, the division had one cavalry squadron for recon, one signal company, 3 field ambulances, 2 Field Companies of Royal Engineers, 3 Brigades of the Royal Field Artillery each with 3 Batteries, one Brigade of Field Artillery with 3 Howitzer Batteries and finally one Heavy Battery of the Royal Garrison Artillery.

Now, you probably noticed there are no regiments in this structure, and in case of the artillery, there are also no battalions. Furthermore the number of Artillery Brigades is 4, in contrast a German Infantry Division in 1914 had only 1 Artillery Brigade. Yet, those 4 British Brigades have a total of only 72 guns, which is exactly the same number as the German Brigade, which had 4 Battalions. So basically, a British Artillery Brigade is about the same as a German Artillery Battalion in 1914. Now, let’s take a closer look at one of the three Royal Field Artillery Brigades.

Royal Field Artillery Brigade

Such a Brigade consisted of three Batteries, each of this batteries had 6 18 pounder field guns. In total the Brigade consisted of 772 Men, 23 Officers and 748 Horses. Yet, the mainstay of an infantry divisions are always the infantry or rifle companies, so let’s take a look at those.

Rifle Company comparison with German Infantry Company

Each rifle company consisted of 227 Men and in total there were 48 Infantry Companies, which means that almost 11000 (10896) men of the 18100 (18073) served in the Rifle Companies. Similar to the number of artillery pieces in a German Infantry Division from 1914, the number infantry companies was also 48. Yet, a German company had 270 men. Although the total number of men in both division layouts was almost exactly the same, the German division had an additional 2000 men more serving in infantry companies than the British.

Organization in 1916

During the war there were many reorganizations in terms of the division layout. Let’s take a look at original 1914 layout and see what had changed til September 1916. The cavalry squadron, the MG section and the Royal Garrison Artillery Battery had been removed. Meanwhile one additional Engineer Company was added, furthermore, each infantry brigade had now one MG Company and one Light Mortar Battery attached. Additionally, there was one Battalion of Pioneers, 3 Batteries of Medium Mortars and one Battery of Heavy Mortars added. Which is similar to the German developments that also increased the number of machine guns and added mortars to their infantry divisions.

Accuracy

Now, take all these values with a grain of salt, because usually every division was a bit different even without considering combat losses. Furthermore, I combined several different sources here and the author of my main source notes the following: “However, the number of discrepancies among the sources is amazing; even two official history volumes give different numbers for a Regular infantry division in 1914.” (-Richard A. Rinaldi: Order of Battle of the British Army 1914, p. 432)

Related

German Infantry Division 1914/18 – Visualization – Organization & Structure

Infographic – German Infantry Division 1914/1918 – Organization, Structure & Numbers

Sources

Books

Richard A. Rinaldi: Order of Battle of the British Army 1914 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Bruce Gudmundsson: The British Expeditionary Force 1914-15 (amazon.com affiliate link)

amazon.com amazon.co.uk amazon.ca amazon.de

Disclaimer amazon.com

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

Disclaimer amazon.co.uk

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

Nafziger Collection

British Army WW1 – Organization (Wikipedia)

Infographic – German Infantry Division 1914/1918 – Organization, Structure & Numbers


infographic_german_infantry_division_1914_1918

German Infantry Division 1914/1918 Organization & Structure- 1,049px × 2,499px

Video

German Infantry Division 1914/18 – Visualization – Organization & Structure

Sources

Stachelbeck, Christian: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (amazon.de affiliate link)

amazon.com amazon.de

German Infantry Division 1914/18 – Visualization – Organization & Structure

Infographic – German Infantry Division 1914/1918 – Organization & Structure

infographic_german_infantry_division_1914_1918

German Infantry Division 1914/1918 Organization & Structure- 1,049px × 2,499px

Intro – Basic Numbers of 1914 Division

In 1914 a German infantry division consisted of about 18000 men. The division was equipped with 4600 horses. 24 heavy Machine guns and 72 light field guns. (Source: Stachelbeck: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (S. 120) – amazon.de affiliate link)

Organization of 1914 Division

Now in terms of organization and structure, a German Infantry division in 1914 consisted of 2 Infantry brigades, which themselves consisted of 2 Infantry regiments each, which consisted of themselves of 3 infantry battalions and 1 MG Company. Furthermore, the division had one artillery brigade, which consisted of 2 artillery regiments, which consisted of 2 artillery battalions each. Additionally in some cases there were also cavalry, engineer and medical units attached.

Infantry Company in 1914

This structure is quite abstract, so to get a better grasp on it in terms of men, let’s get one level lower. Each Infantry battalion consisted of 4 infantry companies. Since a division had 12 infantry battalions there was a total of 48 infantry companies. Such a company itself consisted of 150 men in peacetime, yet was increased to 270 during wartime. This meant that around 13000 (12960) of the 18000 men served in the Infantry companies.

This Layout was soon changed for various reasons. One was to get a more uniform structure, the structure of 2 subunits levels was replaced with a structure of 3 sub-units. This structure of 3 was still the determining in World War 2 infantry divisions. (Note that changing this structure didn’t necessarily lead to a change in total men or equipment, for instance the numbers of guns for a battery was changed from 6 to 4. (S. 123-124))

Changes during the War

There were many other changes throughout the war concerning the division layout, some were to deal with the change in necessities of the war and others about strategy. To note a few changes, there was the addition of a permanent medical company in 1916 and the increase engineer companies throughout the war. But probably the greatest change was in terms of equipment.

Comparison 1914 – 1918

To give you a short impression on how much an early-war Infantry Division was different from a late-war Infantry division, let’s revisit the initial numbers and compare them to a division that was intended for offensive operations in 1918, the so called “Mob-Division” or “Angriffsdivision”.

The early war division had around 18000 men, whereas the late war had 15000 to 16000 men, note that the second number is an estimate by an expert on this topic.
In terms of horses there was a decrease from 4600 to 4300, since the attack divisions received more horses than regular divisions the number of horses in overall decreased to greater extent than this display might suggest.

In terms of light machine guns there was an increase from 0 to 180.

Furthermore, the number of heavy machine guns also increased from 24 to 108.

Whereas in terms of light field guns the number of 72 was halved to 36.

Yet, there was a significant change in other artillery weapons, whereas the early war division relied solely on light field guns the 1918 division had: 12 heavy artillery guns, 18 light mine launchers and 6 medium mine launchers. Note that the mine launcher in German is called “Minenwerfer” meaning literally “mine thrower”, which is the old German name for a mortar.
(Source: Stachelbeck: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (S. 120) – amazon.de affiliate link)

End Note – Visualization of the men to machine gun ratio

As you can clearly see, the number of machine guns increased substantially by more than 10 times from 24 to 288 machine guns, thus several times multiplying the amount of firepower of the division.

To illustrate in 1914 there was one machine gun for every 750 men. Whereas in 1918 there was a machine gun for every 56 men.
The number of artillery pieces in total didn’t change and stayed at 72, but the number of types was increased and thus resulted in a far more versatile artillery force. The heavy artillery provided more firepower and the mortars allowed for short range indirect fire in close coordination with the infantry, thus the overall flexibility and effectiveness of the division was increased without increasing the total number of artillery pieces itself.

Sources

Books

Stachelbeck, Christian: Deutschland Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg (amazon.com link)

amazon.com amazon.de

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Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

Reorganization of the German Army, 1914-1918

Artillery of the Great War

The First German Tank – The A7V Sturmpanzerwagen

Crew Layout of the Sturmpanzerwagen A7V the first German Tank
Crew Layout of the Sturmpanzerwagen A7V the first German Tank – 1,920px × 1,176px

Introduction

The A7V or “Sturmpanzerwagen A7V” was the first German Tank and saw action in the later stages of the First World War. The rather unusual name of the tank was directly derived from a transport department in the war ministry, notably the department 7. (Abteilung 7 Verkehrswesen) (S. 54/2). The A7V was not only the first German tank, it was also the first fully-tracked built vehicle in Germany itself.

In total only 23 were built, 2 of them prototypes, one with a wooden superstructure and one with armor plates. 1 radio variant (S. 76) and 2 production runs with 10 tanks each. Now these low numbers are important to consider if someone makes any assessment about it, because the tank gained a very bad reputation that doesn’t seem to be justified, but more on that later.

Tanks in World War I

Tanks in World War I were quite primitive and a completely new technology. A tank was basically a slowly moving pillbox with guns due to the limits in mobility, reliability, range, doctrine and command capabilities. Tanks were first and foremost an infantry support weapon and even after various technological improvements and years later this was still a common view until the successes of German Panzer Forces in early stages of World War II.

Development

The development of the A7V involved 13 companies and the production 20 due to the complexity of a tank compared to other weapon systems.(S. 14 / 2) The rather fast development of 11 months could only be achieved due to the fact that a large amount of components were already available in the various industries.(S. 15 / 1) The weapons were standard equipment, the armor plates were similar to those used on warships. Yet, the available engines weren’t sufficient in terms of horse power, thus a twin engine plant of production-ready engines was used.

Production

Although the tank was developed quite fast, the overall process of development and production was not straightforward at all. After the initial appearance of Allied tanks on the Battlefield in 1916 the German High Command was convinced of the tank as an important weapon. Yet, this view changed, after the following limited success of the Allied tanks. This restricted the development and production of German tanks and the allocation of resources. Especially since the highest priority was given to submarine warfare. Yet, after the success of British tanks at the Battle of Cambrai in 1917, the German High Command (in end of 1917 (November)) pushed again for the introduction of German tanks. Yet, instead of pouring all resources in the A7V project, many new projects were started that didn’t reach a sufficient production readiness before the end of the war. The change in requirements, resource shortages, changing priorities, shifting interests and the usual bureaucracy delayed ultimately the production of the A7V in significant numbers. (S. 60 & 61) Although it should be noted that even a larger number of these wouldn’t made a difference in the outcome of the war due to the lack of fuel and other crucial resources.

Technical Specifications

Now let’s take a look at some technical specifications:
In this case, I had a great and detailed source co-written by German historians and engineers, which you can clearly see, because the provided the values in millimeters, because everyone knows centimeters or even meters aren’t precise enough when you are German and dealing with the measurements of a 30 ton tank.
The length was 7.35 m (7350 mm) with a width of 3.06 m (3060mm) and height of3.35m (3350 mm). The ground clearance was 0.2 m (200 mm) and a track width of 2.115 m (2115mm). This is especially interesting or crazy, because the tanks were not of identical construction.
It could traverse trenches up to 2 m in width, cross water at a depth of 0.8 m. Climb a vertical obstacle of up to 0.4 m and a climb a slope at 25 degree.
The maximum achieved speed was 16 km / h.
With two fuel tanks each with 250 liters, it had a range of about 30 to 35 km cross country and 60 to 70 km on roads.

Weight of the vehicle with fuel was 16 tons
The weight of the armor was 8.5 tons.
The weapons with ammo made up 3.5 tons.
And the crew with equipment another 2 tons, thus a total weight of 30 tons.
You probably gonna wonder, why you need about 2 tons for the crew and their equipment. Well, that is because the A7V had a crew of just about 16 to 26 men. In comparison a British Mark V tank had about 8 men.

Weapons & Armor

In terms of protection it had a frontal armor of 30 mm, at the side and rear the armor plates had a thickness of 15mm. The top plates were 6mm thick. In comparison the British Mark V had a maximum frontal armor of 16 mm.
The armament consisted of a 57mm Maxim-Nordenfelt gun which was mounted in the front and two 08/15 machine guns for each side and the rear. A large amount of amount of ammo was carried, initially 180 rounds for the 57mm gun, this value was later increased to around 300. The number of MG rounds was about 18 000. Take these values as broad guide lines, because there was a certain lack of standardization, which will be even more apparent when looking at the crew layout. Also note, that the seats are marked read here, because the ammo was stored in those seats.

Crew Layout

According to Uwe Böhm the primary sources provide different values for the total number of crew members ranging from 16 to 26 men. He provides the following base layout:

  • 1 Commander
  • 1 Assistant (Gefechtsordonnanz)
  • 1 Driver
  • 1 Mechanic/technician – trained as a driver (reserve)
  • 1 Mechanic
  • 1 Gun Commander (Geschützführer)
  • 1 Gunner
  • 1 Loader
  • 12 MG Gunners
  • 1-2 Runners
  • 1 Blinker / Signaler
  • 1 Homing Pigeon Handler

Imagine that beast in War Thunder with the Last Man Standing option, it would be almost unkillable if you don’t load any ammo.

Success or Failure – Bad Reputation

The A7V has a very bad reputation, the question is if this reputation is justified at all. Now, it had many problems and was quite unreliable, but to make a reasonable evaluation of it’s quality we need to take into account several factors.

1) The A7V was the first tank and also the first fully-tracked vehicle that Germany ever produced.
2) The development process was performed in 11 months. (S. 144)
3) At the start of the development there were no captured enemy tanks available.
4) The production environment in Germany at the end of the war was everything but suitable to manufacture a complex and new design, due to a lack of qualified labor and resource shortages.
5) There was a total of 23 A7Vs including prototypes, in comparison both the French and British built more than 1000 tanks each.

Calling the A7V a failure is as justified as calling the Tiger I a great tank in both instances only a few factors are considered. When it comes to the Tiger a lot of people completely ignore the reliability issues, yet it was designed and produced under better circumstances and far greater numbers than the A7V. The design flaws of the Tiger are hard to justify, because it was far from being the first German tank and many of the flaws weren’t addressed successfully in its considerable longer operational history than that of the A7V.
Thus, my conclusion is that the A7V wasn’t a bad tank design as many people claim.

Yet, it’s suitability for the realities of the Western Front and how it performed on the battlefield will be part of a future video, which will allow a more holistic assessment of its overall effectiveness as a military vehicle.

Sources

Books

Sturmpanzerwagen A7V – Vom Urpanzer zum Kampfpanzer Leopard 2 – Ein Beitrag zur Militär- und Technikgeschichte

amazon.de (affiliate link)

amazon.com (affiliate link)

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-Disclaimer-
Amazon Associates Program: “Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.”

Amazon Partner (amazon.de): “Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu Amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden kann.”

Websites

Tank Museum Video on the A7V

Beware of Wikipedia articles, I corrected some values already, but I guess there may still some errors left:
Wikipedia article on the A7V (beware of errors)

Tanks Encyclopedia – Mark V

Notes on Accuracy & “Methodology”

I used the tank encylclopdia articles for references values on the Mark V tanks armour. Due to several errors in the Wikipedia articles of the A7V, encountered and corrected several errors on the A7V values.