Month: June 2016

Operation Barbarossa – The Major Errors and Blunders

Intro

Well, this is basically a follow-up video on my second video that I originally wanted to release quite early on, well more than 50 videos, 800 000 views and 20 000 subscribers later, here we go. The major error and blunders of the Hitler and his generals during the planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa.

Hitler & His Generals

First off, some words about Hitler and his generals, Barbarossa was basically their baby, thus both of them were responsible, yet similar to some parents, they constantly blamed the other side for all the shortcomings of their little brat in the Russian steppe. I think, both of them had their fair share of bad decision, hence none of them is above scrutiny.#

Structure

Since, we have dealt with the initial family issues, time to get started, I structured this video into two parts, the first part covers all the planning and preparation errors, the second part deals with errors during the ongoing military operations.

Preparation and Planning

Now, a large amount of errors occurred during the preparation and planning of Barbarossa.

Military Intelligence – or lack thereof

First off, Military Intelligence. The German intelligence service for the Eastern Front “Fremde Heere Ost”, which means “Foreign Armies East” had major problems providing substantial insights about the Red Army and this was a well-known problem at the time.

In general, military intelligence faces two key challenges, first the gathering of information and second the analysis of this information. Due to the closed nature of the Soviet Union the means to gather information were severely inflicted, yet according to a recent phd thesis the German efforts in analysis were sometimes also limited. For instance from 1923 to 1933 the German Armed Forces and Red Army cooperated quite closely, thus many German officers were trained in the Soviet Union. [REFER to HOI 4 – national focus] Yet, there is no evidence that suggests that those officers were ever questioned systematically. (Pahl: Fremde Heere Ost: S. 68)

Ultimately the state of the intelligence was quite shocking, it was assumed that the Soviet Army had around 150 divisions, but only about 100 could be accounted for. (S. 75) In terms of reserves it was assumed that the Soviets would have enough manpower to raise another 50 divisions, but would lack the equipment to arm them properly, thus the total of 150 divisions was the assumption for German planning. (S. 69) Now according to the American Military Historian David Glantz, the Soviets raised more than 800 division equivalent. that is more than 16 times what the Germans assumed.
(around 821 division equivalents of those were 73 tank and 32 mechanized (Glantz: Soviet-German War – Myths and Realities: p. 17 ))

The lack of information was widely known, here is an excerpt of the handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces from January 1941, which was printed around 2000 times:
“At the top of the entire Armed Forces probably is the Chairman of the Defence Committee (about comparable to our OKW) the council of People’s Commissars, currently Marshal Voroshilov, who in 1940 was people’s commissar for defense until the summer. He probably has a general staff at his disposal. Details are unknown ”
“An der Spitze der gesamten Kriegswehrmacht steht wahrscheinlich der Vorsitzende des Verteidigungs-Komitees (etwa unserem OKW vergleichbar) beim Rate der Volkskommissare, z. Zt. Marschall Woroschilow, der bis zum Sommer 1940 Volkskommissar für die Verteidigung war. Ihm steht wahrscheinlich ein Wehrmachts-Generalstab zur Seite. Einzelheiten sind unbekannt.” (zitiert nach Pahl S. 77)
So basically, the German military intelligence didn’t even know the upper echelons of the Soviet Military Forces and completely underestimated the Soviets ability in raising and outfit new divisions. This lack of information was still a problem in 1942 for Case Blue, which ended in the disaster at Stalingrad. Even at that time of the war the German military intelligence also assumed that the Red Army was mostly beaten and had limited abilities to regenerate itself. (Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Strategische Grundlagen und historische Bedeutung”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 659)

Logistics

Now, the next one, probably everyone was expecting anyway, logistics. The main problem was that the German army had not a sufficient amount of trucks nor trains even before the beginning of Barbarossa. The main problem with a lack of transport capacity is that the existing vehicles are used more often and sometimes in ways they are not fully suited, this results in additional wear and tear, which ultimately puts further strain on the supply lines. Basically, any major shortcomings in a logistical system can develop into a death spiral.
There was already a lack of train engines and rail cars in Germany even before the attack on the Soviet Union was started, this was clearly noted by the chief for transportation in January 1941. Operation Barbarossa would thus make the situation even more problematic. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 116)
Another major problem was that the rail gauge in the Soviet Union was different to that in continental Europe, thus the reconstruction of all railways was necessary, even if they could be captured in operational conditions. Originally it was assumed that enough Russian rail engines and cars would be captured and a reconstruction wouldn’t have been necessary, but this clearly was not the case. Although the German High Command ordered its troops to advance along the Soviet railway lines they didn’t comply this allowed the Soviet forces to evacuate or destroy a large amount of equipment. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 126) As a result, there was both a lack of construction workers and trains. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 121-126)
In order to cope with the lack of trains, trucks were used, yet due to the dire conditions of the roads this lead to severe breakdowns. In the beginning of August 1941 the Army Group Center – Heeresgruppe Mitte had lost 25 % and the Heeresgruppe North (Army Group North) had lost 39 % of its supply truck capacity. (Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 127) Furthermore, you need to consider that the situation got even worse during the muddy season, when it was nearly impossible for even tracked vehicles to move properly. Additionally, the Soviets had established special local services to keep the railways in operational conditions during the Winter, such a service needed to be reestablished by the Germans.(Kreidler: Eisenbahnen: S. 124)
In short the transport capabilities of German in both trains and trucks was insufficient and it was known prior to the conflict. There was not enough personnel to handle the rail transportations and there was a lack of construction crews to improve the state of the destroyed rail way infrastructure. At least the lack in crews could have been planned more properly without too much strain on the German industry or manpower.

Missing Grand Strategy – No Two Front War

Now, next is the missing Grand Strategy. One major difference between the Axis and Allied forces was the lack in cooperation and Grand Strategy. The Western Allied Forces, which had a far higher amount of resources, industry and manpower available settled on the Grand Strategy “Germany First”. Now the Axis forces, which had limited economic capabilities couldn’t agree on a grand strategy and usually not even on smaller agreements.

Let’s take a closer look, although in 1936 Germany and Empire of Japan signed, the anti-comintern pact, this pact was lacking and furthermore the German Historian Martin Bernd states:
“Lack of substance and great propaganda should be characteristic for all subsequent German-Japanese agreements.” .(Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.124)
“Mangelende Substanz und großartige Propaganda sollten für alle weiteren deutsch-japanischen Abmachungen charakteristisch werden.” (Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.124)

When looking at the Axis and the Soviet Union relations the situation was quite ironic. In 1939 the Germans were basically partially cooperating with the Soviet Union due to their cooperation against Poland, the large trade agreements and establishment of sphere of influences. Whereas the Japanese were engaged in serious border conflicts with the Soviet Union, most notably the Battles of Khalkhin Gol.

Those border conflicts went badly for the Japanese Army and after the defeats in 1939, the Japanese choose the so-called “South Strategy”, which was favored by the Japanese Navy. The Japanese discussed a German proposal for a military alliance against the Soviet Union several times and it was rejected again and again between January and August 1939. The Japanese Navy was against a military alliance against the Soviet Union and also against Western Forces. The Japanese didn’t want to commit to any alliance. As a result Germany and the Soviet Union established the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was seen as treachery by the Japanese and they recalled their ambassador. (Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.124-125)
After the successes of the German Army in Poland and the Battle of France, the Japanese tried to reestablish contacts with Germany. Yet, Hitler would have preferred a compromise with the British, only after the British declined all German proposals and the Battle of Britain was lost, the Germans reacted positively towards the Japanese.

Yet, the following negotiations didn’t establish a proper unified strategy, thus the military alliance was basically a weak defensive pact, which became even more apparent when in April 1941 signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. After the start of Barbarossa, only the German and Japanese ambassador wanted a Japanese attack immediately. Yet, both the German and Japanese leadership were against an involvement of the Japanese in the attack against the Soviet Union. (Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg S.125-129)

Missing on improving the anti-tank capabilities

Now, since we covered diplomatic aspect, let’s take a look at a more tactical matter. During Operation Barbarossa the German forces several times came in contact with tanks what were almost invincible to most of their weaponry, most notably these tanks were the T-34, the KV-1 and the KV-2. The German Army should have been better prepared for these encounters and they shouldn’t have come as surprises.

Although the Soviets didn’t use the T-34 during the Winter War against the Finns, they used prototypes of KV-1 and the similar heavy tank the SMK in the conflict. (Source: Zaloga, Steven J. : KV-1 & 2 Heavy Tanks 1939-1945,.p. 7) Thus, the German High Command should have been aware that the Russian might have quite strong tanks. Furthermore, German Panzer tropps themselves had severe problems destroying the French Char B-1 bis in the Battle of France several times, most notably at the Battle of Stonne, where one French Tank managed to destroy 13 German ones. Yet, despite the Finnish and German experience, there were no proper actions taken to prepare the German divisions to deal with heavy or well-armored tanks.

Only Planning for a Short Campaign – The Core Problem

Now, let’s take a look at the biggest blunders of all and also the one that was foundation for most of the others. Namely, the wrong assumption that Operation Barbarossa would be a short campaign like the Invasion of Poland and the Battle of France. It should be noted that Operation Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign, unlike the Battle of France.
The military planning was mostly done by the German general staff and Hitler gave them free reign. He reviewed the plans in December 1940 and agreed mostly, but he had a different view of the situation. He wanted to focus on the North and South to capture resources and deny the enemy its ability to regenerate forces. Whereas the head of the General Staff “Generaloberst Halder” wanted to achieve a decisive blow by attacking Moscow. There was a consent about the first part of the plan, which was the aimed destruction of the Red Army in the Western parts of the Soviet Union. Yet, both parties didn’t settle for how the second part should be executed. As a result up to this day people are still arguing about the decision of Hitler in Summer 1941 to push towards Kiew instead towards Moscow. A problem that was already apparent in December 1940. (Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 631)

Now, the assumption of a short campaign was rooted in the over-confidence of the German Army in its capabilities after the tremendous victory against its Arch-Enemy France in 1940, furthermore the underestimation of the Red Army and the stability of the Soviet Union. After all, many assumed that the Red Army would be beaten early on and the Soviet Union collapse. Most people in 1940 were thinking in World War 1 terms, when the Russian Empire collapsed and the French Army was one of the most formidable in the world. This view was not limited to Germans, many non-Axis politicians and military professionals also assumed that Barbarossa would be a quick victory for the German Army. Although the Germans assumed that the Red Army would break, they acknowledged the fierceness of the Russian soldiers even before the attack, yet the clearly underestimated the Soviet leadership, cohesion and capabilities to learn from their experience in the Winter War and early defeats during Barbarossa.

Not an error – War of Annihilation/Extermination – “Vernichtungskrieg”

Now, the next point is not an error in my opinion, but some people often note it as one. Operation Barbarossa was not just a military operation, it was also a “Vernichtungskrieg” or “War of Annihilation”. I don’t consider it a blunder, because it was an inherent part of pre-requisites of the operation itself, yet I think it is paramount that it is mentioned. In this case, I go with a short quote from the Historian Jürgen Förster:

“Operation ‘Barbarossa’ shows clearly – unlike any other campaign – the indissoluble connection of ideological and power-political goals of the social-darwinistic values of the Third Reich.” (Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 639)

“Im Unternehmen ‘Barbarossa’ wird wie in keinem anderen Feldzug die unauflösbare Verbindung von ideologischen und machtpolitischen Zielen mit den sozialdwarinistischen Wertvorstellungen des Dritten Reiches deutlich.” (Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 639)

To put it as simple and clear as possible for the Nazis the Jews were the real enemy and their annihilation as also the direct or indirect annihilation of many civilians in the occupied territories was part of the plan. Thus it is hard to argue that the various deadly operations and harsh treatment against non-combatants in the occupied area were blunders, because on the Eastern Front the distinction between pure military operations and ideological warfare is extremely difficult or even impossible. Thus calling this issue a blunder would mean to not fully acknowledge the inherent genocidal aspects of Operation Barbarossa.

Errors during the Execution

Now, let’s move to the next section the errors during the execution. The mistakes that occurred during the Operation itself are less, but also crucial and they seem to be in line with the chronic optimism that plagued the mistakes in the planning stage.

Not an error – Kiew instead of Moscow

Now, first I will address an error that was mainly a preparation error, namely the dissenting opinions if Moscow should be the primary target or not. This decision is highly debated, because Generaloberst Guderian wo is considered as the founder of the German Panzer Force, noted in his memoirs that he wanted to go for Moscow instead of Kiew, but Hitler insisted on conquering the Ukraine. Once I also assumed that Guderian was right, but most military historians for quite some time think otherwise and I changed my opinion.
Now, the military historian David Glantz notes the following about an early attack against Moscow:

“Had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in September, Army Group Center would have had to penetrate deep Soviet defenses manned by a force that had not squandered its strength in fruitless offensives against German positions east of Smolensk.” (Glantz: Myth & Realities: p. 24)

“Furthermore, Army Group Center would have launched its offensive with a force of more than 600,000 men threatening its ever-extending right flank and, in the best reckoning, would have reached the gates of Moscow after mid-October just as the fall rainy season was beginning.” (Glantz: Myth & Realities: p. 24)

Additionally, there around 10 reserve armies ready that were used for the Soviet counter-attack in Winter 1941, these units would have been ready for the defense of Moscow while at the same time the troops spared at Kiew would have threatened the over-extended flank of the Germans.(Glantz: Myth & Realities: p. 24)

Not adapting nor acknowledging the resilience of the Soviet troops and repeatedly assuming they were beaten
As mentioned in preparation part the German High Command and Hitler completely underestimated the Soviet Army and Soviet Union to equip and raise new troops. As Halder noted:
“The Russian colossus…has been underestimated by us…whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another dozen.” -Franz Halder

Nevertheless, there was no change in strategy nor did it prevent the Germans to repeatedly assume that the Soviet Army was beaten. (S. 91-92: Source Hitlers Krieg im Osten Ueberschär)

Not adapting after the reserves were used up early on and major exhaustion

That mistake goes hand in hand with the next one, namely the lack of adapting to the losses the German Army sustained in a short amount of time. Within a few weeks the German losses were so high that the reserves were all used up, nevertheless the German Army pushed on and overextended its lines and furthermore overstretched logistics. In overall the number of reserves were too low, the German Army only had about 400 000 trained reserves in June 1941. By the end of November 1941 these troops were all used up and furthermore, there was a lack of 340 000 men even after using local volunteers for non-combat roles and many other optimizations. Yet, the number alone is already staggering enough, another problem is that of those more than 740 000 casualties many were experienced and well trained combat troops that got replaced by inexperienced men. (End of November 1941: 340k Fehlstellen (Hillebrand: Das Heer: S. 19)) Additionally, these men had been fighting for months, they were exhausted and badly supplied. Which brings us to the next point.

Not listening to front commanders

Although, the dire situation was apparent to the front commanders. In Mid November(13th) 1941 at the conference at Orsha near Smolensk the Chief of Staff of German Army High Command met with the leadership of the Army Groups, Armies and Panzer Armies. All front commanders argued against continuing offensive operations, yet, Hitler and Halder insisted on continuing to push towards Moscow. In early December 1941 the Germans finally halted its advance, one day later the Soviets started their counter-offensive. (Castano, Vincent: The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth versus Fiction p. 27-29) At this point, Operation Barbarossa, judged by its initial goals of achieving a quick victory against the Soviet Union, had cleared failed.

Summary – The Underlying and Continuous Problems

To conclude, the main underlying problems for the German mistakes were basically, a strong optimism that prevented any worst-case scenario planning, an underestimation of the enemy and an overestimation of the Germans Army capabilities. Ironically or unsurprisingly, depending on your view on the German leadership, this didn’t really change in 1942. Although in 1942 unlike to 1941, there was no real alternative, thus these underlying problems turned into severe habits that continued til the end of the Second World War and maybe even beyond, because quite many people still to this day claim that the mud and the Winter stopped the Wehrmacht and not the Red Army.

Sources

Books & Articles

Pahl, Magnus: Fremde Heere Ost

Ueberschär, Gerd (Hrsg.): Hitlers Krieg im Osten

Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 626-640

Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Strategische Grundlagen und historische Bedeutung”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 652-666

Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg – Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 120-137

Kreidler, Eugen: Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges

Glantz: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay

Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart: Das Heer – Band 3 – 1941-1945

Castano, Vincent: The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth versus Fiction

Zaloga, Steven J. : KV-1 & 2 Heavy Tanks 1939-1945

David M. Glantz Jonathan M. House: When Titans Clashed – HOW THE RED ARMY STOPPED HITLER

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Online Resources

Wikiquote – Franz Halder

Battles of Khalkin Gol

Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

HOI 4 – Historical Infantry Division Layouts – Early War #Hearts of Iron

Intro

In this video I will cover several Infantry Division Layouts from World War II. Although certain parts of the content is tailored for Hearts of Iron players most of the information is military history, only the initial remarks are mostly Hearts of Iron and methodology specific, so just skip ahead on click on the annotation on the screen.

Hearts of Iron IV

Be aware though that these layouts are aimed at being as historical as possible within the Hearts of Iron division builder, thus I am not sure how well they work in HOI 4. This is first and foremost a military history channel, thus I am mainly here for the historical flavor, the German accent and not to support your ambitions in conquering the world, at least for now.
I won’t use the division builder, since I generally try to avoid any copyrighted material and it would actually make everything more complicated and time-consuming. Yet, you will get in one shot the proposed HOI 4 setup and the historical setup together, so you can basically copy it and also learn a bit about the real units too. On the homepage, you can find the proper high resolution screenshots of these layouts see the link on screen and in the description.

Methodology & Accuracy

Some words about methodology and accuracy, if you want to discuss these layout listen to this section very carefully and if you can’t wait for the layouts, you might skip ahead by clicking the button on screen.

Well, figuring out the correct layouts can be quite complicated. Here are a few reason why. You need to be aware that some divisions – especially tank divisions – changed quite considerably throughout the war, thus I usually provide a date for each layout. Another major pitfall is the naming, what one country called a regiment was sometimes something different in another, thus this it was not as straightforward as it seems. Also there were even quite some difference within each country, e.g., a German tank division in 1939 had way more tanks than in 1941, or an US Army Battalion in 1942 was usually larger than an US Army Battalion after the reorganization of September 1943, well, except for two divisions of sixteen armored divisions.
Hence my approach was as follows, it consisted of looking at the data in hearts of Iron, checking the historical division layouts then compare these information to equipment and manpower tables to see if the numbers match for different units.

This process revealed quite some interesting information about hearts of Iron too. First I looked at the data of Hearts of Iron, namely how many manpower and equipment each unit had. This confirmed my assumption that the so called support companies are more like support battalions, only the three smallest ones the engineer, AA and artillery company have 300 men, the others have 400 or even 500 men. Whereas companies were usually around 100 to 200 men. Furthermore, the number of artillery guns for an artillery battalion in game is 36, whereas in real life this was the number of three battalions at least for the German and US Army Infantry division. I don’t know if this is an error on behalf of paradox or if an artillery battalion in game actually should represent a regiment or maybe it is for gameplay balancing reasons. For this video I assume that an artillery battalion in game, is also an artillery battalion historically, if this is not the case, just divide the number of proposed artillery battalions by 3 and you should be fine.

The second step was to look at the organization of these units and the third step was to look at the number of equipment tables and compare if it matches the organization, because the organization can sometimes be misleading. As an example. although an US Army infantry division didn’t have a dedicated anti-tank battalion like a German infantry division, but it had 57 anti-tank guns whereas the German division had only a few more with 75, but some these were also part of the recon battalion, so one might argue that the US Army Infantry division should have a dedicated anti-tank unit in-game if the German Infantry division has one or both should have none.
As you can see it is a bit complicated, thus, take all the following information with a grain of salt, because I had to use a wide variety of sources of different quality and level of detail, which is problematic in itself, but additionally the chances for errors increases due the variety and amount of data. To balance this, I usually added a short explanation why or why not I went with the proposed setup and provide the basic data for my reasoning.

German Infantry Division 1940

So, let’s get started, the Allied Grand Strategy in World War II was “Germany First” and it worked out, so let’s begin with a German Infantry Division from 1940.
It consisted of an Engineer Battalion, an Anti-Tank Battalion, a Recon battalion, an artillery regiment, which consisted of a heavy artillery battalion and 3 artillery battalions, additionally a signal battalion and finally 3 infantry regiments each with 3 infantry battalions. Now the division didn’t have a dedicated medical battalion, but it had 2 medical companies, a field hospital and two medical transport columns with almost 700 men in total, thus I would say this qualifies as a medical battalion. Additionally, it also had maintenance and logistics units attached. So this unit was very well equipped, the only unit type it definitely didn’t possess was an anti-aircraft unit, the division used solely heavy machine guns for anti-air defense. Now, the German infantry division had almost 17 000 men, whereas most other divisions have less than 15 000 men, thus my proposed HOI setup would be as follows:

For support units, an engineer, anti-tank, recon, signal and medical unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get an addition of 2 battalions due to the large amount of men in the division and finally 4 artillery battalions.
Note that for all divisions the non-combat units: logistics, medical and maintenance are the most debatable, because in my sources this information is often not included or limited. Furthermore, their functions sometimes were performed by non-divisional units in several armies.

german_infantry_division_1940_hoi4

Source: Buchner, Alex: The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Soviet Rifle Division 1941

I hope you have your Hammer and Sickle ready, next is a Soviet Rifle Division from April 1941.
It consisted of an a signal battalion, a medical battalion, a supply battalion, an Anti-tank Battalion, an anti-aircraft battalion, a Light Artillery Regiment with 2 battalions, a sapper battalion, one Howitzer Regiment with 2 battalions and 1 heavy battalion, a recon battalion and 3 infantry regiments with 3 battalions each. Yeah, this one seems to tick off all boxes. Yet, in total the division had only around 14500 (14454) men.

But let’s take a closer look at the data, now the number of five artillery battalions sound impressive and the firepower is also clearly more than that of the US and German unit. The number of heavy artillery above 150mm is the same, yet whereas the US and German units use 105 mm guns, the Soviets used 122mm howitzers although 4 less, but additionally they had several 76mm howitzers and cannons, which means that the firepower in artillery at least equal if not greater than the German division. Furthermore, the total number of 54 anti-tank guns is lower than the German division, but similar to the US setup.

Based on this data my proposed HOI setup is as follows:
For support units, an engineer, medical, recon, signal and logistical unit. Then the regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions, to these add one anti-tank and one anti-aircraft battalion. Finally, definitely 4 if not 5 artillery battalions.

soviet_infantry_division_1941_hoi4

Source: Sharp, Charles: Soviet Order of Battle World War II – Volume VIII

US Army Infantry Division 1943

Time for a little bit of freedom, so let’s look at the US Army Infantry division layout from July 1943. It consisted of a Medical Battalion, an Engineer battalion, a divisional artillery unit with a heavy artillery battalion and three artillery battalions. And finally 3 infantry regiments each with 3 infantry battalions. In total this division had around 13000 men.
Now, here is the problem the US Army division had a recon unit, a signal company, a quartermaster company and a maintenance company, but all these units had less than 200 men unlike the German units before. Yet, looking at the data I realized that the division in total had 57 anti-tank guns, which was just short of the 75 from the German division that had some in deployed in their recon battalion, hence my proposed HOI setup is as follows:

For support units, an engineer, an optional anti-tank and a field hospital unit. Then the regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions and finally 4 artillery battalions. Now, the German recon unit consisted to large part of cavalry and only a few armored cars, whereas the US unit had halftracks and 13 armored M8 cars, thus only could also argue that a recon unit could be added as an additional support unit.

us_army_infantry_division_1943

Source: Stanton, Shelby: Order of Battle of the US Army in World War II

British Infantry Division 1939

Next up something for those people that love tea, the British Infantry Division in 1939 of the British Expeditionary Force. Now the British unit names were a bit different, they used the names Brigades and Regiments, although those units were usually had the manpower of Regiments and Battalions, I will use the original names, but symbols that are closing in representing their actual strength.

The division consisted of a Division Cavalry Regiment that was mechanized, an Engineer Battalion, a Divisional Artillery Unit that consisted of 3 field artillery regiments and one anti-tank regiment, furthermore a Supply Unit and a medical unit. And finally 3 infantry Brigades each with 3 infantry battalions. In total the division had a bit short of 14000 men.

Based on this information my proposed HOI 4 setup would be:
For support units, an engineer, a medical, a recon, an anti-tank and a logistics unit. Now, although the number of anti-tank guns was only 48, the unit had a large amount of anti-tank rifles and the French provided anti-tank guns for the British divisions, thus an anti-tank unit seem justified. Then the regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions and finally 3 or maybe 4 artillery battalions, because the British division fielded 72 field guns of the 18 and/or 25 pounder type. Furthermore, the unit was quite well motorized and even mechanized with 140 Bren carriers, thus one actually could replace the regular infantry with motorized or mechanized infantry.

british_infantry_division_1939_hoi4

Source: Nafziger (Note: that it lists 147 pieces of the 25mm anti-tank gun, a number that seems completely off and likely is, because it was a French anti-tank gun and I doubt they received so many of them.)

Japanese Infantry Division 1940 Standard B

Now the war situation may not necessarily develop to your advantage, nevertheless let’s look at the Japanese Infantry division Standard B around 1940, note that these division varied to a certain degree.

It consisted of an engineer regiment, a transport regiment, a recon or cavalry regiment, Division medical services, a field artillery regiment with 3 field artillery battalions and three infantry regiments with 3 battalions. Note that these artillery battalions were equipped with 75mm guns, thus having far less firepower than all other nations. Yet, these divisions had a very high amount of manpower, depending on the setup between 18000 to 21000 men, thus even outnumbering the German division by far.

Based on this data my proposed HOI setup is as follows:
For support units, an engineer, a medical, a recon and a logistical unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get probably an additional 6 battalions. Finally, I think one artillery battalion or at most 2 battalions considering the rather weak firepower of the 75mm howitzer in contrast to the equipment of other nations.

japanese_infantry_division_1940_standard_b_hoi4

Source: Rottmann, Gordon: Japanese Army in World War II – Conquest of the Pacific 1941-1942

Italian Infantry Division 1940

Everyone loves Pizza, but I only can offer you one slice, time to look at the Italian Infantry division of 1940.
It consisted of an engineer battalion, a legion of fascist militia that consisted of two battalions, a regiment of artillery with light gun battalion, a light howitzer battalion and a regular howitzer battalion, finally two infantry regiments, which consisted of three battalions each. Yes, only two infantry regiments, this was the so called binary division layout the Italians used. It also had an anti-tank company, but in total just 24 anti-tank guns. In total this division had 13000 men. (In terms of artillery it had 12 guns with 100mm and 24 with 75mm.)
Now, my sources on this one are a bit varied, I have good German source with the overall numbers and high-level organization, but for more detailed information I rely on the Handbook on the Italian Military Forces from 1943, which was created by the US Military Intelligence during the war, so it might not be 100 % accurate, but so far these handbooks are usually quite reliable in terms of unit organizations.

Based on this information my proposed HOI 4 setup would be:
For support units, an engineer unit and with three eyes closed an anti-tank unit. For infantry, we use the 2 times 3 infantry battalions and add an additional 2 battalions, but maybe a third or even fourth, because the total number of men is similar to that of an US Army infantry division, which had way more support units. Finally, I think one or maybe two artillery battalions, because in total there were 24 guns with 75mm and 12 howitzers with 100mm present.

italian_infantry_division_1940_hoi4

Source: Schreiber, Gerhard: S.56-62, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3; Germany and the Second World War – Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939–1942 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Soruce: Handbook on the Italian Military Forces, August 1943, Military Intelligence Service – TME 30-420

French Infantry Division 1940

Well, after some Pizza, who doesn’t want to enjoy a baguette? So, let’s look at a French Infantry division of 1940:
It consisted of a recon group, a field gun regiment with 3 battalions, a howitzer regiment with one heavy howitzer battalion and a regular one, 3 infantry regiments with 3 battalions each. Additionally, there were several anti-tank companies with a total of 58 anti-tank guns and 2 engineer companies, which were originally organized in a battalion but reorganized in 1939.
In total the division had around 17 500 men. But note that in this case my sources are quite sparse and of limited quality.

Hence my proposed HOI 4 layout is as follows:
For support units, an engineer unit, an anti-tank unit and a recon unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get an additional 3 battalions, because the division has more men than the German division and also less support units. For the artillery battalions, I think three are in order, because it had 36 field guns with 75mm, 12 howitzers with 105mm and 12 howitzer with 155mm.
Source: Sumner, Ian; et. al: The French Army: 1939-45

french_infantry_division_1940_hoi4

Source: Nafziger

Polish Infantry Division 1939

So, in case you want to go into space, here is the Polish infantry division organization for 1939. In this case my data is way more limited than with the previous divisions, especially in terms of the support units, so keep a bit more salt ready.

The division consisted an Engineer Battalion, a light artillery regiment consisting of two light artillery battalions and one regular artillery battalion. Yet, it also had a small detachment with bigger guns, but overall it couldn’t compete with the US or German division in this regard. And as usually it had 3 infantry regiments each with 3 infantry battalions. It had several medical units, but I have no numbers, nevertheless I assume it would be sufficient for a medical battalion. Similar to the German division the Polish division has more than other countries with around 16 500 men.

The division had quite many companies attached, like several anti-tank, a bicycle, an MG, and a cavalry company. Thus, one could argue that these units qualify together as a recon and/or anti-tank unit, although the total number of anti-tank guns was only 27 guns, which is less than half of the US Infantry division anti-tank guns. Based on that data my proposed HOI setup is as follows:
For support units, an engineer, a medical, maybe a recon and with two eyes closed an anti-tank unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get two additional battalions, 2 artillery battalions and maybe a third artillery battalion.

polish_infantry_divsion_1939_hoi4

Sources:
Ellis, Johen World War II – A Statistical Survey – The Essential Facts & Figures for All the Combatants, Edition: 1995 reprinted with corrections

Niehorster

Nafziger

Romanian Infantry Division 1941

And the last division layout for this video, the setup of the Romanian Infantry Division of 1941.
It consisted of a recon battalion, an engineer battalion, a field artillery regiment with 2 light battalions and a regular battalion, an artillery regiment with a light field artillery battalion and regular battalion and 3 infantry regiments with 3 infantry battalions each.
Additionally, it had an anti-tank and anti-aircraft company, furthermore each of the regiments had an anti-tank company, but these units were usually not sufficiently equipped. In total it would be around 30 anti-tank guns. About the signal and medical units, my source for the layout on the Romanian units is good, but it doesn’t include any non-combat units. Yet, since the author notes that the communication and many equipment was quite poor, one can assume that there was no state-of-the art signal unit present and the medical services were probably lacking. The division in total was a bit short of 17 000 men, thus it is quite a large force, especially considering the low numbers of additional units. (Source: Axworthy, Mark: Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1945, p. 39-42)

Based on this information my proposed HOI 4 setup would be:
For support units, an engineer, a recon and with two eyes closed an anti-tank unit. The regular 3 times 3 infantry battalions should get probably an additional 3 battalions. Finally, I think two artillery battalions, because in total there were 36 field guns with 75mm and 16 howitzers with 100mm present.

romanian_infantry_division_1941_hoi4

Source: Axworthy, Mark: Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1945

Sources

amazon.com amazon.co.uk amazon.ca amazon.de

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Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

US Army Armored Division – Organization & Structure – World War 2 #Visualization

Intro

In total the United States raised 16 armored division in World War 2. In September 1943 fourteen of those were reorganized, these are sometimes called the „light“ armored divisions, although this name is a bit misleading, because the main difference was in size and not the equipped tanks. So let’s take a closer look. (Source: Stanton, Shelby L.: Order of Battle US Army World War II, p. 15-20)

Numbers

Such a “light” division in total consisted of around:
11 000 men
54 M8 Armored Cars
54 M7 Priest Self-Propelled Artillery
460 2 ½ Trucks,
450 M3 Halftracks
465 .30 cal Machine guns
404 .50 cal Machine guns
30 57mm anti tank guns
77 Light Tanks like the M5A1 Stuart(, which were later on replaced by the M24 Chaffee)
168 Medium M4 Sherman Tanks
18 Medium Tanks with 105 mm Howitzers
30 M32 Tank Recovery Vehicles
449 Jeeps

Organization

The structure of the September 1943 divisions was without regiments, hence the largest sub-unit is the battalion. The division consisted of 1 Signal Company, 3 Tank Battalions, 3 Armored Infantry Battalions, the divisional Artillery consisting of 3 armored field artillery battalions, 1 Mechanized Cavalry Recon Squadron, 1 Armored Division Trains with a Medical Battalion and an Armored Maintenance Battalion. And 1 Armored Engineer Battalion.

Now every of these Tank Battalions consisted of three Medium Tank Companies and One light Tank Company. Let’s take a closer look.
The Medium Tank Company consisted of an HQ section and 3 Medium Tank Platoons. The HQ Section consisted of two M4 Shermans, one M4 with a 105 howitzer and a jeep. Each of the Medium Tank platoons consisted of 5 M4 Shermans.

The Light Company was quite similar. It consisted also of one HQ section and three platoons. The HQ section consisted of two M5A1 Stuart tanks and one jeep. Each Platoon consisted of 5 tanks. Note that from late 1944 onwards the Stuarts were replaced by the M24 Chaffee Light tank. (Source: Stanton, Shelby L.: Order of Battle US Army World War II, p. 19)

Sources

Books

Zaloga, Steven J.: US Armored Divisions, European Theater of Operations, 1944-45 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Stanton, Shelby L.: Order of Battle US Army World War II (amazon.com affiliate link)

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Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

Disclaimer amazon.co.uk

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

M4 Sherman

Italian Forces and Industry in Early World War 2 (1939-1940)

Intro

Prior to World War 2 both Hitler and Mussolini were boasting about their military forces to each other. Mussolini announced in 1934 that he can mobilize 6 Million soldiers, in 1936 he increased the number to 8 million and in 1939 to 12 million. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 54, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3) If those numbers sound a bit off, well, Operation Barbarossa was largest military invasion in history and it was conducted by around 4 million soldiers. Nevertheless, the Italians managed to mobilize around 3 million soldiers, yet these soldiers were basically worse equipped than the Italian troops in World War 1. Quite in contrast to the German and Japanese forces, the Italian forces were not ready for a war against any major force.(Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 54, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

The question is why the Italian Armed Forces were not ready, there are several reasons for this, in general the Italian and Fascists system was quite inefficient. First, the Italy had a limited amount of industries, which weren’t properly prepared for arms production. Second, the allocation of resources and organization was limited, additionally similar to Germany and Japan, Italy also had a severe lack of resources. Third, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain required resources that the Italians couldn’t spare, after all those conflicts dragged on far longer than anticipated. As a result the Italian forces were not ready when the war started in 1939. Mussolini was quite aware of this problem, after all, he insisted on a period of peace during the negotiations of the Pact of Steel – “Stahlpaket” with Germany and didn’t join the war until June 1940 by declaring a war on France. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 54-56, in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Organization before the war

At first, some word about the general organization of Italian Army before the war. Like other countries Italy drew lessons from experiences in Spain and Ethiopia, yet their forces were still in reorganization when the war started and the industry couldn’t match the requirements for the required motorization or even the basic equipment that was needed.

In 1937 the Italian Army restructured its divisions from the common system of tripartite to a bipartite system, the so called “binary” system, where each infantry division only consisted of 2 infantry regiments instead of 3. Something that is also portrayed in Hearts of Iron III and Hearts of Iron IV, as you can see here for the division builder of an Italian division in 1939 and a British division in 1939, but be aware though that the Hearts of Iron IV basic divisions layouts lack artillery regiments, furthermore the so called support companies historically usually were battalions, as you can see here with a basic German infantry division from 1940. Yet, from a game design perspective it makes sense to call them companies, because so you can’t mix them up with your regular battalions when writing about division compositions on the forums. Anyway, if you want to learn more about unit organizations, check out the playlist on my various organization videos.

Now, the intention of the binary system was to make the units more capable for mobile warfare, the units should be easier to command and be more mobile. The lack in manpower should be countered with modern equipment, yet, this was wishful thinking because the Italian industry couldn’t even provide basic equipment in sufficient numbers. On the outside the binary system created more divisions, but basically this was only useful for propaganda and didn’t increase the capabilities of the Italian Army. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S.56-57 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Next up, is a brief look at the Situation in September 1939 and then a more detailed look at the state in June 1940.

Situation in September 1939

Let’s look at the state of the Italian forces in the beginning of the War in September 1939, when Italy was still at peace. In short the Situation of the Italian Armed forces in September 1939 was abysmal. Yet, you need to keep in mind that Italy didn’t enter the war before June 1940.

Army

At first the Army, it had had 67 divisions without the units in Ethiopia, these divisions consisted of
43 Infantry
3 Tank
2 Motorized
3 Fast division
5 Alpini, and
11 other division for special purposes.

Yet, only 16 of these division were completely restructured, furthermore there was a lack of artillery, tanks, transport-vehicles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Even basic supplies like quality food was lacking, so basically the Army had a severe lack of almost everything. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S.58-59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Navy

The Navy was better equipped in terms of basic supplies like food and ammo, but it also lacked anti-aircraft capabilities on its ships and in its bases. Yet, there was severe lack of fuel. Still, in comparison with the other branches the Navy was the best equipped and prepared.

Air Force

The Italian Airforce the “regia aeronautica” also had major problems, there was a vast amount of different aircraft types and additionally the ground crews were of limited quality, this lead to low number of operational aircraft of less than 50 % in September 1939, when only 1190 planes were operational out of 2586. Furthermore, most aircraft were usually underpowered and under-armed. [Something most War Thunder players are highly aware off “Spaghetti guns”.] (Schreiber, Gerhard: S.58-59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)
As a result of that dire state of the Armed forces and the severe lack of ammo, weaponry, fuel, transport capacity and personnel, the ministry for war production in December 1939 advised Mussolini that only an army of 73 division would be feasible instead of the originally planned number of 126. Yet, still the industry wasn’t capable in equipping those units sufficiently til the entry of Italy in into the war in June 1940, but nobody assumed that Italy would enter the war that early. Well, seems like Mussolini had a tendency for premature – declarations. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 58-59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

The Situation in June 1940

Now, after the Italian declaration of war in June 1940 the situation was a bit different, but not much, but let’s take a more detailed view.

Army

First the Army, in June 1940 Italy entered the war with a total of a bit less than 1.7 million soldiers (1 687 950) and a total of 73 divisions..
Whereas in 1915 the Italian army joined the war with more men, it was also an army that had similar quality weapons and equipment like other majors, but in 1940 this was clearly not the case. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 59 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Of the 73 divisions only 19 had the required amount of personnel, equipment,weapons and transport capacity. Another 34 division were operational, but lacked personnel (25 %) and transport capacity. The last 20 divisions lacked more than 50 % personnel, a significant amount of equipment and 50 % of transport capacity. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 59-60 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

The infantry formed the mainstay of the Italian army, but the firepower of an Italian infantry division was according to Gerhard Schreiber only about 25 % of a French Infantry division or around 10 % of a German infantry division. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 61 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3) Now, I don’t know how the author determined those numbers, but here is a direct comparison on the numbers of a Italian and German Infantry division with the intended equipment and personnel:

Comparison between an Italian and German Infantry Division in 1940

Ital. ID (1940) German ID (1940)
449 Officers 518 Officers
614 NCOs 2573 NCOs
11916 Men 13667 Men
12 Heavy howitzers (sFH) 15 cm
6 Heavy infantry support guns 15cm
12 100mm howitzer 36 Light howitzers (lFH) 10,5 cm
24 75mm guns 20 Light infantry support guns 7,5 cm
8 65 mm mountain guns
8 47mm anti-tank gun 75 3,7cm anti-tank guns
8 20mm anti-air guns
30 Mortar 81mm 54 mortar 8,1 cm
126 Mortars 45mm 84 mortar 5cm
80 Heavy machine guns 110 Heavy machine gun
270 Light machine gun 425 Light machine guns
(Source for the German Division: Alex Buchner: Handbuch der Infanterie 1939-1945)

The most important differences here are the low number of NCOs in the Italian division, NCO form the backbone of every army, thus this lack of leadership definitely didn’t improve the overall quality of the division. Furthermore, the biggest Italian gun had 100mm and only 12 were assigned to a division, whereas the Germans had 3 times that and additional 18 guns with 150 mm of caliber. Now, the Italians had a variety of guns ranging from 75mm to 20mm, but almost all in low numbers and of various types this is basically a logistical nightmare with limited firepower, especially in combination with the severe lack of transport capacity and weak industry. Also in terms of infantry support weapons like mortars and machine guns the Germans had an advantage.
Based on that data, I assume the firepower difference was calculated based on how much shell weight each division could deliver for a specified amount of time. At first you can’t spot a 1 to 10 difference, but you need to consider the weight differences of higher caliber guns. Let’s take a look at the weight of a 15 cm howitzer shell, it was about 50 kg whereas the 10,5 cm howitzer could only deliver a shell of around 15 kg. The shell weight and thus the resulting firepower can easily missed, if one looks only at the caliber alone. (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/15_cm_Kanone_16 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/10.5_cm_leFH_18 )

Resource Problems

Yet, this comparison assumes that the division was fully equipped with artillery, but Italy had a severe lack of modern artillery and anti-aircraft guns, it lacked about 15 000 modern artillery guns and the industry could only put out less than 100 per month. This meant that the Italians had a limited amount of modern artillery and since that wasn’t bad enough there was also a lack of ammo. The situation with tanks was not much better and those tanks were also to a large degree simple light tanks of limited combat capabilities. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 61-65 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)
Resource Problem
Furthermore, the Italian industry had a lack of resources, how dire the situation was can be best expressed with some numbers. These are the percentages on the Italian estimate for meeting the requirements of 1940:
Artillery (all types) 6 %
Ammo, small caliber 25 %
Ammo, medium caliber 7 %
Ammo, heavy caliber 10 %
Rifles (Model 1891) 35 %
Machine Guns 10 %
Mortar 81mm 70 %
Ammo, Mortar grenades 81mm 10 %
Planes 42 %
Engines 40 %
Bombs under 1000 kg 40 %

(Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 66 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)
One can assume that Mussolini would get führious from the “insufficient resources” icon popping up all the time, if he would play Hearts of Iron.
One can assume Mussolini would have gone mad from the “insufficient resources” icon popping up all the time, but he was probably already mad already.

Navy

Now, the Italian Navy was by far the strongest part of the Armed Forces. For the Mediterranean the numbers of the Italian fleet were quite considerable: (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 77 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3) Here is a comparison between the Italian, British and French Fleets assigned to the Mediterranean.

Italy UK France
Type Number Tonnage Number Tonnage Number Tonnage
BB 4 117240 5 148350 5 116165
CV 0 0 1 22600 0
CA 7 70000 0 0 7 70000
CL 12 74630 9 51000 7 51723
DD & TP 125 120335 35 48200 57 67250
Submarine 113 88000 12 13000 46 49000

Note that 2 of these 4 Italian battleships weren’t fully operational yet in June 1940. Also, due to the lack of the Italian industry these numbers can be a bit misleading from strategic point of view, because the British had way better capabilities to construct new ships in contrast to the Italians, thus losses on the Italian side had a greater strategic impact. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 75-78 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Furthermore, these numbers don’t represent the quality of the ships, its crews nor other important factors. Nevertheless the Italian ships meet the international standards unlike their army units. Although, there was some major problems. First the lack of air coverage by land based aircraft due to range and insufficient coordination with the air force, of course the aforementioned missing naval air arm was also a major flaw in the Italian Navy structure. Second, the power plants of the ships had limited reliability and there was a general lack of anti-aircraft weapons for the ships and harbors. Third, the lack of a radar on Italian ships had a crucial impact during the Battle of Matapan against the British. The Germans had their own radars, but only after the loss at Matapan informed the Italians about their radar and provided assistance. (Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 75-78 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Air Force

Now, let’s take a brief look at the Air Force. In June 1940 the “regia aeronautica” had 1796 operational planes and 554 non-operational ones (total 2350), thus it clearly had a higher readiness ratio than in September 1939, the total number of planes is actually a little lower than in 1939, this is probably due to the fact that this number doesn’t include training planes. Yet, a major problem was the lack of a proper naval aviation, which is quite problematic for a country that has a quite extensive coastline. Although Italy had some good air frame designs it lacked mostly powerful engines and also its production capabilities were not the best to put it very mildly, well, time for an international comparison. Schreiber writes about the Italian aircraft industry the following:

“Italy basically achieved between 1940 and 1943 an average output per year that was slightly above the British monthly average of produced aircraft in 1943.”

(Translated & cited from the German version of Germany and the Second World War – Volume III)

“Italien erreichte also zwischen 1940 und 1943 im Durchschnitt eine jährliche Fertigungsquote, die etwas über dem lag, was die britische Luftfahrtindustrie 1943 in einem Monat ausstieß.”

(Schreiber, Gerhard: S. 71 , in Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3)

Conclusion

There is a strong tendency to give the Italian soldiers a bad reputation for being cowards and unreliable, which certainly is influenced by the fact that in World War 1 the Italians turned against their former Allies the German and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Nevertheless, in World War 2, Italian soldiers fought as brave as their allies and foes, thus there is no reason for the continuous disrespect about their combat capabilities, which was mostly a result of the poor state of their industry, equipment, weaponry and supply situation.
As said before soldiers deserve our respect, even if we don’t share their side and/or views.

Sources

Books

Germany and the Second World War – Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939–1942 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Buchner, Alex: The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945 (amazon.com affiliate link)

Schreiber, Gerhard: Politische & milititärische Entwicklung im Mittelmeerraum 1939/1940, in: Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 3 (amazon.de affiliate link)

Buchner, Alex: Das Handbuch der deutschen Infanterie 1939-1945; Gliederung – Uniformen, Bewaffnung – Ausrüstung, Einsätze (amazon.de affiliate link)

amazon.com amazon.co.uk amazon.ca amazon.de

Disclaimer amazon.com

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.

Disclaimer amazon.co.uk

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon EU Associates Programme, an affiliate advertising programme designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.co.uk.

Disclaimer amazon.ca

Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon.com.ca, Inc. Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.ca.

Disclaimer amazon.de

Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können.

Online Resources

15 cm Kanone 16

10.5 cm leFH 18

Artillery Combat in the First World War

Intro

World War 1 is often seen as a mindless slaughter fest that saw little tactical innovation nor major methodical advancements. There are many reasons for this ranging from anti-war literature to military writers that were directly affected by the war. And of course the so called “Great War” was overshadowed by its bigger brother the Second World War, which saw the widespread and revolutionary use of tanks, the rise of air power and the end of the battleship. Yet, many of these revolutionary tactics, doctrines and vehicles can be traced back to World War 1. Although in 1914 many tactics and approaches were quite blunt and obsolete, by 1918 a lot of innovations took hold or were fully implemented already. (Steel Wind: p. 1-2 (amazon affiliate link))

Artillery tactics 1914-1918

This video will focus on how the use of Artillery changed throughout the war and cover some of the many major innovations. Artillery tactics changed to a large degree from 1914 to 1918, whereas in 1914 the use of artillery in tactics and techniques had still a strong resemblance to the Napoleonic era, in 1918 the foundations of a modern artillery is clearly recognizable. Although the basic principles of indirect fire, massed fire, counter-battery fire, calibration and meteorological corrections and combined arms were known, they were usually not applied on the field in 1914, yet in 1918 these principles were used consistently and to a large degree by all sides. (Steel Wind: p. 2-3)

The situation prior to the War

Let’s begin, prior to 1914 all sides envisioned a highly mobile war with a strong focus on offensive operations. Furthermore, artillery was mostly seen as a direct fire weapon that would be brought forward with galloping horses at crucial moments and support the attack of the infantry.
Yet, this wasn’t possible at all, because the increase in firepower was enormous, not only from machine guns, but also from regular rifles, because their ranges usually could reach artillery that was using direct fire. Furthermore, the combined fire power of artillery, rifles and machine guns forced the infantry into trenches, but direct fire artillery against trenches doesn’t work. Hence, the traditional artillery used in a direct fire role was suddenly both vulnerable and quite ineffective in the early stages of the war. (Steel Wind: p. 5-6)

The four phases of artillery employment according to J.B.A. Bailey

So let’s take a look at the different phases and challenges the artillery faced during the First World War. The four major phases as described by the British Colonel J.B.A. Bailey are as follows:
Inadequacy (1914), Experimentation and Build-up (1915), Destruction (1916-1917) and finally Neutralization (1917-1918)

Inadequacy (1914)

In the beginning of the war the artillery was mostly an auxiliary arm, it should support the infantry, but there was little training or doctrine available in order to coordinate such efforts. This often led to friendly fire incidents. In terms of coordination of artillery itself, there were major limits too. The highest level for coordination was the division and in some cases it was only at battalion level. (Steel Wind: p. 5-7)

The massing of artillery was still performed like in Napoleons time, a large number of guns was placed next to each other in an area as close to the front as possible. The use of the artillery as a direct fire weapon was still the common approach, although the Russo- Japanese War (1904-1905) already showed that indirect fire was necessary due to the increased firepower of small arms that forced the artillery further behind the front line. Additionally in 1914, there was no real concept nor focus on counter-battery fire, some doctrines even forbade using artillery against enemy artillery. (Steel Wind: p. 5-7)

Due to the focus on mobility and offensive operations prior to the war, field artillery was first and foremost light. As a result these guns were too light to do real damage against field fortifications and trenches. Additionally, they were setup for a low trajectory line of fire and limited range. As Zabecki notes exemplary about the French:

“Prewar French doctrine envisioned using the 75-mm gun to maximum ranges of only 4,500 meters. The gun itself could fire out to 9,000 meters; but to conform to doctrine, the carriage and fire control instruments were constructed for a maximum range of only 6,000 meters.” (Steel Wind: p. 7)

Ammo Problems

The Inadequacy was also a problem in terms of supplies, especially when it came to ammo. All armies had far too less ammo stockpiled. Let’s take a look at the ammo consumption rates of artillery rounds per month from 1866 onward:(Steel Wind: p. 6-8, Table 2.1)

Year War Army Rounds
1866 Austro-Prussian German 20 000
1870 Franco-Prussian German 81 000
1904 Russo-Japanese Russian 87 000
1912 First Balkan Bulgarian 254 000
1914 World War I French 900 000
1916 World War I French 4 500 000
1918 World War I German 8 000 000

As you can clearly see there was a constant increase. Now let’s take a look at the consumption rate in the Great War.
Yet, the national stockpiles and industries weren’t sufficient for this amount of ammo consumption.
The French assumed a consumption of 100 000 rounds per month, but used 900 000 rounds, considering that in the First Balkan war 254 000 rounds were used per month, this number was either dated or didn’t take into account the latest developments. Thus, at beginning of the war in 1914 the French Army had less than 5 million rounds in stock. The Russians had 12 million. The Germans more than 20 million, but they also had more artillery than the French.

Besides the shortage of ammo, there was another problem, the main type of ammo in 1914 was the shrapnel round. A shrapnel round was filled with iron balls that extended in a cone-shaped pattern when it exploded (The Field Artillery – History & Sourcebook p. 48), so in a way it acted like a flying shotgun. It could cover an area of about 25 meters (82 ft) wide and 150 meters (492 ft) long (values for a 75mm gun). Shrapnel was only useful against troops on open ground, because it was quite ineffective against dug in troops and basically useless against fortifications.
The alternative were high explosive shells which killed by tiny steel fragments and air burst. (The Field Artillery – History & Sourcebook p. 48) Furthermore, it allowed to destroy and damage field fortifications and entrenchments, something the shrapnel round was unable to do. Thus, the high explosive (HE) round became the most important round, which at the end of the war was almost as deadly against troops in the open as shrapnel. (Steel Wind: p. 7-9)

Lack of Large Guns and/or Lack of Doctrine for them

Although ammo was a major problem for all nations, when it came to heavier guns like howitzers, there was a clear difference between France, the German and the British Empire. The French fielded an excellent 75mm field gun the M1897, but they assumed it would be able to deal with all targets, thus there was only a very small amount of heavy long-range artillery available. In contrast the Germans took lessons from the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) war and had a larger number of heavy guns, but their doctrine was lacking and thus couldn’t really exploit the numerical superiority in heavy artillery. The British had taken lessons from the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and had a large number of heavier guns, yet the British Expeditionary Force that landed in France 1914 had only a small amount of these heavy guns with them. (Steel Wind: p. 10 -11) Hence, every side had its own far share of limitations, but let’s take a closer look at the numbers.

In 1914 the French had 3840 75 mm guns, but they only had 308 guns with a larger caliber than 75mm. In comparison the Germans in 1914 had 5086 77mm field guns and 2280 larger artillery guns, whereas the British in 1914 had 1608 light guns and 1248 heavy guns in total, but only a small portion in the British Expeditionary Force in France.
By 1918 these numbers changed quite considerably, the French in November 1918 had 4968 field guns and 5128 artillery pieces above 75 mm. Thus, they had more than 10 times the heavy artillery than in 1914. But let’s look at the Germans, in 1918 they fielded 6764 field and guns and 12 286 artillery pieces above 77 mm. Thus still outgunning the French in heavy artillery. Although, if we add the British guns of 1918, with 3242 light guns and 3195 heavy guns in France, the gap in heavy artillery gets smaller but is still significant. (Steel Wind: p. 10 -11)

Experimentation and Build-up (1915)

Now, back to 1915, after the war reached a static stalemate on the Western Front the Armies began to adapt their techniques. The artillery units also faced a major leadership problem, due to the rapid expansion in 1914 and 1915. This was especially true for the French artillery, because many artillery NCOs were transferred to the machine-gun units. (Steel Wind: p. 12-13) Thus, many of the techniques needed to kept simple.

Methods of indirect fire

One of the major changes was to shift to effective indirect fire. Since Napoleon the basic technique was to mass fire, but due the increase in firepower from small arms and machine guns, the artillery needed to be deployed behind the front lines. Hence, the only possibility to mass fire was by using indirect fire. Basically, two approaches for indirect fire were developed and used in the Great War: Observed fire and unobserved fire.

Observed fire

Observed fire as the name suggest needs an artillery observer, he locates the target and communicates the coordinates accordingly, furthermore if necessary information to adjust range or direction is passed on.

There were several disadvantages with this approach:
1) The Observer needs a line of sight to the target.
2) Any adjustment of the firing solution would result in sacrificing any surprise, which allowed troops to either move out of the area or take cover. It should be noted that taking cover considerable lowered the effectiveness of an artillery strike, something that is usually not well portrayed in movies nor computer games. (Steel Wind: p. 13-14)
3) The observer needs a reliable line of communication, which was usually not possibly due to technical limitations and/or battle damage. (The Field Artillery – History & Sourcebook p. 46-47)

Unobserved fire

The alternative to observed fire was unobserved fire, yet it relied on maps and was done without adjustments. This is one of the reasons why modern military maps are usually way more accurate and full of elevation information, but at the beginning of the war that information was usually not available. Another problem was, that since no adjustments were performed the fire would also be incorrect, due to the fact that firing tables were based on standard data, which relied on standard conditions and well, you don’t have standard conditions in real life. Factors like weather, the conditions of the gun tubes and the different quality of ammo lead to inaccurate unobserved fire even if the maps were precise enough. (Steel Wind: p. 12-13) To address these challenges various methods like registration and other techniques were developed during the war to allow for more precise unobserved fire.

Standing & Creeping Barrage

Another area of improvement was the change from Standing Barrages to Creeping Barrages. In the beginning the basic attack pattern was a standing barrage. This meant that the enemy line was shelled for a certain period of time, during that time the defending units often moved away from their defensive position or into secured underground shelters. After the artillery attack ended, the units moved back into position, thus when the infantry began its attack it would usually still face strong opposition from the defending infantry. (Steel Wind: p. 14)

To counter these, the so called creeping barrage was developed, which slowly moved ahead of an infantry attack, first shelling the target area and then moving to the next area. The problem with the creeping barrage is that the attacking infantry had to move through heavily shelled terrain during their advance. (Steel Wind: p. 14) To put it simply, in 1915 the armies developed or consolidated their abilities in indirect fire and basic artillery coordination.

Focus on Destruction (1916-1917)

Now, the time period of 1916 to 1917 saw the artillery becoming “a blunt instrument of the indiscriminate hammering of entire patches of real estate.” (Steel Wind: p. 14)
The main goal during this period was to destroy enemy infantry and enemy fortifications. Additionally, artillery should serve as wire cutter by destroying enemy barb wire through extensive shelling. If you think this might be a quite a loud and expensive way to cut wire, well you might be right:
4 75mm field guns at a range of 2500 meters needed about 600 rounds to sufficiently destroy an area of 25 by 30 meters of barbed wire. Of course the number of shells increased at a range of 7000 meters the amount of rounds doubled to 1200. (Steel Wind: p. 14) Now, destroying barb wire was not some rare objective.
The artillery basically became a tool for almost anything, no matter how suited or unsuited it was. This lead to extensive shelling of enemy positions prior to attacks.

April-June 1917 Field Artillery Journal of the United States Field Artillery Association
Zabecki points out that the April-June 1917 issue of Field Artillery Journal of the United States Field Artillery Association, gives a very good picture of the prevailing doctrine at the time. It summarizes the steps for an attack the following way:

No attack is possible until after an intense and effective artillery preparation, which has for its objects:
(a) To destroy the enemy’s barbed wire;
(b) To disintegrate and destroy enemy’s trenches and dugouts, and to destroy or annihilate their defenders;
(c) To prevent, or at least to interfere with, hostile artillery action;
(d) To prevent the passage of the enemy’s reserves by curtain (barrage) fire; and
(e) To destroy the machine guns wherever they can be located.

(Source)

In short, the artillery should basically do almost everything besides moving into the enemy trenches. Notice that the first objective was destroying the barbed wire, only on the third and fifth objective were the enemy artillery and machine guns. The problem was the success of these artillery attacks was limited, any surprise was lost during the long shelling of the enemy position, during that time the enemy could prepare counter-measures and move troops into positions. Additionally, many troops moved into secured concrete bunkers or left the attacked positions. Even if the barb wire was destroyed, the terrain was usually also hard to traverse for infantry and especially for any artillery or guns that would be needed to support any deeper advancement into the enemy lines. (Steel Wind: p. 15-16)

The limited effectiveness of a long preparation attack can probably best illustrated by taking a look at the British attack at the Somme in June/July 1916. They performed a 7 day preparation attack in which about 1500 (1537) guns fired about 1,6 million shells ( 1 627 824) at the German positions, as reminder the French started the war with about 5 million shells.
After these prolonged and extensive shelling some generals believed that nothing could have survived the bombardment, but after the artillery stopped the Germans moved into positions and the British Army took the largest single-day loss in British History with more than 57 000 (57 470) men wounded, dead or missing. (Steel Wind: p. 16)

I see by your gravestone you were only nineteen
When you joined the great fall-in in Nineteen-Sixteen.
I hoped you died well, and I hoped you died clean,
Or young Willie McBride, was it slow and obscene?

-Green Fields of France / No Man’s Land – Eric Bogle

Neutralization – Suppression (1917-18)

In the final phase of the artillery warfare that started around the winter of 1917 there was a shift towards how artillery was used to support an attack, instead of trying to destroy the enemy troops and fortification it shifted towards neutralizing the enemy, whereas neutralizing in this case means basically suppressing the enemy. The suppression should prevent the enemy from using his weapons effectively, thus the destruction of the enemies troops and equipment was not the primary objective of the artillery attack anymore. (The European Powers in the first World War: p. 74-76; BRITISH ARTILLERY IN WORLD WAR 2 )

The aim was to stun the enemy by a short preparation attack that lasted “only” hours instead of days. To achieve this the Germans used a three phase attacks the first attack was against the communication, command and control, the second phase aimed at the enemy artillery and the third phase was directed against the enemy infantry defending the front. The use of different types of gas shells and different types of artillery for specific targets increased the effectiveness of these attacks. After the successful applications of these techniques on the Eastern Front, they were used also in the German offensives in 1918. Soon all Western Allies adopted the German artillery techniques. (The European Powers in the first World War: p. 74-76)

Generally, the French usually were several step behind the German innovations, quite in contrast to the British, which in certain areas were actually were more advanced than the Germans. (The European Powers in the first World War: p. 75-76) The British seemed to have developed independently to the Germans similar ideas on neutralizing the enemy with the use of gas and other means, although some these principles were not used or delayed due to prejudices of the Commander-in-Chief. Probably most notable is the battle of Cambrai in November 1917, where the British used their artillery in a new way. They use gas and smoke to neutralize the enemy and at the same time achieved surprise by moving the guns at night and proper camouflage. Unlike the Germans the British used large-scale tank attacks and adapted their tactics for supporting tanks accordingly. (Steel Wind: p. 114-116)

Summary / Conclusion

To summarize, the First World War saw an extensive change in the use of artillery, first it was deployed and used almost like in Napoleonic times, yet soon it was forced off the front lines due to overwhelming fire power. This resulted in a switch to indirect fire, which the armies were mostly not adequately equipped nor trained for. After adapting indirect fire, the artillery was seen as a tool for everything from destroying enemy obstacles to annihilating enemy troops, a task that it was not suited for.In the final phase it was deployed and used with a clear focus on its abilities and usefulness against specific targets, which resulted in major success and the establishment of effective principles. These principles to a large degree are still the core of modern day artillery to this day.

SourcesBooks

Zabecki, David T.: Steel Wind – Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery (amazon.com affiliate link)

Zabecki, David T.: Artillery in The European Powers in the First World War (amazon.com affiliate link)

Dastrup, Boyd L.: The field artillery: history and sourcebook (amazon.com affiliate link)

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Online Resources

https://web.archive.org/web/20160322214456/http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/1917/APR_JUN_1917/APR_JUN_1917_FULL_EDITION.pdf

BRITISH ARTILLERY IN WORLD WAR 2 – Fire planning

Marble, Sanders: the Infantry cannot do with a gun less – The Place of the Artillery in the BEF, 1914-1918f

My favorite Version of Green Fields of France by Dropkick Murphys: